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Part I
Introduction
This dissertation presents five papers on the solutions of discrete decision and
distribution problems. Two of them were written together with a coauthor. A
detailed overview on each author’s contribution is given at the beginning of each
paper.
1 Historic perspective on normative economic
theory
Economic theory mainly consists of two major branches. Descriptive theory (or
positive theory) describes the behavior of agents, households, firms, and govern-
ments. Among other things, this can be done by empirical approaches, statistics,
or by analyzing simplified economic models. In contrast, normative economic
theory describes how agents, households, firms, and governments should behave.
This dissertation contributes to one major topic in normative theory, distribu-
tion theory. That is, we analyze different situations in which agents bargain
over a particular worth. For each specific problem, specific information on the
bargaining power, the claims, and the feasible payoff vectors must be taken into
consideration. The common goal to all the problems is the determination of a
fair solution. Then, the results can be used by legislative or judicial powers to
solve the distribution problems.
1.1 How to divide an estate - bankruptcy problems
One of the first traditional and most simple distribution problems can be found
in the Babylonian Talmud from around 200 AD. Here, in the Mishnah, tractate
(chapter) Ketubot, the following distribution problem is described. After the
bankruptcy of its former owner, an estate is distributed among three debtors.
These debtors claim 100, 200, and 300, respectively. Unfortunately, the worth to
be distributed is lower than the aggregated claims of the debtors. These facts
can be formalized by the following model.1 The set of players is given by a finite
set N . The distributed worth (the estate) is given by E > 0. Each player has a
claim on this worth, ci > 0, i ∈ N , but the overall claims exceed the worth;∑
i∈N
ci > E.
A solution for this class of problems proposes which specific distribution should
be chosen. Each solution Ψ assigns a vector of real numbers and is a function of
the player set, the players’ claims, and the worth which is to be distributed. The
1This model is introduced in O’Neill (1982).
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Talmud proposes three particular distributions:
Ψ({1, 2, 3}, (100, 200, 300), 100) =
(
100
3
,
100
3
,
100
3
)
,
Ψ({1, 2, 3}, (100, 200, 300), 200) = (50, 75, 75) , and
Ψ({1, 2, 3}, (100, 200, 300), 300) = (50, 100, 150) .
This is not a solution in the sense of the definition above. However, one may
think about generalizing these distributions, as scientists did for nearly 1.800
years. The basic approach is to formulate properties that a good solution should
fulfill. For bankruptcy problems, clearly, the whole estate should be distributed,
which is called efficiency. A second property states that no player should obtain
more than her/his claims and no player should obtain negative payoffs. A third
natural property is that if a player’s claims is as high as that of another player,
both players’ payoffs should coincide. This is called Equal Treatment of Equals
or Symmetry. These are the most basic properties that are also applied to many
other topics in normative economic theory. Depending on additional properties
different solutions can occur.2 Finally, a solution, replicating the payoffs of the
Talmud, was discovered by Robert Aumann and Michael Maschler in 1985.3 Their
proposed solution is now known as the Talmud rule. For any i ∈ N its payoffs
are given by
Ti (N, (ci)i∈N , E) =
{
min
{
ci
2
λ
}
if
∑
i∈N ci ≤ E2
max
{
ci
ci−µλ
}
if
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E2 ,
where λ and µ are s.t. ∑
i∈N
Ti(N, (ci)i∈N , E) = E.
1.2 How to divide seats within parliaments - apportion-
ment problems
A second class of distribution problems is called apportionment problems. It
bases on the question how to convert population shares or voting results into
parliament seats. Again, we consider a simple example. A country has three par-
ties whose number of votes are 2.520, 6.020, and 9.460. The parliament consists
of 10 representatives. The question arises how to convert the voting results into
seats within the parliament. We can calculate the parties’ relative claims on the
seats within the parliament, that is the quotient of the achieved votes and the
overall votes. These are given by
Party 1: 2.520
18.000
· 10 = 126
90
= 1.4
Party 2: 6.020
18.000
· 10 = 301
90
≈ 3.34, and
Party 3: 9.460
18.000
· 10 = 473
90
≈ 5.26.
2A detailed overview on the most prominent solutions can be found in Herrero and Villar
(2001).
3Aumann and Maschler (1985)
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However, this distribution is not feasible as parliament seats are not arbitrarily
divisible. Thus, payoff vectors for apportionment problems must be integer vec-
tors and may consist of several payoff vectors, e.g. if the numbers of votes of two
parties are equal. The theory of apportionment goes back to the founding of the
United States of America.4 Several founding fathers proposed compositions of
the first House of Representatives. In 1792, Alexander Hamilton introduced an
apportionment method based upon the populations of the states. He proposes
distributing the integer parts of the relative claim on the house. As this does not
distribute all seats, one seat is allocated to the states with the largest fractional
remainders.5 In our example, within the first step, the parties obtain 1, 3, resp.
5 seats within the parliament. As there is one seat left, this seat is distributed to
the party with the largest fractional remainder. Thus the Hamilton solution leads
to the apportionment (2, 3, 5). In the same year, Hamilton’s main rival Thomas
Jefferson proposed another apportionment method. His solution also uses the rel-
ative claims on the house. In contrast to Hamilton’s solution, the relative claims
are scaled such that the integer parts of the resulting numbers add up to the
house size.6 Applied to the example, note that
540
473
·
(
126
90
,
301
90
,
473
90
)
=
(
756
473
,
1.806
473
, 6
)
,where
756
473
< 2,
1.806
473
< 4.
Thus, the integer parts of these scaled relative claims add up to the overall worth
of 10, implying the payoff vector (1, 3, 6). President George Washington, marking
the first presidential veto in the US, rejected the Hamilton bill while accepting the
Jefferson proposal. Washington’s argumentation followed an axiomatic approach7
as, according to the constitution of the United States, a proportionality condition
is necessary.8 The Hamilton solution does not comply with this concept, while the
Jefferson solution fulfills it. Over the years several other apportionment rules were
introduced. Especially important are the solutions proposed by Daniel Webster
9 and by Joseph A. Hill and Edward V.Huntington (1921). Like the Jefferson
method, the Webster method scales the relative claims. But unlike using the
integer parts, Webster proposes to choose the scalar such that ordinary rounding
the scaled relative claims leads to an efficient distribution. For our example, note
4A detailed overview on apportionment problems and their solutions can be found in Balinski
and Young (2010).
5The text of the bill can be found in Hamilton (1966), p. 226-230.
6Ford (1904)
7Additionally, this argumentation benefited Washington’s home state Virginia
8The Constitution of the US, article I, section 2 states: “Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers, ...”
9Webster and Everett (1903, p. 121)
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that
495
473
·
(
126
90
,
301
90
,
473
90
)
=
(
693
473
, 3.5, 5.5
)
,where
693
473
< 1.5.
The Webster method uses the (ordinary) rounded integers of these scaled relative
claims. Hence, players 2 and 3 are tied for an additional seat, implying the
apportionments (1, 3, 6) and (1, 4, 5). The Huntington-Hill method uses a similar
approach, but replaces ordinary rounding with another rounding scheme. Instead
of rounding up or down at the fixed limit of x.5, Huntington-Hill’s limits are
given by the geometric means of the corresponding integers. For our example,
the relevant geometric means are
√
1 · 2 ≈ 1.41,√
3 · 4 ≈ 3.46,√
5 · 6 ≈ 5.48.
Hence, scaling the relative clams leads to
90 · √2
126
·
(
126
90
,
301
90
,
473
90
)
=
(√
2,
301 · √2
126
,
473 · √2
126
)
,where
301 · √2
126
<
√
3 · 4,
473 · √2
126
<
√
5 · 6.
Thus, this method again leads to (2, 3, 5). From an objective point of view, the
Webster solution has many desirable properties, e.g., it favours neither smaller
nor larger states. In contrast, the Huntington-Hill method prefers small states.10
From a federal perspective11, this is often considered a desirable condition; thus,
the United States has used the Huntington-Hill rule since 1940. Before 1940,
the Webster apportionment was, more or less, used for congressional apportion-
ment.12 In Europe, the Jefferson method was reinvented by Victor D’Hondt in
1878. The Webster method was reinvented as the method of Sainte-Lague¨.13 At
the German Bundestag, the Hamilton method was applied from 1989 until 2009,
while the Webster method has been used since 2009. For German state elections,
some states use the Jefferson method, while most states have chosen the Webster
method.14 The representation of the factions in the Bundestag Committees are
distributed according to the Webster method. If the government coalition does
not keep the majority within the committee, the Jefferson method is applied.
10According to Balinski and Young (2010, p.128), per capita, small states’ number of repre-
sentatives is 3.5% higher than those of large states.
11Also consider the countries’ representatives per capita within the European Parliament.
12https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/apportionment
/apportionment legislation 1890 - present.html, accessed August 26th, 2015.
13Sainte-Lague¨ (1910)
14An overview can be found on http://www.wahlrecht.de/verfahren/, accessed August 26th,
2015.
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1.3 The Road to the Shapley solution
This dissertation mostly deals with questions originating from cooperative game
theory. According to Maschler, Solan and Zamir (2013), “game theory is the
name given to the methodology of using mathematical tools to model and an-
alyze situations of interactive decision making”. Thus, game theory deals with
multiple players, their strategies, and the resulting payoffs or utilities. Histori-
cally, it dates back to the works of Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1838)and Joseph
Bertrand (1883) who analyzed oligopolies with quantity competition (Cournot)
and price competition (Bertrand). Both authors used an equilibrium concept
which was later formalized by John Nash Jr. (1951) as the Nash equilibrium, one
of the central achievements of game theory. The formal introduction of game the-
ory as a research discipline is the result of John Neumann. His paper on min-max
strategies in zero-sum games 15 and his book (written together with Oscar Mor-
genstern) “Games and Economic Behaviour”16 represent the founding of game
theory and provided the theoretical foundation for a large number of authors.
Neumann and Morgenstern’s research focusses on the players’ strategies and
the resulting payoffs/utilities. Each player acts in her/his own interest, thus this
branch is called noncooperative game theory.
The theory of cooperative games does not consider strategies or actions. In-
stead it studies the distribution of the worth that occurs if we assume that all
agents cooperate. A simple example for this class of games is the gloves game.
Assume a group of three agents consists of two agents with a left-hand glove and
a third agent with a right-hand glove. The players can sell a pair of gloves for
a market prize of 1. The question arises how to divide this worth among the
three players. Clearly, as there is only one right-hand glove, the third player’s
payoff should be higher than the other two players’ payoffs. A first solution to
cooperative games is proposed in the seminal paper of Nash Jr. (1950) . Nash
proposes a distribution algorithm, later called the Nash bargaining solution, and
he also shows that this solution is the unique solution that fulfills four more or
less convincing axioms.17
A similarly significant paper and the main foundation of this dissertation is
the paper of Lloyd Shapley (1953). It presents an axiomatic solution for those
distribution situations in which the cooperation benefit of every subset of players
is known and each can be measured with a real number. This information is
represented by the coalition function. Additionally, the cooperation benefit must
be arbitrarily sharable among the players. Thus, these games are denoted as
games with transferable utility, shortly TU-games. The gloves game is such a
game. Consider the player set {1, 2, 3} and the coalition function that assigns for
any S ⊆ N the worths
v (S) =
{
0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1, S = {1, 2} ,
1 if S = {1, 3} , S = {2, 3} , S = {1, 2, 3} .
This function models the fact that any coalition (subset of players) that owns a
15Neumann (1928)
16Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)
17Usually, as formulated by Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), a not completely convincing
axiom is the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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left-hand glove and a right-hand glove can sell the pair of gloves, while all other
coalitions do not.
Shapley presents three simple axioms that uniquely define a solution formula.
This formula only takes into account the players’ contributions (to subsets of
the remaining players). We illustrate the solution algorithm for the above gloves
game. Assume that the players enter successively an empty room (by a random
order). Each entering player obtains the difference she/he makes according to
the coalition function (her/his contribution). E.g., for the order 1 2 3, player 1 is
the first player to enter the room. Her contribution is given by v({1}) − v(∅) =
0. Secondly, player 2 enters the room. Because player 1 and player 2 each
have a left-hand glove, they do not benefit of cooperation. Thus, player 2’s
contribution is 0, as well. Thirdly, player 3 enters the room and a full pair of
gloves is present(v({1, 2, 3}) = 1). Thus, her contribution is 1. Other orders
result in the following payoffs:
order payoff player 1 payoff player 2 payoff player 3
1 2 3 0-0 0-0 1-0
1 3 2 0-0 0-0 1-0
2 1 3 0-0 0-0 1-0
2 3 1 0-0 0-0 1-0
3 1 2 1-0 0-0 0-0
3 2 1 0-0 1-0 0-0
Table 1: Marginal contributions within the gloves game
Shapley assumed that the orders are equally probable. Thus, the Shapley
payoffs are the mean of each column. Thus, the presented distribution problem
is solved by the payoff vector
(
1
6
, 1
6
, 2
3
)
.
1.4 Important Properties of the Shapley solution
Within the fourth and fifth paper of this dissertation, we assume that the Shapley
solution is the only reasonable solution for games with transferable utility. Besides
its intuitive solution algorithm, the Shapley solution’s importance results from
several other beautiful properties. Another famous solution concept, the Core,
supports the Shapley value’s importance. The Core, proposed by Donald Gillies
(1959), defines a set of acceptable payoff vectors for any game with transferable
utility. The vectors are selected by two intuitive properties. Firstly, any vector x
within the Core has to be efficient. Analytically speaking we demand∑
i∈N
xi = v (N) .
Secondly, for any subset of players within N , the sum of the subset’s Core payoffs
should be at least as high as the subset’s worth according to the TU-game. That
is, we demand
for all S ⊆ N :
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v (S) .
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This second property implies that cooperation does not hurt any subset of players.
In cases of an empty Core, there is some subset of players that is better off
if its players do not cooperate with the remaining players. For these games,
cooperation among all players is not preferable. For many other games the Core
is not unique and therefore it is not very useful for the solution of distribution
problems. In these cases, additional restrictions have to be formulated. For
a large class of games, called convex games, these restrictions can lead to the
Shapley payoffs. That is, the Shapley payoffs often lie within the Core. For an
illustration, consider the simple TU-game with N = {1, 2} and
w(S) =
{
0 if S 6= {1, 2} ,
1 if S = {1, 2} . .
The Core simply restricts the acceptable payoffs to those nonnegative vectors that
sum up to 1. From all these alternatives, the Shapley solution picks the vector
(0.5, 0.5). However for the gloves game with three players, the Shapley payoffs
do not lie in the Core. Any element of the core x ∈ R3 has to fulfill the following
(in-)equalities:
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0 = v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}),
x1 + x3 ≥ 1 = v({1, 3}),
x1 + x2 ≥ 1 = v({1, 2}), and
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 = v({1, 2, 3}).
The first three rows prevent that coalitions obtain less than their worth according
to the coalition function. The fourth row guarantees efficient payoff vectors. The
unique vector that satisfies these (in-)equalities, is the vector (0, 0, 1). That is, for
this problem, the Core extremely benefits the player with the scarce right-hand
glove. In comparison, many game theoretists prefer the Shapley payoffs
(
1
6
, 1
6
, 2
3
)
.
A third major points towards the Shapley solution is the wealth of axiomatiza-
tions of the solution. Shapley used one axiom, called additivity, that is quite
technical. Thus, although accepting the Shapley formula, many game theorists
have not been completely satisfied by the original axiomatization. By replacing
the additivity axiom, several authors have proposed more intuitive axiomatiza-
tions of the Shapley value. Roger Myerson (1977) replaces the additivity axiom
with an axiom that captures the idea of equal benefits or gains of cooperation.
Myerson’s Balanced Contributions axiom demands that for every pair of players,
if one player leaves the game, the other player’s lose is as high as the first player’s
lose assuming the roles are reversed. Reconsidering the gloves-game, we write v−i
for the game v without the player i. Then, Balanced Contributions demands for
any solution ϕ
ϕ1(N, v)− ϕ1(N\{2}, v−2) = ϕ2(N, v)− ϕ2(N\{1}, v−1),
ϕ1(N, v)− ϕ1(N\{3}, v−3) = ϕ3(N, v)− ϕ3(N\{1}, v−1), and
ϕ2(N, v)− ϕ2(N\{3}, v−3) = ϕ3(N, v)− ϕ3(N\{2}, v−2).
These equations hold as
ϕ(N, v) =
(
1
6
,
1
6
,
2
3
)
and
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ϕ1(N\{2}, v−2) = ϕ3(N\{2}, v−2) = 1
2
,
ϕ1(N\{3}, v−3) = ϕ2(N\{3}, v−3) = 1
2
, and
ϕ2(N\{1}, v−1) = ϕ3(N\{1}, v−1) = 0.
Peyton Young (1985) introduces the principle of marginality. It demands that
the solution of a game with transferable utility should only depend on the contri-
butions of a player (to subsets of the remaining players). Thus, the contributions
of the other players and other variables should play no role. Consider the game
w′ given by N = {1, 2} and
w′(S) =

0 if S = ∅ or S = {1},
1 if S = {2},
2 if S = {1, 2}.
Player 1’s contribution to the empty set is 0 − 0, while the contribution to the
set S = {2} is 2 − 1. These are the same contributions as in the game (N, v).
Thus, Marginality demands that player 1’s payoffs in w and w′ are equal. The
Shapley solution fulfills this property, as the payoffs are 0.5 in both games. A
third important alternative axiomatization is presented by Young Chun (1989).
He proposes the axiom of Coalitional Strategic Equivalence. It demands that
the payoff of a player should not change if the coalition function’s worths of a
set of other players increases with same rate (in absolute terms). Reconsider the
three-player gloves game (N, v) and the game (N, v′) given by
v′ (S) =

0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1,
1 if S = {1, 3} , S = {2, 3} , S = {1, 2} ,
2 if S = {1, 2, 3} .
The game v′ can be derived by increasing v’s worth within coalition function by
1, whenever the coalition contains the set S = {1, 2}. Thus, Coalitional Strategic
Equivalence demands that player 3’s payoff in v and v′ should coincide. For the
game v, this holds as player 3’s Shapley payoffs are 2
3
in both games.
1.5 Games with cooperation structures
A second branch regarding the Shapley value deals with imperfect communication
channels. Additionally to the original assumptions of Shapley we may demand
that, in order to cooperate, players must be able to communicate. Here, the
acquaintance with other players may be established directly or indirectly. Di-
rect acquaintance refers to players that know each other. In contrast, indirect
acquaintance means that the players merely know each other through a set of
mediators. Then, the game (with cooperation structure) is modeled by a game
with transferable utility and an undirected graph. A link of the graph represents
a direct communication possibility between two players. The payoff of a player
may depend on the productivity measured in the coalition function and the set of
links/connections to other players. For illustration, again, we consider two simple
11
examples. Let there be three players, i.e. N = {1, 2, 3} and the coalition function
v is given by
v (S) =

0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1, {2, 3} ,
1 if S = {1, 3} , S = {1, 2} ,
2 if S = {1, 2, 3} .
We enrich this game with transferable utility with two different cooperation
structures. The first structure is given by L1 = {{1, 2}}, the second one is
L2 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}. That is, within L1, players 1 and 2 know each other, but
they do not know the third player. Thus, players 1 and 2 can cooperate only
and their cooperation benefit is 1. The worth v(N) = 2 is not relevant for this
problem as communication between all players cannot be established. Within L2
all players can cooperate. But for cooperation among N , the players 1 and 3 need
player 2 for establishing the indirect acquaintance. Famous solutions for this class
of games are the Myerson value, the Position value, the Hamiache value, and the
graph-χ value. The Myerson (1977) value is the application of the Shapley value
to a particular game with transferable utility that respects both the original game
and the graph. Consider the two games with cooperation structures (N, v, L1)
and (N, v, L2) from above. For any of these games, the TU-game and the graph
together define an induced coalition function vL1 resp. vL2 . These induced games
specify which cooperation worths (given by the coalition function) can be realized
by the available links. For the two games, we obtain
vL1 (S) =
{
0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1, S = {1, 3} , S = {2, 3} ,
1 if S = {1, 2} , S = {1, 2, 3} and
vL2 (S) =

0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1, S = {1, 3} , S = {2, 3},
1 if S = {1, 2} ,
2 if S = {1, 2, 3} .
We select vL1 ({1, 2, 3}) and vL2 ({1, 3}) for illustration. vL1 ({1, 2, 3}) = 1 be-
cause imperfect communication prevents v(N) = 2. Only players 1 and 2 can
communicate, while player 3 contributes neither links nor cooperation benefits.
For the same reasons we have vL2 ({1, 3}) = 0. Players 1 and 3 can only commu-
nicate, if player 2 and her links join the two players. For given induced coalition
functions, the Myerson payoffs µ are defined as the Shapley payoffs of the induced
games. That is, we obtain
µ (N, v, L1) = Sh
(
N, vL1
)
=
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)
,
µ (N, v, L2) = Sh
(
N, vL2
)
=
(
5
6
,
5
6
,
1
3
)
.
As we can see, nonrealized bargaining benefits do matter for the payoffs. Player
3 does not obtain a positive payoff within
(
N, vL1
)
. Another important solution
is called the Position value, introduced in Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992). While
the Myerson value directly measures the cooperation potential of the players, the
Position value measures the cooperation potential of the links of the graph. On
the subsets of L1 resp. L2 we define the link game that measures the cooperation
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benefits if certain links can be used. For (N, v, L1) we define the link game by
v′ (L′) =
{
0 if L′ = ∅,
1 if L′ = {1, 2} .
That is, within (N, v, L1), if the link {1, 2} is available, the worth of 1 can be
created. For (N, v, L2) the link game is given by
v′′ (L′) =

0 if L′ = ∅, L′ = {2, 3},
1 if L′ = {1, 2} ,
2 if L′ = L2.
The Position value’s payoffs are then determined by half of the Shapley payoffs
of all the players’ links. In our examples, the links’ Shapley payoffs are
Sh{1,2}({{1, 2}}, v′) = 1 resp.
Sh{1,2}(L2, v′′) =
3
2
Sh{2,3}(L2, v′′) =
1
2
.
Thus, the Position value’s payoffs are given by
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
resp.
(
3
4
, 1, 1
4
)
. For L1 the
payoffs coincide with the Myerson payoffs, while for L2 the graph’s central player,
player 2, obtains a larger share. A third solution, the Hamiache (1999) value, uses
a consistency axiom that connects the payoffs of different games. It demands that
the payoffs should be in line with payoffs of reduced games. To determine the
solutions one has to solve a fix-point-problem that becomes the more difficult the
more links and players are present. For our simple examples, Hamiache’s proposes
the same payoffs as the Position value. In general however, the solutions do not
coincide.18 The Hamiache solution’s payoffs improve players with important links
even more than the Position value. As the consistency principle pertains to the
more important concepts within this dissertation, we would like to point to an
overview of several other applications of the consistency principle that can be
found in Thomson (1990). Last but not least, there is another important value
for games with cooperation structures: the graph-χ value, introduced in Casajus
(2009a). While all other values measure the productivity potentials of the players
that are linked (directly or indirectly), non-realized links with a high production
potential (according to the coalition function) might also influence the payoff
structure. That is, a player with high potential may establish links in the future,
without using mediators. This threat might increase the player’s payoff in the
present. Non-realized links that influence the realized payoffs are called outside
options and play an important role for the graph-χ value. Again, we illustrate
the general principles with the help of the introduced games. Within the graph
L1, players 1 and 3 have outside-options. They could achieve a cooperation
benefit of 1. As they are not linked, this worth is not relevant for the former
18For four players, the game w given by w(N) = 1 and w(S) = 0, S 6= N and the graph L3 =
{{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}, the Position value proposes the payoffs ( 16 , 13 , 13 , 16) while the Hamiache
value proposes
(
1
8 ,
3
8 ,
3
8 ,
1
8
)
.
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three solutions. For the solution we have to construct each component’s outside-
option graph. This includes the component’s links in the graph and adds all links
between players within the component and players outside of the component. As
we can see, for L1, all outside-option graphs are the full graph. The graph-χ
value uses the Myerson payoffs of the game with the outside-option graphs. For
the graph L1 we obtain the Myerson payoffs (that now coincide with the Shapley
payoffs)
(
1, 1
2
, 1
2
)
. The final step comprises the adjusting of the players’s payoffs
such that the sum of payoffs within each component coincide with the worth
according to the coalition function. Adjusting results in the graph-χ payoffs(
3
4
, 1
4
, 0
)
. In comparison to the Myerson payoffs
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
we see that the graph-χ
solution benefits player 1 because she could generate worths with player 3. The
game v together with the graph L2 does not have outside options as the players
are linked via player 2. Thus, the outside-option graph coincides with L2. Thus,
the graph-χ payoffs coincide with the Myerson payoffs
(
5
6
, 5
6
, 1
3
)
.
2 First modification of TU-games:
Exogenous payments
This dissertation consists of two groups of themes. The first one, consisting of
three papers, enriches the class of cooperative games with exogenous players.
Within games of transferable utility, payoffs are determined by the cooperation
potentials of the players. We may imagine cooperation situations that involve
parties who are paid a fixed wage, called exogenous players. In return, these ex-
ogenous players transfer their cooperation benefits to the remaining players. This
situation may involve cooperations between firms and a lawyer or buyers and sell-
ers matched by a real-estate agent. In addition to her/his usual contributions to
other subsets, a non-exogenous player may now use the contributions of all the
subsets including her/him and the exogenous players. Wiese (2012b) introduces
this framework for games with transferable utility. A solution to this class of
problems is given by a particular distribution of the remaining worth (after sub-
tracting the wages) to all other players. Wiese’s paper presents a Shapley-like
solution and an axiomatization that reflects this situation. Most importantly,
the introduced solution is consistent. In other words, if the wages are equal to
the Shapley payoffs, the non-exogenous players also obtain the Shapley payoffs.
Again we illustrate the mechanics of the solution with an example. Consider
N = {1, 2, 3} and a game v given by
v (S) =

0 if S = ∅, |S| = 1, S = {1, 2}
1 if S = {1, 3} ,
2 if S = {2, 3} ,
4 if S = N.
Player 3 acts as a mediator by increasing the worths of coalitions consisting of
player 1 or player 2. The Shapley payoffs of the game are
(
5
6
, 4
3
, 11
6
)
. Now assume
player 3 obtains a fixed wage pi3 of 2. Any coalition of the other players is able
to use player 3’s cooperation benefits. By using an axiomatic approach, Wiese
proposes payoffs that base upon the Shapley payoffs. The Shapley payoffs are
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modified by the difference of the orginal exogenous players’ Shapley payoffs and
the sum of their wages. Thus, for the example, as the exogenous player’s wage
is 1
6
higher than her Shapley payoffs, the other players payoff is reduced by half
of this difference. This approach results in the payoff vector
(
3
4
, 5
4
, 2
)
. The first
paper within this dissertation presents a different approach for this setting. If
the exogenous players’ worth is transferred to any set of nonexogenous players,
we can imagine a new coalition function that models this idea. With regard to
the example, we construct a new game ({1, 2}, v′) where v′ is given by
v′ (S) =

0 if S = ∅,
1− 2 if S = {1} ,
2− 2 if S = {2} ,
4− 2 if S = {1, 2} .
Now, any nonempty coalition implicitly assumes that player 3 is present. That
is, the worth v′({1}) results from the worth v({1, 3}), but as player 1 uses the
potential of player 3, her wage has to be paid. We present a set of axioms that
also recommend applying the Shapley solution to this new game. Thus, the rec-
ommended distribution for the game with an exogenous payoff is the payoff vector(
1
2
, 3
2
, 2
)
. In the paper, we extend this basic framework. If the exogenous players’
payoffs are fixed, they may lack motivation, as their payoffs are independent of the
other players’ bargaining outcome. Thus, the non-exogenous players may benefit
less from employing exogenous players and using their cooperation benefits. The
paper presents this extended framework, desirable properties of solutions, and a
solution for this class of games. The solution also allows an increase in effort
for the exogenous players. Nevertheless, if we interpret results, we stick to effort
losses. Most of the literature supports this assumption. By comparing exogenous
players with civil servants, we can rely on a rich literature on the question whether
public agents with a fixed wage work as hard as agents in similar private sectors.
Buelens and Van den Broeck (2007, p. 67) present data that strongly supports
the thesis that “Compared to private sector employees, public sector employees
report fewer working hours and less willingness to exert considerable effort on be-
half of the organization.” They do not assert that the cause of this phenomenon
is that civil servants are lazy; civil servants’ lower working hours are a positive
decision, as these agents prefer different work rhythms. The first paper within
this dissertation establishes the pay-and-use value (PU value for short). For a
given set of exogenous players and given wages it proposes a distribution of the
remaining payoffs among the nonexogenous players. For this solution we provide
an axiomatization, resembling Shapley’s axiomatization. The axiomatization dif-
fers in the efficiency property as effort losses can lead to a smaller distributable
worth. The second paper contributes to the topic of the size of government. We
model the government as a set of exogenous players. In comparison to the first
paper, we do not fix this set of exogenous players. Instead we adress the question
which set of exogenous players should be chosen. Our approach is to determine
the optimal set by also applying the (Nash-) Kaneko (1980) product. Within
this setting we assume a decreased effort on the part of the exogenous players
which is also proposed in the literature.19 A second major result of the paper
19Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005)
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is the introduction of a new stability concept, resembling that of Hart and Kurz
(1983). Within their paper, a small group of players can block a particular payoff.
We cannot imagine this for a problem on the size of government. We propose a
democratic stability concept. That is, a payoff is democratically stable, if there is
no other payoff vector that increases the payoffs for more than half of the players.
The minority players may or may not benefit of the government. The third paper
applies the theory of exogenous players to games with cooperation structures.
Players may employ exogenous players because they want to use their connec-
tions and their cooperation potentials. In practice, e.g., a real-estate agent may
know a certain buyer for a real-estate or a company may employ a lawyer to find
a compromise with another negotiating party. In these examples, the payoff of
the mediator does not depend on the cooperation benefits. Instead, the mediator
is paid a fixed wage. This framework generalizes the results of Wiese (2012a)
that combines exogenous payment and coalition structures.20 Within the paper,
we present two solutions for the class of games called XP-CO games. The first
one generalizes the Myerson value. Most importantly, for a pair of non-exogenous
players within the same component, the loss of a player, if the other player leaves
the game, is equal for both players. The second solution relates to the graph-χ
value. If all the players are indirectly linked within the initial graph, outside
options do not matter. Otherwise, if the initial graph is not connected, outside
options may imply that the linked players do not gain or lose in the same way.
One of the players may have several outside options that improve her/his payoff
within the new cooperation structure. Particularly, this should hold, if there are
exogenous players. The bargaining power of a seller, and thus the payoff of a
player, should increase if the mediator knows many potential buyers of a real-
estate while only one seller is known. An axiomatization is presented for both
the XP-Myerson value and the XP-graph-χ value.
3 Second Modification of TU-games:
Games with indivisible goods
The fourth and fifth paper deal with another research question. Games with
transferable utility typically assume that the distributed good is arbitrarily di-
visible among the players. Thus, solutions like the Shapley value may not be
applicable to problems where the distributed good is only partly divisible. A
proper solution to this kind of problem must provide integer vectors. Solutions
for games with transferable utility may only function as a point of reference for
integer solutions. Consider the game with N = {A,B,C} and the coalition func-
tion v given by
v (S) =

0 if S = ∅,
1 if S = {B}, S = {C}
3 if S = {A}, S = {B,C}
4 if S = {A,B}, S = {A,C}
6 if S = N
20Here, the game with transferable utility is enriched with a partition structure. A player is
linked to any other player within a component.
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The players must distribute these six units. The Shapley value proposes the pay-
offs (3, 1.5, 1.5), but the distributed good cannot be split. Thus, usual solutions
to TU-games must be modified. There are only few papers on this topic. For
instance Azamkhuzhaev (1991) and Azamkhuzhaev (1994) determine the neces-
sary conditions such that the Core of a special class of games is nonempty. We
propose an approach using solutions to apportionment problems. We interpret
the payoffs of a solution to games with transferable utility as the fair claim on
the units of the indivisible good. Thus, in the example, the payoffs (3, 1.5, 1.5)
represent the claims. In a second stage, the claims together with a particular
apportionment method determine the particular distribution of the worth. For
our example, independent of a particular apportionment method, the integer so-
lutions should clearly be (3, 2, 1) and (3, 1, 2). Multiple vectors are necessary, as,
like in the previous papers, equals are treated equally. Because player A’s payoff
already is an integer, this payoff should not change. The remaining payoff of 3 is
distributed to the remaining two players such that one player obtains 1 and the
other player obtains a payoff of 2.
For the fourth paper, we propose a solution that resembles a quite intuitive
approach for integer distribution. Let us assume a certain solution to games with
transferable utility, but it is not feasible due to indivisibility. Then a suitable
distribution may be given by those efficient integer vectors being closest possible
to the TU-solution. Using the framework of apportionment problems, we show
that the application of the Hamilton solution yields these vectors. Additionally,
we use the Shapley value as the solution to games with transferable utility, repre-
senting the First-Best solution for the distribution scheme. We present a simple
axiomatization for the Hamilton-Shapley solution that, however, inherits some
of the major disadvantages of the Hamilton solution. Even if the TU-payoffs
increase proportionally for all the players, there may be a player whose integer
payoff decreases. In apportionment literature, this is known as the population
paradox.21
The fifth paper provides a solution that captures this property since it is
closely related to the Webster solution of apportionment problems. As a minor
result we show that the monotonicity axiom, together with some usual properties,
heavily restricts the set of acceptable integer solutions. Any acceptable solution
is given by some sort of rounding of the First-Best solution to TU-games. An
axiomatization of the Webster-Shapley solution is then provided by adding the
axiom of Near-Quota. This axiom describes that the Webster solutions is as
close as possible to the Shapley payoffs among all the solutions that do not suffer
from the population paradox. As a consequence, there may be integer games that
provide a Shapley payoff of 10.8, while the Webster-Shapley payoff is 12. However,
this paradox occurs less often than the Alabama paradox of the Hamilton-Shapley
solution.22
21Consider Bradberry (1992) for an overview on possible paradoxes within apportionment
solutions.
22Consider Balinski and Young (2010, p. 81).
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Part II
Games with exogenous payments
4 The pay-and-use value
This paper was written together with Harald Wiese (Leipzig University). The
results presented in this paper follow a joint idea that includes the applied paper
in the next section. Harald Wiese proposed the presented axioms (including the
idea of applying the multilinear extension) and the axiomatization. I simplified
the proof of the main theorem 13 and rewrote most of section 4.2. I also clarified
the definition of a t-game in definition 6 as well remark 7 and added the lemma
1 and theorem 14. The formulations within the introduction and the conclusions
were shared work.
4.1 Introduction
Most economies are mixed economies, with a private sector and a public sector.
There are many reasons, good ones and bad ones, for the use of civil servants
working in the public sector. In most economies, civil servants are also employed
in sectors alongside, or instead, of private firms (e.g., in education, transport,
energy, and water supply) although exclusively private activity may well be more
productive. In general, the services provided by the public sector benefit some
private actors more than others while all of them pay taxes which, by definition,
do not need to be in line with the benefit obtained. Thus, we have in mind a
situation in which some players (exogenous players) receive exogenous payments.
The other players (endogenous players) can use the productive services of the
exogenous player, but contribute equally to the exogenous payments.
Consider a player set N together with the strict subset X ⊂ N of exogenous
players and with the given payments pi to these exogenous players. The tuple
(X, pi) is called the exogenous vector. In particular, we modify one of the most
famous concepts of cooperative game theory, the Shapley (1953) value, so as to
incorporate (X, pi). The new value is called the pay-and-use Shapley value.
Productivity has two meanings in our paper. First of all, some players are
more productive than others according to the coalition function. Second, if players
who are more or less productive in the first sense are exogenous, their productivity
may be enhanced or reduced in line with some common effort parameter - For
example, civil servants may be less productive than private ones.
In the next section, we provide some basic definitions and notations for coali-
tional games. In particular, we present the Harsanyi dividends as well as the
Shapley value. In section 4.3 we introduce the effort parameter for games with,
and without, exogenous players . The pay-and-use value is axiomatized in section
4.4. Finally, section 4.5 concludes the paper.
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4.2 Cooperative game theory and the Shapley value
A game with transferable utility (abbreviated as TU-game) is a pair (N, v) (often
abbreviated as v) where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set and v a function 2N → R
such that v (∅) = 0. The set of all games on N is a real vector space denoted by
V (N). A payoff vector y for N is an element of RN or a function N → R. By yS
for S ⊆ N we mean ∑i∈S yi. For notational convenience, we often write i rather
than {i}. The cardinality of coalitions S or N are denoted by s or n, respectively.
Player i ∈ N is a dummy player (in game v) if for all K containing i we find
v (S) = v (S \ i) + v (i) .
Player i ∈ N is a null player (in game v) if he is a dummy player and v (i) = 0
holds.
Two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric (in game v) if for all coalitions S
obeying i /∈ S and j /∈ S we have
v (S ∪ i) = v (S ∪ j) .
Permutations (rules of order, rank orders) ρ on S = {1, 2, ..., s} are written
as (ρ1, ..., ρs)where ρ1 is the first player in the order, ρ2 the second player etc.
Formally, rank orders on S are bijective functions S → S. The set of all rank
orders on S is denoted by RO (S). For every i ∈ S there exists a j (i) ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}
such that ρj(i) = i. Then, we define Si (ρ) :=
{
ρ1, ..., ρj(i)
}
. Thus, Ki (ρ) is the set
of players up to and including player i (for a given rank order ρ). Let B ⊆ Rn.
We define ρ (B) by
{
z ∈ Rn : ∃y ∈ B with zi=yρ(i) for all i ∈ N
}
.
The Shapley value makes use of marginal contributions (in the respective
game) of players. For any coalition S ⊆ N and any player i ∈ S ⊆ N we define
MCSi (v) := v (S)− v (S \ i) .
Formally, a value on N is a function V (N)→ RN . TheShapley (1953) value
is denoted by Sh (N, v) or Sh (v) for v ∈ V (N) and it is given by
Shi (N, v) =
1
n!
∑
ρ∈RO(N)
MC
Ki(ρ)
i (v) , i ∈ N.
Player i’s Shapley value is the average of his marginal contributions for all rank
orders on N.
For any nonempty coalition T ⊆ N, uT (S) = 1, S ⊇ T ; 0 otherwise, defines a
game, called a unanimity game. For every v ∈ V (N), let
hv : 2
N → R
S 7→ hv (S) =
∑
T∈2S
(−1)s−t v (T ) .
hv is called the Harsanyi dividend
23 and v can be uniquely written as a linear
combination of unanimity games:
23They are introduced in Harsanyi (1963).
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v (S) =
∑
T⊆S
hv (T )
=
∑
T∈2N\{∅}
hv (T )uT (S) , S ⊆ N. (1)
It is easy to see that the Harsanyi dividend is a linear function on V (N), i.e.,
for any S ⊆ N and any we have α, β ∈ R
hαv′+βv′′ (S) = αhv′ (S) + βhv′′ (S) . (2)
The Harsanyi dividends of a TU-game can be used to characterize symmetric
players and null players.
Lemma 1 A player i ∈ N is a null player in (N, v) iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i} we
have
hv (S ∪ {i}) = 0.
Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v) iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j} we have
hv (S ∪ {i}) = hv (S ∪ {j}) .
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
4.3 Games with exogenous players
In this section, we first assume an effort parameter t = 1 where there are no
differences in effort between exogenous and endogenous players.
Definition 2 A game with exogenous players is a tuple (N, v,X, pi) where
• (N, v) is a game,
• X is a proper subset of N , and
• pi = (pii)i∈X is a vector specifying an exogenous payoff for every member of
X.
X is called the set of exogenous players and (X, pi) is called the exogenous
vector.
This setting is introduced in Wiese (2012b). X ⊂ N , where ⊂ means strict
inclusion, is chosen as we will impose efficiency later.
On the basis of (v,X, pi), we define a mixed game with player set N and also
an equivalent endogenous game with player set N \X.
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Definition 3 Given a game with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi), the endogenous
game
(
N \X, dv,X,pi) is given by dv,X,pi : 2N\X → R and
dv,X,pi (S) =
{
v (S ∪X)− piX if S 6= ∅,
0 if S = ∅.
The mixed game is the game
(
N,mv,X,pi
)
given by mv,X,pi : 2N → R and
mv,X,pi (S) = dv,X,pi (S \X) + piS∩X . (3)
We sometimes write d for dv,X,pi and m for mv,X,pi.
Both the mixed game and the endogenous game incorporate the idea that the
endogenous players (the players from N \X) have to pay piX while at the same
time benefitting from the X-players.
Remark 4 We find:
• The definition of dv,X,pi (∅) = 0 is necessary because v (X)−piX may well be
non-zero.
• m (N) = v (N) , d (N \X) = v (N)− piX , and (S) = piS for S ⊆ X.
• For X = ∅, m = v = d.
• m is a dummy extension of d to N with m (j) = pij for all players from X.
• The above points imply Shj (m) = pij for ∈ X and Shj (m) = Shj (d) for
j ∈ N \X.
d is close to games defined in Aumann and Dreze (1974) and in Peleg (1986).
The most important difference is that these authors assume that players from S
can choose the players from X they want to use and pay for. We opted for the
above, simpler, endogenous game. Apart from tractability, our leading example
also provides a justification. After all, all people have to pay taxes irrespective
of whether they actually use the services provided by civil servants.
We now introduce different effort levels and assume that exogenous players
are more or less productive than private ones (see the introduction). Let t ≥ 0
be the effort exercised by a typical exogenous player and x be the efforts of all
agents, i.e.,
x : N → [0, 1]
obeying x (i) ∈ {0, 1} for all i /∈ X and x (i) ∈ {0, t} for all i ∈ X. Endogenous
or exogenous players that do not belong to the coalition at hand obey x (i) = 0.
From now on, we will write xi rather than x (i).
Following Owen (1972), we now define the multilinear extension (MLE, in the
sequel) of a game v as the function vMLE on [0, 1]
N as follows:
vMLE (x) = vMLE (x1, ..., xn) =
∑
S⊆N
∏
i∈S
xi
∏
j∈N\S
(1− xj) v (S)
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Of course, for every S ⊆ N , x with xi = 1 for i ∈ S and xi = 0 for i /∈ S
fulfills vMLE (x) = v (S). Note
vMLE (x) =
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
hv (S) ·
∏
i∈S
xi.
When effort levels are between 0 and 1, the multilinear extension has a prob-
abilistic interpretation.24 For example, two productive players in the unanimity
game u{1,2} with S = N = {1, 2} and x =
(
1
2
, 1
3
)
can produce 1
2
· 1
3
, only.
Remark 5 The MLEs for d and m are related by
mMLE
(
(xi)i∈N
)
= dMLE
(
(xi)i∈N\X
)
+
∑
j∈X
pijxj.
We now add the effort parameter t to the definition of a game with exogenous
players:
Definition 6 A t-game with exogenous players is a tuple (N, v,X, pi, t) where
(N, v,X, pi) is a game with exogenous players and t is the effort parameter t ≥ 0.
The endogenous t-game is the game
(
N \X, dv,X,pi,t) given by dv,X,pi,t : 2N\X → R
and
dv,X,pi,t (S)
=

vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
players of X
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
players of S
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
players of (N\X)\S
− piX , S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅.
The mixed t-game mv,X,pi,t : 2N → R is given by
mv,X,pi,t (S) = dv,X,pi,t (S \X) + piS∩X (4)
and obtained by the obvious application of eq. 3. We sometimes write d∗ for
dv,X,pi,t and m∗ for mv,X,pi,t.
Thus, an endogenous t-game uses the exogenous players and their payoffs as a
parameter. The endogenous players’ worth takes the effort of exogenous players
into account. For t = 1, this definition equals definition 3.
Remark 7 We find:
• For S ∩X = ∅, m∗ (S) = d∗ (S) .
• m∗ (S) = piS for S ⊆ X.
24This is noted by Owen (1972, p. 64).
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4.4 Axiomatization of the pay-and-use value
An exogenous t-value ψ assigns a payoff vector ψ (N, v,X, pi, t) ∈ RN to every
t-game with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t). Values ψ may obey the following
axioms:
Axiom 8 (exogenous payments - EP) For all t-games with exogenous play-
ers (N, v,X, pi, t) and for any i ∈ X we have
ψi (N, v,X, pi, t) = pii.
Axiom 9 (efficiency - E) For all t-games with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t)
we have
ψN (N, v,X, pi, t) = vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous players
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous players
 .
Axiom 10 (symmetry - S) For all t-games with exogenous players
(N, v,X, pi, t) and all symmetric players i, j ∈ N \X we have
ψi (N, v,X, pi, t) = ψj (N, v,X, pi, t) .
Axiom 11 (null player - N) For all t-games with exogenous players
(N, v,X, pi, t) and any null player i ∈ N \X we have
ψi (N, v,X, pi, t) =
vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
players of X
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
players of N\X
− piX
|N \X| .
Axiom 12 (additivity - A) For all t-games with exogenous players
(N, v′, X, pi′, t) and (N, v′′, X, pi′′, t) we have
ψ (N, v′ + v′′, X, pi′ + pi′′, t) = ψ (N, v′, X, pi′, t) + ψ (N, v′′, X, pi′′, t) .
Axiom EP imposes the exogenous payments pi for the players in X. E, S, and
N for X = ∅ are the efficiency, symmetry, and null-player axioms due to Shapley.
An endogenous null player in v need not be a null player in dv,X,pi,t and hence
does not always obtain a payoff of zero. While he produces nothing himself, he
may benefit (or be harmed) by the exogenous players. For an endogenous null
player in v, the worth of using the exogenous players is
vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex. players
, 1, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
en. players
 = vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex. players
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
en. players

where “1” on the left-hand side refers to the null player in question. N also
assumes that every player may use the exogenous players, but has to pay for them
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(their aggregate pay is piX). Since every endogenous player (null player or not)
has the same chance of using and paying the exogenous players, we divide by
the cardinality of the endogenous players. Note that A adds both the coalition
functions and the exogenous payments on the left-hand side of the equation.
We now provide the axiomatization of our pay-and-use value; the proof can
be found in this paper’s appendix.
Theorem 13 There exists one and only one exogenous t-value that satisfies EP,
E, S, N, and A. It is called the pay-and-use value, denoted by ϕ∗, and given by
ϕ∗i (N, v,X, pi, t) = Shi (N,m
∗) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
Shi (N \X, d∗) if i /∈ X
An interpretation in terms of rank orders can be given. Consider the endoge-
nous t-game (N \X, d∗). The players from X are gathered in a room. They are
able to produce v (X) but demand payment piX . Now, the players from N \ X
enter the room, one after the other. The first player j from N \ X to join the
X-players obtains the marginal contribution
d∗ (j)− 0 = vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex. players
, 1, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
en. players
− piX .
He pays the civil servants. The following players, all from N \X, obtain marginal
contributions with respect to vMLE (the piX-term always cancels). Since every
endogenous has the same chance of being the first to enter, the taxpayable by
each endogenous player is equitable and equal to piX|N\X| .
Of course this is a minimal axiomatization.
Theorem 14 None of the axioms mentioned in the previous theorem is redun-
dant.
4.5 Conclusions
The pay-and-use value presented in this paper is the second value that awards
exogenous payoffs to some players. The other one is Wiese (2012b), which is also
a generalization of the Shapley value, but differs in one important aspect. The
exogenous-payments Shapley value (as it is called) uses a consistency axiom: If
the exogenous players obtain what they would obtain if no exogenous payments
were made to anybody, the endogenous players also obtain what they should get
without any exogenous players. It is clear that the pay-and-use value does not
obey consistency. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} , v = u{1,2}, X = {2}, and t = 1.
Player 2 is the exogenous player. If she happens to obtain his Shapley value of 1
2
,
player 3 does not obtain his Shapley value of 0, but −1
4
because 3 has to pay half
of player 2’s payment. This brings out the important feature that endogenous
players differ in their use of exogenous players while contributing equally (or at
least independently of use) to the exogenous payments.
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4.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let i ∈ N be a null player in (N, v). That is, by definition,
for any S ⊆ N \ {i} we have
v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S) .
Induction basis for |S| = 0:
v ({i}) = hv(∅ ∪ {i}) = 0.
Induction step: Assume the statement is true for all S ⊆ N \ {i} with |S| ≤ m
and let T ⊆ N \ {i} with |T | = m+ 1: We obtain
hv(T ∪ {i}) = v (T ∪ {i})−
∑
R⊂T∪{i}
hv(R)
= v (T )−
∑
R⊆T
hv(R)−
∑
R⊂T
hv(R ∪ {i})
= −
∑
R⊂T
hv(R ∪ {i})
= 0 (ind. hypothesis)
Thus, for all S ⊆ N\{i} we have hv (S ∪ {i}) = 0. Let’s assume for all S ⊆ N\{i}
we have hv (S ∪ {i}) = 0 and consider some T ⊆ N \ {i}. We obtain:
v (T ∪ {i}) =
∑
R⊆T∪{i}
hv(R)
=
∑
R⊆T
hv(R) +
∑
R⊆T
hv(R ∪ {i})
=
∑
R⊆T
hv(R)
= v (T ) .
Thus, i is a null player. Now consider i, j ∈ N are symmetric in (N, v). We show
for any S ⊆ N \ {i, j}
hv (S ∪ {i}) = hv (S ∪ {j}) .
Induction basis for |S| = 0:
hv ({i}) = v ({i}) = v ({j}) = hv ({j}) .
Induction step: Assume the statement is true for all S ⊆ N \ {i} with |S| ≤ m
and let T ⊆ N \ {i, j} with |T | = m+ 1:
hv (T ∪ {i}) = v (T ∪ {i})−
∑
R⊂T∪{i}
hv(R)
= v (T ∪ {j})−
∑
R⊆T
hv(R ∪ {i})−
∑
R⊂T
hv(R)
= v (T ∪ {j})−
∑
R⊆T
hv(R ∪ {j})−
∑
R⊂T
hv(R) (ind. hypothesis)
= hv (T ∪ {j}) .
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Thus, for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we obtain
hv (S ∪ {i}) = hv (S ∪ {j}) .
Now, on the contrary, let this hold for any two players i, j ∈ N and a TU-
game (N, v). We show that these two players are symmetric in (N, v). For any
S ⊆ N \ {i, j} we obtain
v (S ∪ {i}) =
∑
R⊆S∪{i}
hv(R)
=
∑
R⊆S
hv(R) +
∑
R⊆S
hv(R ∪ {i})
=
∑
R⊆S
hv(R) +
∑
R⊆S
hv(R ∪ {j})
=
∑
R⊆S∪{j}
hv(R)
= v (S ∪ {j}) .
Thus, players i, j are symmetric in (N, v).
Proof of Theorem 13. We follow the proof outlined by Aumann (1989, pp.
30). In order to show uniqueness, let ψ be any exogenous t-value satisfying the
axioms mentioned in the theorem. Note that axiom A implies
ψ (N, v,X, pi, t) = ψ (N, 0, X, pi, t) + ψ (N, v,X, 0, t)
= ψ (N, 0, X, pi, t) +
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
ψ (N, hv (S)uS, X, 0, t)
For the mixed t-game (N, 0, X, pi, t), payoffs are determined by axioms N and
EP. For (N, hv (S)uS, X, 0, t) (where S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅), the players from N \ S are
null players and their payoffs are determined by N. According to axiom EP, the
exogenous players’ payoffs are 0. Axioms E and S now determine the payoffs for
the players from S \X. Thus, the axioms determine the payoffs. It is not difficult
to show that the pay-and-use value ϕ∗ satisfies all the axioms. EP is obviously
fulfilled. N follows from the fact that every player i ∈ N \X has a chance of 1
over |N \X| of being “the first player to enter” and hence of using the exogenous
players. Efficiency follows from
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∑
i∈N
ϕ∗i (N, v,X, pi, t)
=
∑
i∈X
ϕ∗i (N, v,X, pi, t) +
∑
i∈N\X
ϕ∗i (N, v,X, pi, t)
= piX +
∑
i∈N\X
Shi
(
N \X, dv,X,pi,t) (definition of ϕ∗, EP)
= piX + d
v,X,pi,t (N \X) (efficiency of Shapley value)
=
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
hv (S) t
|X∩S| (definition of dv,X,pi,t)
= vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous players
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous players
 .
S is true for ϕ∗ because the payments for players outside X are not affected
by ϕ∗. We now turn to A. Additivity obviously holds for i ∈ X. Consider any
coalition functions v′, v′′ ∈ V (N) and any payments pi′, pi′′ ∈ RX . First we show
for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N \X (the equation for S = ∅ is obvious)
dv
′+v′′,X,pi′+pi′′,t (S) = dv
′,X,pi′,t (S) + dv
′′,X,pi′′,t (S) .
By using
xSi =

1 i ∈ S,
t i ∈ X,
0 i ∈ (N \X) \ S.
and the additivity of the Harsanyi dividends (eq. 2) we find:
dv
′+v′′,X,pi′+pi′′,t (S)
= (v′ + v′′)MLE
(
xS
)− pi′X − pi′′X
=
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
hv′+v′′ (S) ·
∏
i∈S
xSi − pi′X − pi′′X (definition of MLE)
=
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
hv′ (S) ·
∏
i∈S
xSi − pi′X +
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
hv′′ (S) ·
∏
i∈S
xSi − pi′′X ,
= dv
′,X,pi′,t (S) + dv
′′,X,pi′′,t (S) .
A is true for ϕ∗, because for any i ∈ N \X we have
ϕ∗i (N, v
′ + v′′, X, pi′ + pi′′, t)
= Shi
(
N \X, dv′+v′′,X,pi′+pi′′,t
)
(definition of ϕ∗)
= Shi
(
N \X, dv′,X,pi′,t + dv′′,X,pi′′,t
)
= Shi
(
N \X, dv′,X,pi′,t
)
+ Shi
(
N \X, dv′′,X,pi′′,t
)
(additivity of Sh)
= ϕ∗i (N, v
′, X, pi′, t) + ϕ∗i (N, v
′′, X, pi′′, t) .
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Thus, ϕ∗ fulfills all the axioms mentioned in the theorem and is the only value
to do so.
Proof of Theorem14. We present solutions that fulfill four of the five axioms
but that do not meet the fifth one.
i) Exogenous Payments: For the class of t-games with exogenous players
(N, v,X, pi, t) and for any player i ∈ N we define the solution ψEP by
ψEPi (N, v,X, pi, t) =

ϕ∗i (N, v,X, pi, t) , {1, 2} * X or i /∈ {1, 2} ,
pi1 +
pi2
2
if {1, 2} ⊆ X and i = 1,
pi2
2
if {1, 2} ⊆ X and i = 2.
Clearly, whenever {1, 2} ⊆ X and pi2 6= 0, EP is violated for player 1.
As the endogenous players’ payoffs coincide with the pay-and-use payoffs,
ψEP fulfills S and N. E holds for ψEP , because the sum of players 1 and
2’s payoffs stays constant. For the same reasons, A holds for many games
(N, v,X, pi, t). The remaining games satisfy {1, 2} ⊆ X. Consider such a
game. We obtain
ψEP1 (N, v
′ + v′′, X, pi′ + pi′′, t)
= pi′1 + pi
′′
1 +
1
2
(pi2′+ pi′′2)
= pi′1 +
1
2
pi2′+ pi′′1 + 12pi′′2
= ψEP1 (N, v
′, X, pi′, t) + ψEP1 (N, v
′′, X, pi′′, t)
and an equivalent statement for player 2. Thus, A also holds for the games
with {1, 2} ⊆ X and EP is not redundant within the axiomatization in the
previous theorem.
ii) Efficiency: For the class of t-games with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t),
we firstly define the solution ψE for scaled unanimity games λ · uS and
exogenous payments equal to 0. For any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and for any player
i ∈ N \X, we define
ψEi (N, λ · uS, X, 0, t) =
{
2 · ϕ∗i (N, λ · uS, X, 0, t) if i ∈ S,
ϕ∗i (N, λ · uS, X, 0, t) if i /∈ S.
For i ∈ X, we define
ψEi (N, λ · uS, X, 0, t) = 0.
Secondly, the payoffs for the null-game 0 ∈ V (N) and arbitrary exogenous
payments pi are defined by
ψEi (N, 0, X, pi, t) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
− piX|N\X| if i /∈ X.
Finally, for an arbitrary game (N, v,X, pi, t), we define
ψEi (N, v,X, pi, t) = ψ
E
i (N, 0, X, pi, t) +
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
ψEi (N, hv (S) · uS, X, 0, t)
28
This solution ψE fulfills the axioms EP, S, N, and A, but violates the
axiom E. EP is fulfilled by definition. Assume i, j ∈ N \X are symmetric
in N . Then by lemma 1 for any S ⊆ N \ {i, j} we have
hv (S ∪ {i}) = hv (S ∪ {j}) .
Thus, by the symmetry of ϕ∗ we obtain
ψEi (N, hv (T ) · uT , X, 0, t)
=
{
ψEj (N, hv (T ) · uS, X, 0, t) if {i, j} ⊆ T,
ψEj
(
N, hv (T \ {i} ∪ {j}) · uT\{i}∪{j}, X, 0, t
)
if i ∈ T, j /∈ T.
Thus, S also holds for ψEi . As ϕ
∗ fulfills N, ψEi fulfills N by construc-
tion. Finally A is also fulfilled. Let there be two games (N, v′, X, pi′, t) and
(N, v′′, X, pi′′, t):
ψE (N, v′ + v′′, X, pi′ + pi′′, t)
= ψEi (N, 0, X, pi
′ + pi′′, t) +
∑
S∈2N\{∅} ψ
E
i (N, hv′+v′′ (S) · uS, X, 0, t)
= ψE (N, v′, X, pi′, t) + ψE (N, v′′, X, pi′′, t) (additivity of Harsanyi div.).
Clearly, ψEi does not fulfill E. For X = ∅, t = 1 and v = uN the players’
payoffs are 2|N | , which do not add up to 1.
iii) Symmetry: For the class of t-games with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t):
Let w ∈ RN++ such that there are j, k ∈ N with wj 6= wk and define the
weighted Shapley payoff by
Shwi (N, v) =
∑
S⊂N
wi∑
l∈S wl
· hv(S).
Then we define ψS by:
ψSi (N, v,X, pi, t) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
Shwi
(
N \X, dv,X,pi,t) if i /∈ X.
This solution fulfills the axioms EP, E, N, and A. However it does not
fulfill S.
iv) Null player: For the class of t-games with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t),
we define the solution ψN :
ψNi (N, v,X, pi, t) =

pii if i ∈ X,
vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous players
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous players

|N\X| if i /∈ X.
Clearly, this solution fulfills EP, E, S, and A, but violates N.
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v) Additivity: For the class of t-games with exogenous players (N, v,X, pi, t),
let P (v) be the set of endogenous null players in v,
α = vMLE
t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N\X
 ,
β = vMLE
t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N\X
 .
Then for any i ∈ N , we define the solution ψA by
ψAi (N, v,X, pi, t) =

pii if i ∈ X,
α−piX
|N\X| if i ∈ P (v),
β− |P (v)||N\X| ·α
|N\(X∪P (v))| − |N\X|−|P (v)||N\X||N\(X∪P (v))| · piX otherwise.
This solution obviously fulfills EP, E, S, and N. However it does not fulfill
A. Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, X = ∅, t = 1, and v = −u{1,2} + u{1,2,3}. We
obtain, P (v) = ∅, but P (−u{1,2}) = {3}
ψA (N, v,X, pi, t) = (0, 0, 0)
ψA
(
N,−u{1,2}, X, pi, t
)
=
(
−1
2
,−1
2
, 0
)
ψA
(
N, u{1,2,3}, X, pi, t
)
=
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
,
where the the last two payoff vectors do not add up to the zero vector.
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5 Using civil servants for the purpose of rent
seeking - a cooperative game theory approach
This paper was written together with Harald Wiese (Leipzig University) and is
the second publication of a research project on exogenous payments and effort.
This second paper follows the joint idea of applying the Nash bargaining solution
to determine the “ideal” set of exogenous players.
The application is based solely on my research. This includes all theorems,
proofs, and graphics, especially the democratical stability concept and the ap-
plication to the unanimity games in section 5.5. Joint work was the selection of
the two-player example in section 5.4 and the formulations within some sections
(introduction, conclusion, and the description of the results of theorem 32).
5.1 Introduction
Nearly all economies are mixed economies, consisting of a private sector and a
public sector. Basically, all private actors have to pay taxes for the public sector,
but the services provided by the public sector yield benefits that differ between
the private agents. Therefore, private actors may well disagree about the size and
structure of the public sector. This may still hold when establishing the public
sector results in an overall productivity loss (see below). The aim of this article is
(i) to predict the number of civil servants in a model of cooperative game theory
and (ii) to motivate the existence of civil servants as a rent-seeking device.
There are several very influential papers on the topic of the “size of govern-
ment”. We would like to mention the paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981), which
discusses a rational theory of the size of government where (i) voters know that
governmental redistribution or services have to be paid for by taxes (now or in
the future), and (ii), the public-good argument for publicly provided services is
neglected. The median voter in Meltzer & Richard’s approach determines the size
of government in his own interest. Indeed, the rent-seeking approach to the size-
of-government question has also been pursued in the empirical papers by Mueller
and Murrell (1986) and Becker and Mulligan (1998). The first paper finds evi-
dence that the size of government in OECD countries is affected by the number
of interest groups within the country, the median income of people, and several
other variables. The second paper explores the possibility that the institution of
a public sector is a rent-seeking device.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use cooperative game
theory to elucidate the existence of the public sector. Our model has two stages.
At the second stage, we assume a given set of civil servants together with their
wages, summarized in a civil-service vector. We introduce mixed economies (in
a cooperative-game theory formulation) in which we have two types of agents,
private agents and civil servants. The latter obtain a prespecified payoff (wage),
while the private agents use their services. This is the setting introduced in the
first paper. For proposing a solution to such problems, the paper modifies one of
the most famous concepts in cooperative game theory, the Shapley (1953) value.
The resulting solution is called the pay-and-use value where the private agents
pay the civil servants while using their services. This transfer of productivity
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(from civil servants to private agents) is reminiscent of the proxy game concept
by Lehrer (1988). However, our solution concept requires budget balancing, i.e.,
the private agents pay the wages for the civil servants.
While the civil servants’ payoffs (their wages) are exogenous, the private
agents’ payoffs depend on two aspects of productivity. The first is embodied in
the coalition function, which specifies worths for each and every coalition (subset
of the players). The second one tries to reflect the possibility that civil servants
might be less productive than private agents. In this paper, we use the phrase
“low effort” of the civil servants as short-hand for the many reasons for which
civil servants may be less productive than private employees. It is not easy to
come by hard statistical evidence. However, we would like to point to the study
by Bogg and Cooper (1995) who find that senior civil servants in Great Britain
are less satisfied with their jobs, and hence less productive, than comparable
private-sector employees. Also, Afonso et al. (2005) compare public-sector effi-
ciency across 23 countries. While the authors do not compare public efficiency
with private efficiency, they identify reasons for public inefficiency in individual
countries.
The first stage of our model endogenizes the civil-service vector and consists
of a Nash Jr. (1950) bargaining game. These games are defined by a bargaining
set (the set of payoffs achievable through bargaining) including a threat point
(payoffs if bargaining breaks down). Every civil-service vector gives rise to pay-
and-use payoffs and hence, possibly, to a point in the bargaining set. The threat
point is given exogenously and stands for the payoffs the agents expect to obtain
when not cooperating (for example by emigrating). We do not exclude negative
threat payoffs. For example, if an agent has a great love for his homeland, his
threat payoff may be negative. It turns out that our bargaining set is compact
but not necessarily convex. Therefore, we employ the Nash bargaining solution in
the extended form proposed by Kaneko (1980). Of course, the question may arise
why we do not allow the agents to convexify the bargaining set. In particular,
agents might toss a die and agree on specific sets of civil servants with specific
probabilities. However, we find it hard to imagine this procedure in real life.
We first assume Nash bargaining between all players in our economy. Thereby,
all agents should profit from establishing a government (unanimity rule), other-
wise the bargaining breaks down and the agents obtain their threat payoff. As
bargaining breaks down if there are very demanding players (those who have a
high reservation payoff but a low productivity), we weaken this veto power for
all players. A group of more than 50% of the players (a majority) can decide to
exclude all other players by forming a political party with the aim of awarding
benefits to the majority, exclusively. In this framework we suppose the minority
does not coordinate and, as a result, obtain their reservation payoff.
We then search for the democratically acceptable payoffs that are stable. By
modifying the famous stability concept by Hart and Kurz (1983), we propose
a slightly different stability concept. An allocation is democratically stable if
there is no group of more than 50% of the players that can be better off. In
our setting of establishing a government, a majority and a civil service vector is
called democratically stable if the civil-service vector maximizes the Nash-Kaneko
product and if the players within the majority cannot do better by establishing
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another majority.
We would like to highlight some of our results.
• Consider any monotonic two-player game. If one of the two players were to
be a civil servant, it should be the less productive one. In that case, there
exists a range of effort parameters for which the more productive player
who is not a civil servant would prefer a purely private economy to a mixed
one.
• We now turn to unanimity games with productive players and unproductive
ones. Assume a Nash set of civil servants (i.e., a set of civil servants that
maximizes the Nash product). We obtain two results. First, there is at
least one productive player who does not belong to this Nash set. Second,
adding unproductive players will also lead to a Nash set.
• For democratic stability and again unanimity games, we find that unpro-
ductive players who are demanding (i.e., with relatively high reservation
prices) should be left outside the majority if possible. Our main theorem
presents a full characterization of stable governance structures for unanim-
ity games with identical reservation prices within the group of productive
agents and within the group of unproductive agents.
In the following section, we provide some basic definitions and notations for
coalitional games (e.g., Harsanyi dividends, Shapley value) and, additionally, the
second stage of the model, i.e., mixed economy and the pay-and-use value. The
rest of the paper focuses on the first stage of our model. Section 5.3 shows how
to adapt the Nash-Kaneko bargaining solution to our model. For the set of all
players, section 5.4 discusses the outcomes for some important classes of coalition
functions. The implications of democratic stability are then expounded in section
5.5. Section 5.6 concludes the paper.
5.2 Cooperative game theory, the Shapley value, and the
pay-and-use value
A TU-game (in coalition-function form) is a pair (N, v) (often abbreviated by
v) where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set and v a function 2N → R such that
v (∅) = 0. The set of all TU-games on N is a vector space on R and denoted by
V (N). The restriction of (N, v) to M ⊆ N with M 6= ∅ is the coalition function
v |M : 2M → R given by v |M (K) = v (K) for all K ⊆ M . A payoff vector y for
N is an element of RN or a function N → R. For y, r ∈ RN , we write y ≥ r
for yi ≥ ri for all i ∈ N, y > r for y ≥ r and y 6= r, and y  r for yi > ri for
all i ∈ N . By yS for S ⊆ N we mean
∑
i∈S yi. For notational convenience, we
often write i rather than {i}. The cardinality of coalitions C,K,L,N, and S are
denoted by c, k, l, n, and s, respectively. For a real number z, bzc is the highest
integer smaller or equal to z.
Player i ∈ N is a null player (in game v) if for all K containing i, we find
v (K) = v (K \ i) .
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Two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric (in game v) if for all coalitions K
obeying i /∈ K and j /∈ K we have
v (K ∪ i) = v (K ∪ j) .
Formally, a value on N is a function V (N) → RN . The Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)) is denoted by Sh (N, v) or Sh (v) for v ∈ V (N) and for each player i ∈ N
its payoffs are given by
Shi (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
i∈S
(s− 1)! (n− s)!
n!
[v (S)− v (S \ i)] .
Player i’s Shapley payoff is an average of her of his marginal contributions. For
any nonempty coalition T ⊆ N, uT (S) = 1, S ⊇ T ; 0 otherwise, defines a game,
called a unanimity game. For every v ∈ V (N), let
hv : 2
N \ {∅} → R,
S 7→ hv (S) =
∑
K⊆S
(−1)s−k v (K) .
hv is called the Harsanyi dividend
25 and v can be uniquely written as a linear
combination of unanimity games:
v (S) =
∑
K⊆S
K 6=∅
hv (K)uK (S) , K ⊆ N.
Following Owen (1972), we use the multilinear extension (MLE, in the sequel) of
a game v as the function vMLE on [0, 1]
N as follows
vMLE (x) =
∑
S⊆N
S 6=∅
hv (S) ·
∏
i∈S
xi.
We now turn to the concepts specific to the pay-and-use value. A mixed economy
is a tuple (N, v, C, pi, t) where
• N is the nonempty, finite player set,
• v is a TU-game,
• C (the set of civil servants) is a proper subset of N ,
• pi = (pii)i∈C is a vector specifying an exogenous payoff (wage) for every
member of C, and
• t is the effort parameter for the civil servants obeying 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
25Harsanyi (1963)
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The mixed t-game mv,C,pi,t ∈ V (N) is given by
mv,C,pi,t (S)
=

piS if S \ C = ∅
vMLE
 t, ..., t︸ ︷︷ ︸
civil servants C
, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
private agents S\C
, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
rem. pl.
− piN\S if S \ C 6= ∅.
Since the civil servants have to get their wages pi, a coalition S consisting ex-
clusively of civil servants, carries the worth piS. If there is at least one private
agent in a coalition S, that coalition’s worth can be explained in the following
manner: Coalition S can use all civil servants (albeit with an effort level t) and
all private agents within S, but has to pay wages for the civil servants outside S.
In particular, if S consists of only one private agent, she can use all civil servants
and must pay them. A civil-service value ψ assigns a payoff vector to every mixed
economy (N, v, C, pi, t) , ψ (N, v, C, pi, t) ∈ RN .
Definition 15 The pay-and-use value is the civil-service value given by
ϕ∗i (N, v, C, pi, t) = Shi
(
N,mv,C,pi,t
)
.
Thus, the pay-and-use payoffs for a mixed economy equals the Shapley payoff
of the corresponding mixed t-game.
5.3 Bargaining set and Nash-Kaneko solution
The first stage of our model consists of the Kaneko (1980) extension of the
Nash Jr. (1950) bargaining solution.26 We begin with the general case and then
turn to our specific model.
Definition 16 (bargaining problem) Let N be the set of players, r ∈ RN the
threat point (also called reservation payoffs) and B ⊆ RN the bargaining set.
(B, r) is called a bargaining problem (on N) if
(a) x ≥ r for all x ∈ B (individual rationality),
(b) r ∈ B, and
(c) B is compact.
Consider Φ (B, r) ⊆ RN defined by
Φ (B, r) =
{
y ∈ B : ∀x ∈ B
∏
i∈N
(yi − ri) ≥
∏
i∈N
(xi − ri) and y > z ⇒ z /∈ B
}
.
26Nash’s results depend on the convexity of the bargaining set. Kaneko shows that if one
drops convexity existence of the Nash solutions still holds, while uniqueness does not hold
anymore.
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Φ is called the Nash-Kaneko bargaining solution which associates with a bar-
gaining problem a set of payoffs rather than a specific payoff. Φ is character-
ized by five properties.27 In particular, efficiency is guaranteed by the condition
y > z ⇒ z /∈ B. ∏i∈N(yi − ri) is called the Nash product at y and yi − ri player
i’s Nash factor (at y). The conditions (a) through (c) guarantee that Φ (B, r) is
nonempty for every bargaining problem (B, r).
Turning to the bargaining set for the problem at hand, consider a coalition
function v, an effort parameter t, and a threat point r. The bargaining set
B (v, t, r) is derived in two steps, first with respect to specific sets of civil servants,
second by forming the union across all sets of civil servants:
Definition 17 Let v be a TU-game, t the effort parameter, and (ri)i∈N ∈ RN the
players’ reservation prices or threat points. (v, t, (ri)i∈N) is called a bargaining
t-game.
• For C ⊂ N , define the C-bargaining set
BC (v, t, r) =
{
y ∈ RN ∣∣y = ϕ∗(N, v, C, pi, t), pi ∈ RC, y ≥ r} .
• Let
B (v, t, r) := {r}∪
⋃
C⊂N
BC (v, t, r) .
B (v, t, r) is called the bargaining set (for the bargaining t- game).
Lemma 18 The bargaining set B (v, t, r) is nonempty and compact for any t ≥ 0.
In case of t = 1,
⋃
C⊂N B
C (v, t, r) is convex.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
Now we are able to apply the Nash-Kaneko solution concept. Maximizing the
Nash product in our specific case is best done by looking at all the possible sets
of civil servants. For a bargaining t-game (v, t, (ri)i∈N), we proceed step by step
as indicated in the following two definitions:
Definition 19 A civil-service vector (C, pi) defines its Nash product by
NP (C,pi)(v, t, r) :=
{ ∏
i∈N(ϕ
∗
i (N, v, C, pi, t)− ri) if ϕ∗(N, v, C, pi, t) ≥ r,
−1 otherwise.
Definition 20 The Nash product for a given set C of civil-servants is defined by
NPC(v, t, r) := max
pi∈RC
NP (C,pi)(v, t, r),
For C ⊂ N, we call pi∗ (C) = arg maxpi∈RC NP (C,pi)(v, t, r) the associated maxi-
mizing set of wages. The maximal Nash product is given by
NP (v, t, r) := max
C⊂N
NPC(v, t, r).
27These properties are Pareto efficiency, invariance with respect to affine transformations,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry and continuity.
36
If the maximal Nash product is −1, all pay-and-use payoff vectors violate
individual rationality for at least one player and all players obtain their reservation
prices. In this case, we sometimes say that “bargaining breaks down”.
If the maximal Nash product is not −1, C∗ ∈ arg maxC⊂N NPC(v, t, r) is
called a Nash set of civil servants. The set of all Nash sets is denoted by CN . Fi-
nally, the tuple (C∗, pi∗ (C∗)) is a solution to our bargaining t- game (v, t, (ri)i∈N).
Note the difference between CN = ∅, i.e., there is no Nash set of civil servants,
and CN = {∅} , i.e., there is exactly one Nash set of civil servants, the empty set,
leading to the Shapley payoffs.
5.4 Results for the unanimity rule
We now present the pay-and-use payoffs for a specific two-player game and de-
termine conditions such that a civil sector is established.
5.4.1 A monotonic coalition function for two players
The pay-and-use payoffs for the game Consider N = {1, 2} and a coalition
function v with v({1, 2}) = 1. Assume that v is monotonic, where 0 ≤ v (2) <
v (1) < 1. Note that any v (N) > 0 would lead to the same qualitative results as
v (N) = 1. We call 4v := v (1)− v (2) player 1’s productivity advantage and we
use v1 instead of v (1) and v2 instead of v (2).
The Harsanyi representation of v is
v = v1u{1} + v2u{2} + (1− v1 − v2)u{1,2}
and the multilinear extension of the game v is given by
vMLE (x) = v1x1 + v2x2 + (1− v1 − v2)x1x2.
For this bargaining t- game and C = {2} we obtain
m∗ (∅) = 0,
m∗ (1) = vMLE (1, t)− pi2,
m∗ (2) = pi2,
m∗ (1, 2) = vMLE (1, t) .
Hence, the pay-and-use value of this mixed economy is given by
ϕ∗ (N, v, C, pi, t) = (v1 + (1− v1) t− pi2, pi2) .
For the three possible sets of civil servants, we obtain the following payoff vectors:
set of civil servants
C
pay-and-use payoffs
ϕ∗ ({1, 2} , v, C, pi, t)
∅ (1
2
+ 4v
2
, 1
2
− 4v
2
)
{1} (pi1, v2 + t (1− v2)− pi1)
{2} (v1 + t (1− v1)− pi2, pi2)
Table 2: Pay-and-use payoffs for a two-player-game
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C = ∅ yields the Shapley payoffs. C = {1} means that player 1 is the civil
servant who obtains his exogenous payoff pi1. The private agent 2 obtains the
worth of his one-man coalition plus the civil servant’s marginal contribution with
respect to the private agent multiplied with the effort parameter t minus, of
course, the civil servant’s payment. C = {2} is analogous to C = {1}.
Introducing reservation payoffs We now introduce reservation prices r1 and
r2. The bargaining sets can be gleaned from the polytopes (bounded polyhedrons)
shown in figure 1 which refers to two different effort parameters and hence to two
different bargaining sets.
1
1 1
x
2x
1r
2r
1
2
+
v2
2
1
2
+
v2
2
1
2
+ ∆v
2
1
2
+
v1
2
1
2
+
v1
2
1
2
− ∆v
2
B{1}(v ,0.5 , r )
B{2}(v ,0.5 , r)
B∅(v , t , r)
B{1}(v ,1 , r )=B{2}(v ,1 , r )
Figure 1: Bargaining sets for different sets of civil servants
For t = 1
2
, the C = {1}-polytope, the C = {2}-polytope, and the C = ∅-
polytope (i.e., the Shapley payoffs) show that the bargaining set (the threat point
together with all three polytopes) will, in general, not be convex. For t = 1, the
C = {1}-polytope and the C = {2}-polytope coincide and the Shapley payoffs
ϕ∗ ({1, 2} , v, ∅, pi, t) (which is the C = ∅-polytope) lie on this line as expected by
Lemma 18.
Let 4r = r1 − r2 be player 1’s reservation-price advantage (which may be
positive or negative). We assume r1 + r2 < 1. In more general terms, a non-
negative “room for bargaining” R := v (N) − rN is a necessary condition for
a bargaining solution that obeys individual rationality. However, even in that
case bargaining may break down. One player’s reservation payoff may be above
this player’s Shapley value so that C = ∅ cannot be agreed upon. Also, if this
player and others are made civil servants, the effort parameter t < 1 may make
a bargaining solution “northeast of the threat point” impossible.
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Maximizing the Nash products for a fixed civil servant structure Turn-
ing to C = ∅, we obtain the Shapley payoffs (1
2
+ 4v
2
, 1
2
− 4v
2
)
which belong to
the ∅-bargaining set B∅ (v, t, r) if and only if
1
2
+
4v
2
≥ r1 and 1
2
− 4v
2
≥ r2
hold. Under these conditions, the Nash product for the set of civil servants C = ∅
is
NP ∅(v, t, r) =
(
1
2
+
4v
2
− r1
)(
1
2
− 4v
2
− r2
)
=
1
4
(
[1− (r1 + r2)]2 − [4v −4r]2
)
.
This Nash product in the absence of civil servants is the higher,
• the larger the room for bargaining (i.e., the smaller the sum of the reserva-
tion prices),
• the smaller the absolute difference of 4v and 4r.
For the set of civil servants C = {2}, we need to solve the maximization
problem
NP {2}(v, t, r) = max
pi2∈R
(t+ (1− t) v1 − pi2 − r1) (pi2 − r2)
under individual rationality,
t+ (1− t) v1 − pi2 ≥ r1 (player 1) and
pi2 ≥ r2 (player 2),
both of which are possible for
t ≥ r1 + r2 − v1
1− v1 =: t{2},
only. By the positive room for bargaining, we have r1 + r2 < 1 and hence
the nominator is smaller than the denominator. Therefore, every t fulfills this
inequality for a sufficiently high value of v1. Intuitively, if the civil servant’s
addition to the player set is unimportant (because player 1 alone achieves nearly
1), his effort becomes irrelevant.
In that case, the first-order condition leads to
pi∗2 ({2}) =
t+ (1− t) v1 + r2 − r1
2
which then fulfills individual rationality. Using this and exploiting the symmetry
between players 1 and 2, we summarize:
NP ∅(v, t, r) =
(
1
2
+
4v
2
− r1
)(
1
2
− 4v
2
− r2
)
,
NP {2}(v, t, r) =
1
4
(t (1− v1)− (r1 + r2) + v1)2 ,
NP {1}(v, t, r) =
1
4
(t (1− v2)− (r1 + r2) + v2)2 .
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Finding the Nash set of civil servants Since we have ∆v > 0 by assumption,
C = {2} leads to a higher Nash product than C = {1} whenever t < 1 (effort
strictly lower than 100%) holds:
NP {1}(v, t, r) < NP {2}(v, t, r)
⇐⇒ t (1− v2) + v2 < t (1− v1) + v1
⇐⇒ (1− t)4 v > 0.
That is, if (!) a civil servant is to be employed, the less productive player should
embrace this role. With this result in mind, we can attack the question whether
no civil servant is better than player 2 as a civil servant.
Assuming t < 1, player 2 becomes the civil servant iff
NP {2}(v, t, r) ≥ NP ∅(v, t, r)
holds, i.e., iff t is sufficiently high:
t ≥ t{2}∼∅ := 1− 2
( 12+
4v
2
−r1)+( 12−4v2 −r2)
2
−
√(
1
2
+ 4v
2
− r1
) (
1
2
− 4v
2
− r2
)
1− v1
where we find
t{2}∼∅ ∈ R iff Sh (N, v) ≥ r
and, in this case,
t{2}∼∅ ≤ 1 and
t{2}∼∅ = 1⇔4v = 4r.
Note also t{2} ≤ t{2}∼∅. That is, whenever t > t{2}∼∅ (i.e., C = {2} yields a higher
Nash product than C = ∅), we also have t > t{2} (i.e., individual rationality for
C = {2} and C = {1} is fulfilled). Besides t{2}∼∅ is only defined if C = ∅ is
individually rational.
Thus, the critical effort parameter t{2}∼∅ depends on the variation of the Nash
factors with respect to the two means. If the Nash factors differ a lot, the arith-
metic mean lies well above the geometric mean and the chances for t to lie above
the threshold value t{2}∼∅ are high. Also, turning to the denominator, the closer
v1 is to 1, the higher the chances for t to lie above t{2}∼∅. The following propo-
sition reports the Nash sets of civil servants together with the associated payoffs
for different scenarios:
Proposition 21 In the two-player bargaining t- game (v, t, (r1, r2)) that is de-
fined by v ({1, 2}) = 1, 0 ≤ v2 < v1 < 1, and r1 + r2 < 1, we obtain the following
results:
r ≤ Sh (N, v) r  Sh (N, v)
t{2} ≤ t < t{2}∼∅ CN = {∅} t < t{2} CN = ∅
t = t{2}∼∅ CN = {∅, {2}} t ≥ t{2} CN = {{2}}
t{2}∼∅ < t < 1 CN = {{2}}
Table 3: Nash sets of civil servants for a monotonic two-player game
where the payoffs are given by
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• (1
2
+ 4v
2
, 1
2
− 4v
2
)
for C∗ = ∅,
•
(
v1+t(1−v1)+∆r
2
, v1+t(1−v1)−∆r
2
)
for C∗ = {2} , and if CN = ∅ holds, the pay-
offs are the reservation payoffs (r1, r2).
On the one hand, employing civil servants has the advantage of enlarging the
C-bargaining sets. On the other hand, civil servants exert a lower effort. The
above proposition is driven by this trade-off: The higher the effort parameter t,
the more probable a nonempty set of civil servants.
Interestingly, at t = t{2}∼∅, the Nash products are the same for C∗ = ∅ and
C∗ = {2}, but the agents have different preferences: player 2 prefers to be a civil
servant while player 1 may prefer a purely private economy:
Proposition 22 In the above two-player bargaining game, assume 4v > 4r and
r ≤ Sh (N, v). Then, agent 1’s payoff at t′ = t{2}∼∅− ε is higher than his payoff
at t′′ = t{2}∼∅ + ε for some sufficiently small ε > 0 and preferences are inverse
for agent 2.
4v ≥ 4r means that player 1’s productivity advantage is higher than his
reservation-price advantage. Since the reservation prices have no role to play for
the Shapley payoffs, i.e., for C = ∅, player 1 tends to prefer a purely private
economy which would result from an efficiency parameter t′ slightly below t{2}∼∅.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
5.4.2 Unanimity games
In all the discussions to follow, we focus on unanimity games. First we present
some general results.
Proposition 23 In the n-player bargaining game (N, uS, t, r) with s < n and
rN ≤ 1, we obtain the following results:
• for every Nash set of civil servants C∗, there exists an agent i ∈ S such that
i /∈ C∗ if t < 1 holds.
• for every Nash set of civil servants C∗, C∗∪k with k /∈ S is also a Nash set
of civil servants.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
According to this proposition, at least one productive player is not a civil
servant. Thus, C = {S} is never a Nash set. Also, adding an unproductive
player will never decrease the Nash product. Therefore, unless bargaining breaks
down, N \ S is always a subset of at least one Nash set.
We now turn to a special case, where the reservation prices are the same for
the productive players. Then, the above proposition takes this simple form: all
the productive players are private agents and all the unproductive players are
civil servants:
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Proposition 24 Consider the n-player bargaining game (N, uS, t, r) with 1 <
s < n, an effort parameter t < 1, ri = r̂, i ∈ S and rN ≤ 1. Then the unique Nash
set of civil servants is C∗ = N \ S and the payoff for any player i ∈ N is given
by
ϕ∗i (N, uS, N \ S, pi∗ (N \ S) , t) = ri +
R
n
.
Proof: see this paper’s appendix.
Thus, in the case described in the above proposition, if the optimal allo-
cation is determined by Nash bargaining, the bargaining surplus (payoff minus
reservation payoff) is the same for every player and equals the average room for
bargaining R/n. Thus, we have a special instance of the equal division rule (which
has been used since Bertrand (1883)).
For later results we need the following theoretical proposition.
Proposition 25 Consider the n-player bargaining t- game (N, 0, t, r) with∑
j∈N rj ≤ 0. Then the sets {Q ⊆ N : q = n− 1} are among the Nash sets of
civil servants and for any Nash set C ∈ CN and the payoffs of any player i ∈ N
is given by
ϕ∗i (N, 0, C, pi
∗ (C) , t) = ri −
∑
j∈N rj
n
.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
If the aggregated reservation payoffs are at most zero, the room for bargaining
for the null game is nonnegative. In that case, the Nash set of civil servants is
maximal, i.e., may consist of n− 1 players. The bargaining surplus on top of the
individual reservation payoffs is again given by the equal division of the worth of
the grand coalition minus the aggregated reservation payoffs.
5.5 Results for the majority rule (democratic stability)
5.5.1 Definition of democratic stability
In the previous section, we assumed that the bargaining procedure concerns all
players from N . We now turn to the possibility that only a groupM forms a ruling
party and bargaining within M is again governed by the Nash-Kaneko bargaining
solution. We look for majorities that are “stable”. While we may have used the
stability concept of Hart and Kurz (1983), we think that this concept does not
suit our institutional setting as it allows small groups of players to block decisions
or allocations - even if 95% of the players would accept the allocation. Inspired
by this majority concept, we search for “democratically stable” allocations. For
that purpose, we concentrate on groups M with more than 50% of the players
(majorities) that can enforce allocations. In case of an agreement within this
group, the set of all players decomposes into two groups of players. The first
group M (which forms a political party) obtains its pay-and-use value, while the
“oppositional” players outside of M obtain their reservation payoff:
Definition 26 Consider a player set N and the bargaining t- game (v, t, (ri)i∈N).
For M ⊆ N , (v |M , t, (ri)i∈M) is called a bargaining subgame. On the basis of
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M, C ∈ CM and pi = (pii)i∈C, we define the payoffs (induced by the subgame and
the civil-service vector) for all players from N by
zi (M, v,C, pi, t, r) :=
{
ϕ∗i (M, v |M , C, pi, t) if i ∈M,
ri if i /∈M.
If m > n
2
holds, (M,C) with C ∈ CM is called a governance structure.
We assume the players within M exclusively benefit from paying the civil
servants. Players outside of M would have to pay the civil servants without
profiting from the offered services. As a result these agents decide to “leave” the
economy and they obtain their reservation payoff. Note that the payoffs of the
players within M do not depend on the worths possibly obtainable with players
outside M. This makes sense in our model since we assume that players outside
M emigrate. See the conclusions for further comments on this matter.
We search for payoffs (and civil-service vectors) such that players within a
subgroup cannot do better by joining another majority.
Definition 27 For a player set N, assume efficiency parameter t and reservation
payoff (ri)i∈N . Consider, also, two governance structures (M,C) and (M
′, C ′)
with collections of Nash sets of civil servants CM , and CM
′
, respectively, C ∈
CM , C ′ ∈ CM ′. We say that (M ′, C ′) dominates (M,C) if for all i ∈M ′ ∩M
ϕ∗i (M
′, v |M ′ , C ′, pi∗ (C ′) , t) > ϕ∗i (M, v |M , C, pi∗ (C) , t)
and for all i ∈M ′ \M
ϕ∗i (M
′, v |M ′ , C ′, pi∗ (C ′) , t) > ri
hold.
We offer three comments:.
• The above inequalities can also be expressed by
zi (M
′, v, C ′, pi, t, r) > zi (M, v, C, pi, t, r)
for all players i ∈M ′.
• Both M and M ′ are majorities so that the intersection M ′ ∩ M is non-
empty. Therefore, it can never hold that (M ′, C ′) dominates (M,C) and
that (M,C) also dominates (M ′, C ′).
• In general, the domination of (M,C) by (M ′, C ′) may come about in three
different manners:
1. excluding some players from M, i.e., M ′ ⊂M,
2. enlarging the majority M, i.e., M ⊂M ′,
3. excluding and enlarging at the same time, i.e., M ′ \M 6= ∅ and M \
M ′ 6= ∅.
Definition 28 The governance structure (M,C) is called democratically stable
if we have individual rationality for the players from M , i.e., for all i ∈M
ϕ∗i (M, v |M , C, pi∗ (C) , t) ≥ ri,
and if there is no other governance structure (M ′, C ′) that dominates (M,C) .
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5.5.2 Application to unanimity games
For the rest of the paper, we consider the n-player bargaining game (N, uS, t, r)
with 1 < s < n, an effort parameter t < 1, rN < 1, and ri = r̂ < 1 for all i ∈ S
and ri = r < 1 for all i /∈ S. The following framework prepares the main theorem.
Definition 29 By R (M) we denote the room for bargaining in case of player set
M, i.e.,
R (M) := uS (M)−
∑
i∈M
ri
:=
{
1−∑i∈M ri if S ⊆M,
−∑i∈M ri, otherwise.
We find a simple condition for stable governance structures:
Proposition 30 Assume consider n-player bargaining game (N, uS, t, r) with
1 < s < n, an effort parameter t < 1, rN < 1, and ri = r̂ < 1 for all i ∈ S
and ri = r < 1 for all i /∈ S. A governance structure (M,C) is democratically
stable iff R (M) ≥ 0 and for any governance structure (M ′, C ′) we have:
R (M)
m
≥ R (M
′)
m′
.
Definition 31 Let M be a majority. By dN (M) = m−
⌊
n
2
⌋− 1, we denote the
number of players that can leave the set M so that the remaining players still
constitute a majority. If dN (M) = 0 holds, M is called a minimal majority.
Intuitively, if dN (M) is small, the agents in M are relatively indispensable.
Remember proposition 24 according to which the Nash set of civil servants
is unique and consists of the unproductive players. The setting of this section
is a special case of the conditions of that proposition. The following theorem
characterizes all democratically stable governance structures.
Theorem 32 Consider the n-player bargaining game (N, uS, t, r) with 1 < s < n,
an effort parameter t < 1, rN < 1,
ri =
{
r̂ < 1 if i ∈ S,
r < 1 if i /∈ S.
Then for different parameter settings, the following democratically stable gover-
nance structures occur:
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scenario
restrictions
for r̂, r
democrat. stable
gov. structure (M,C)
A:
s ≤ dN (N)
A1:
r̂ − r ∈ (−∞, 1
s
)
,
sr̂ + (n− dN (N)− s) r ≤ 1 S ⊆M , dN (M) = 0
A2: r̂ − r = 1
s
, r ≤ 0 S ⊆M or S ∩M = ∅
A3: r̂ − r ∈ (1
s
,∞), r ≤ 0 S ∩M = ∅
B: s = n
2
B1 r̂ − r ∈ (−∞, 1
s
)
, sr̂ + r ≤ 1 S ⊆M , m− s = 1
B2 r̂ − r = 1
s
, r ≤ 0 S ⊆M
B3 r̂ − r ∈
(
1
s
, s+1
(s−1)s
)
, sr̂ + r ≤ 1 M = N
B4 r̂ − r = s+1
(s−1)s , r̂ ≤ 1s−1
M = N or
N \ S ⊆M , |M ∩ S| = 1
B5 r̂ − r ∈
(
s+1
(s−1)s ,∞
)
, sr + r̂ ≤ 0 N \ S ⊆M , |M ∩ S| = 1
C: s > n
2
C1 r̂ − r ∈ (−∞, 1
s
)
, r̂ ≤ 1
s
M = S
C2 r̂ − r = 1
s
, r ≤ 0 S ⊆M
C3 r̂ − r ∈
(
1
s
, n−dN (N)
dN (N)(n−s)
)
, r ≤ 0 M = N
C4 r̂ − r = n−dN (N)
dN (N)(n−s) , r̂ ≤ 1dN (N)
M = N or
N \ S ⊆M , dN (M) = 0
C5
r̂ − r ∈
(
n−dN (N)
dN (N)(n−s) ,∞
)
,
(n− s) r + (s− dN (N)) r̂ ≤ 0
N \ S ⊆M , dN (M) = 0
Table 4: Democratically stable governance structures for unanimity games
For any other combination of r̂ and r, there is no democratically stable go-
vernance structure.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
The main scenarios describe the different majority situations. In scenario
A (with s ≤ dN (N)), the unproductive players can form a majority while the
productive players cannot. Hence any majority contains at least one unproductive
player. The unproductive players are the powerful players in this scenario. This
scenario is depicted in figure 2.
In scenario B (with s = n
2
or, alternatively, s > dN (N) and, additionally,
n even and s = dN (N) + 1), neither the productive players nor the unproduc-
tive players can form a majority. Hence every majority contains at least one
productive and one unproductive player (figure 3).
In scenario C (with s > n
2
or, alternatively, s > dN (N) and, additionally, n
odd or s 6= dN (N) + 1), the productive players are the powerful ones. They can
form a majority while the unproductive players cannot (figure 4).
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Democratic stability depends on the three scenarios just mentioned and on the
(r, r̂) combination. Roughly speaking, majorities tend to come about whenever
the reservation payoff are sufficiently small. Inversely (consider the north-east
corners of the three figures), if the reservation payoffs are too large, everybody
emigrates.
We now focus on scenario C (see figure 4) in which the productive players
can form a majority. In C1, r (the unproductive players’ reservation payoff) is
relatively large (r > r̂ − 1
s
) and all these unproductive and demanding players
emigrate. This is an extreme case of proposition 24 where the set of civil servants
is empty.
Turning to C2, we have r = r̂ − 1
s
in which the unproductive players are less
demanding than in C1. Here, the productive players’ payoffs do not change if we
admit one or several unproductive players to the (non-minimal) majority. These
players become civil servants, again in line with the proposition.
By further decreasing r, we enter subscenario C3. The productive players con-
vince all the unproductive ones not to emigrate. In that case, all the unproductive
players become civil servants.
Alternatively, the transition from C1 to C2 and C3 can be affected by increas-
ing r̂ (rather than by decreasing r). In that case, the productive players get more
demanding (obtain better offers from abroad). Their reservation payoffs increase
and so do their payoffs from Nash bargaining. They then tend to be more happy
about unproductive players who do not emigrate.
By again increasing r̂ or decreasing r, we enter into subscenario C4 where
the unproductive players are indifferent between all productive players remaining
or some emigrating (while still upholding the majority). Here, the productive
players’ reservation prices are so high that a majority forms where some of them
emigrate. Then, of course, the productive value of one cannot be created.
The dark area in fig. 4 corresponds to proposition 25. Some productive
players emigrate and all unproductive players belong to M . Since the economy
is not productive, any set of civil servants C∗ with |C∗| = m − 1 is possible (in
exceptional cases, smaller sets of civil servants may also be realized).
In contrast to scenario C, scenario A admits M = N only in the exceptional
case of A2. Scenario B is a “mixture” of scenarios A (in particular, subscenarios
A1 and A2) and C (subscenarios C2 through C5).
First we observe that there is always a democratically stable governance struc-
ture if we have scenario A and a non-positive reservation payoff r. Similarly, there
is a democratically stable governance structure if we have scenario C and a reser-
vation payoff r̂ ≤ 1/s. For scenario B there is no such result. For sufficient high
r or for high r̂, the existence of a democratically stable governance structure
depends on the other groups’ reservation payoff.
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Figure 2: Stable governance structures for scenario A
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Figure 3: Stable governance structures for scenario B
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Figure 4: Stable governance structures for scenario C
Consider scenario C. From scenario C, we turn to scenarios B and finally A by
increasing the number of unproductive agents. Roughly speaking, the higher the
number of unproductive agents, the less probable scenario C3 (where no player
emigrates and hence the worth of 1 is created) and the more likely scenario C5
(where a few productive players emigrate so that the aggregate production is
zero).
5.6 Conclusions
Microeconomic analysis of the limits of government, the limits of the firm or
other economic institutions is well established. This paper is part of an ongoing
research program in which similar analyses are done by way of cooperative game
theory. The size-of-government question is a companion problem to the famous
boundaries-of-the-firm question posed by Ronald Coase (1937): What kind of eco-
nomic activity is conducted through markets and what kind is conducted through
firms? Wiese (2005) is an attempt to approach that question with cooperative
means.
This paper uses the Nash-Kaneko solution for bargaining situations. As a
result, the agents within the economy obtain their payoffs by the equal share rule.
The question of whether the equal share rule also results from other bargaining
solutions like the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is still open.
Our results focus on unanimity games. We do not think that general results
can be obtained for arbitrary coalition functions without resorting to numeri-
cal procedures. Finally, we conjecture that qualified majorities (threshold value
larger than 50%) will not substantially alter the qualitative nature of our results.
We offer a few remarks on future research. In the definition of a bargaining
subgame (definition 26), the payoffs of the players within the majority do not
depend on the worths possibly obtainable outside. In the literature, outside
option values have been introduced where payoffs result from coalitions within
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a player subset (M in our case), but also from coalitions also including players
outside. A first value was introduced in Wiese (2007). In particular, one might
combine our pay-and-use value and the more manageable outside option value
due to Casajus (2009b).
5.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 18. Turning to the first part of the Lemma, note
B (v, t, r)
= {r}∪
⋃
C⊂N
⋃
pi∈RC
{
y ∈ RN : y = ϕ∗(N, v, C, pi, t)} ∩ {y ∈ RN : y ≥ r}
= {r}∪
⋃
C⊂N
⋃
pi∈RC
{
y ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣y ≥ r, y = ϕ∗(N, v, C, pi, t), where
pi obeys
∑
i∈C
pii ≤ v(N)−
∑
i/∈C
ri; pii ≥ ri, i ∈ C
}
.
Observe that {
pi ∈ RC
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈C
pii ≤ v(N)−
∑
i/∈C
ri; pii ≥ ri, i ∈ C
}
is compact as a polytope of RC and that the pay-and-use value is continuous with
respect to pi. Therefore, for any C ⊂ N, BC (v, t, r) is compact as the image of
a continuous function on a compact set. Finally, the bargaining set B (v, t, r) is
compact as the finite union of compact sets.
We now assume t = 1 and turn to the second part of the Lemma. Note that the
sum of the pay-and-use payoffs is independent of C ⊂ N by∑
i∈N
ϕ∗i (v, C, pi, 1) = m
v,C,pi,1 (N)
=
∑
S∈2N\C∪C\{∅}
hv (S)− piC + piC
= v (N) .
Fixing i ∈ N , any payoff vector y ∈ RN with y ≥ r and ∑j∈N yj = v (N) is a
feasible payoff vector for C = N \ {i} . Choosing specific wages for all players
j ∈ N \ {i} given by
pij = yj,
yields
ϕ∗i (v, C,N \ {i} , 1) = v (N)−
∑
j∈N\{i}
pij = yi.
Hence the bargaining set without the threat point
⋃
S⊂N
BS (v, 1, r) =
{
y ∈ RN : y ≥ r} ∩{y ∈ RN : ∑
i∈N
yi = v (N)
}
,
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is the intersection of two convex sets and convex itself.
Proof of Proposition 22. The payoffs for different effort levels t follow from
proposition 21. According to this proposition, the payoff for player 1 is given by
y1 =
{
1
2
+ 4v
2
if C = ∅ (for t < t{2}∼∅)
v1+t(1−v1)+4r
2
if C = {2} (for t > t{2}∼∅).
Now, agent 1 prefers C = ∅ over C = {2} if
1
2
+
4v
2
>
v1 + t(1− v1) +4r
2
holds, i.e., in case of
t < t{2}∼1∅ :=
1− v2 −4r
1− v1 .
It now follows that
t{2}∼1∅ ≥ t{2}∼∅ iff 4r ≤ 4v.
Therefore there is a small ε > 0 such that the payoff for agent 1 for t{2}∼∅ + ε is
lower than the payoff for t{2}∼∅ − ε.
Proof of Proposition 23. We first note the payoffs for any player set N and
the unanimity game uS with s < n:
ϕ∗i (N, uS, C, pi, t) =

pii if i ∈ C,
t|S∩C|
|S\C| − 1n−cpiC , if i ∈ S \ C,
ts
n−s − 1n−spiC if i ∈ N \ S,C = S,
− 1
n−cpiC if i ∈ (N \ S) ∩ (N \ C) , C 6= S.
Turning to the first bullet item, assume a Nash set of civil servants C∗ and a
(non-productive) player k /∈ S that is not contained in C∗. The Nash product for
(C∗, pi) is given by
NPC
∗,pi(uS, t, r)
=
∏
i∈C∗
(pii − ri)
∏
i∈S\C∗
(
t|S∩C
∗|
|S \ C∗| −
piC∗
n− |C∗|
) ∏
i∈N\(S∪C∗)
(
− 1
n− |C∗|piC∗ − ri
)
while the Nash product for (C∗∪k, pˆi) can be confirmed as
NPC
∗∪{k},pˆi (uS, t, r)
=
∏
i∈C∗∪{k}
(pˆii − ri)
∏
i∈S\C∗
(
t|S∩C
∗|
|S \ C∗| −
pˆiC∗∪{k}
n− |C∗| − 1
)
·
∏
i∈N\(S∪C∗∪{k})
(
− 1
n− |C∗| pˆiC∗ − ri
)
.
By choosing
pii =
{ − 1
n−|C∗|piC∗ if i = k
pii if i 6= k,
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NPC
∗∪{k},pi (uS, t, r) equals NPC
∗,pi(uS, t, r). Hence, as claimed, if C
∗ is a Nash
set of civil servants, so is C∗ ∪ {k} .
The second bullet items claims that, for t < 1, any set of civil servants C that
obeys C ⊇ S is not a Nash set of civil servants. For any C ⊇ S the Nash product
for (C, pi) , pi ∈ RC is given by
NPC,pi(uS, t, r) =
∏
i∈N\C
(
ts
n− c −
piC
n− c − ri
)∏
i∈C
(pii − ri)
while C = N \ {j}, j ∈ S and pi ∈ RC , leads to the Nash product
NPN\j,pˆi(uS, t, r) =
(
ts−1 − pˆiN\j − rj
) ∏
i∈N\j
(pˆii − ri) .
If we choose
pii =
{
pii if i ∈ C \ j,
ts
n−c − piCn−c if i ∈ N \ C
we find
NPC,pi(uS, t, r) =
ts−1 − ts + pij − rj
pij − rj NP
C,pi(uS, t, r)
and t < 1 now implies
NPC,pi(uS, t, r) > NP
C,pi(uS, t, r).
This inequality concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 24. From proposition 23 we have to compare the Nash
products for different C, where N \ S ⊆ C and we define K := S ∩ C as the
subset of productive players joining the public sector. The Nash product is then
given by
NP (C,pi)
(
N, uS, (ri)i∈N
)
=
(
tk
s− k −
∑
i∈C pii
s− k − r̂
)s−k∏
i/∈S
(pii − ri)
∏
i∈K
(pii − r̂) .
For any j ∈ C, the partial derivatives with respect to pij given by
∂
∂pij
NP (C,pi)
(
N, uS, (ri)i∈N
)
=
(
tk
s− k −
∑
i/∈C pii
s− k − r̂
)s−k−1 [
tk
s− k −
∑
i∈C pii
s− k − r̂ − (pij − rj)
]
lead to the first-order conditions
pi∗j =
{
tk
n
+ rj −
∑
i∈N ri
n
if j /∈ S
tk
n
+ r̂ −
∑
i∈N ri
n
if j ∈ C ∩ S.
For the productive players j ∈ S \K the payoff zj is then given by
zj =
tk
n
+ r̂ − 1
n
∑
i∈N
ri.
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For t < 1 the payoffs of all players are strictly decreasing with respect to k. Hence
the Nash set of civil servants is the set C∗ = N \S (which is individually rational)
with optimal wages
pi∗j (N \ S) =
1
n
+ rj −
∑
i∈N ri
n
, j ∈ N \ S.
Proof of Proposition 25. As there is no production in the null game, effort
levels do not play a role for a maximizing set of civil servants, hence we have
ϕ∗i (N, 0, C, pi, t) =
{
pii if i ∈ C,
− piC
n−c if i /∈ C.
For any set of civil servants C1 and wages (pi1,j)j∈C1 we find a set of civil servants
C2 ⊃ C1, |C2| = n − 1 which allows the same payoffs as the set of civil servants
C1.
For k /∈ C1, C2 := N \ {k} and by choosing
pi2,j :=
{
pi1,j if j ∈ C1,
− piC1
n−c1 if j ∈ C2 \ C1
we obtain, for all i ∈ N :
ϕ∗i
(
N, 0, C1, (pi1,j)j∈C1 , t
)
= ϕ∗i
(
N, 0, C2, (pi2,j)j∈C2 , t
)
,
i.e., choosing C2 is atleast as good as choosing C1. Therefore all sets of civil
servants with n− 1 public servants are Nash sets.
We now turn to the optimal wages pi∗ (N \ {j}) :
pi∗ (N \ {j}) = arg max
pi∈Rn−1
pii≥ri,i∈N\{j}
− ∑
i∈N\{j}
pii − rj
 ∏
i∈N\{j}
(pii − ri) .
The first-order conditions lead to the optimal wages, for any i ∈ N \ {j} ,
pi∗i = ri −
∑
j∈N rj
n
.
Proof of Proposition 30. Within this framework a governance structure
(M,C) is democratically stable iff for all i ∈M
ri +
R (M)
m
≥ ri, (def. 28, prop. 24)
and, additionally, there is no governance structure (M ′, C ′) with M ′ ⊆ N such
that for all i ∈M ∩M ′
ri +
R (M)
m
< ri +
R (M ′)
m′
, (def. 27) and
ri < ri +
R (M ′)
m′
, i ∈M ′ \M.
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Equivalently a governance structure (M,C) is democratically stable iff
R (M)
m
≥ 0 (5)
and for any other governance structure (M ′, C ′) we have
ri +
R (M)
m
≥ ri + R (M
′)
m′
, i ∈M ∩M ′ (def. 27)
or
ri +
R (M)
m
< ri +
R (M ′)
m′
, i ∈M ∩M ′ (def. 27) and (6)
ri > ri +
R (M ′)
m′
, i ∈M ′ \M.
However, inequalities (5) and (6) imply 0 ≤ R(M)
m
< R(M
′)
m′ contradicting the last
inequality.
Proof of Theorem 32. We have to distinguish between S ⊆ M (proposition
24, cases A and B) and S 6⊆M (proposition 25, case C)
A) Consider S ⊆M, we first analyze whether the set M is dominated by a set
M ′, also containing S, where |M ′| = m+ k and
−min (m− s, dN (M)) ≤ k ≤ n−m.
If M is stable the payoffs of players in M are not lower than the payoffs of
players inM ′. Thus, we have
1
m
−
∑
j∈M rj
m
≥ 1
m+ k
−
∑
j∈M rj + kr
m+ k
⇐⇒
kr ≥ − k
m
(
1−
∑
j∈M
rj
)
.
i) If we choose k > 0 (inviting unproductive players) we obtain
r ≥ −1−
∑
j∈M rj
m
⇐⇒ r̂ − r ≤ 1
s
.
Therefore if r̂ − r > 1/s any set M such that S ⊆ M and M 6= N
cannot be stable and is dominated by M ′ = M∪{i} with an i ∈ N \M.
ii) For k < 0 (excluding unproductive players) we obtain
r ≤ −1−
∑
j∈M rj
m
⇐⇒ 1
s
≤ r̂ − r.
If r̂−r < 1/s any set M such that S ⊆M,dN (M) 6= 0,M 6= S cannot
be stable and is dominated by M ′ = M \ {i} with an i ∈M \ S.
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B) We now turn to the domination of M by a set, which does not contain all
productive player, i.e., we have M ′ = M \ L ∪K, L ⊆ S, and K ⊆ N \M
which fulfils:
1 ≤ l ≤ min {dN (N) , s} ,
max {s−m, l − dN (M)} ≤ k ≤ n−m.
The stability condition is then given by
1− sr̂ − (m− s) r
m
≥ −(s− l) r̂ + (m− s+ k) r
m− l + k ⇐⇒
r̂ − r ≤ m− l + k
l (m− s) + ks =: Z (l, k) .
Using ∂Z
∂l
(l, k) < 0 and ∂Z
∂k
(l, k) < 0 the smallest lower bound is determined
by inviting all unproductive players (K = N \M) and excluding as many
productive players as possible (l = min {s, dN (N)}) .
i) For a scenario with s ≤ dN (N) we obtain
r̂ − r ≤ 1
s
and hence if r̂ − r > 1/s, a majority M, S ⊆M cannot be stable and
is dominated by M ′ = N \ S.
ii) For a scenario with s > dN (N) we obtain
r̂ − r ≤ n− dN (N)
s (n− dN (N))−m (s− dN (N)) .
If
r̂ − r > n− dN (N)
s (n− dN (N))−m (s− dN (N))
and s > dN (N) a set M,S ⊆ M cannot be stable and is dominated
by M ′ = N \ L such that L ⊆ S and l = dN (N) .
C) Let M be a majority with S 6⊆M. Then the payoffs for i ∈M are given by
zi = ri −
∑
j∈M rj
m
,
where individual rationality holds iff∑
j∈M
rj ≤ 0.
i) In scenario dN (N) < s, all majorities fulfilling M ⊂ S and cannot be
stable and are dominated by M ′ = S.
ii) A majority M such that M \ S 6= ∅, M ∩ S 6= ∅, and dN (M) 6= 0
cannot be stable. M is dominated by M ′ = S \{i} , with i ∈M ∩S (if
r̂ > r), by M ′ = S \ {j} with j ∈M \ S (if r̂ < r), or by M ′ = M ∪ S
(if r̂ = r).
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iii) If r̂ − r ≤ 0 a majority M such that M \ S 6= ∅,M ∩ S 6= ∅, and
dN (M) = 0 cannot be stable and is dominated by M
′ = M ∪ S.
iv) For r̂ − r > 0 consider M such that M \ S 6= ∅,M ∩ S 6= ∅, and
dN (M) = 0. Additionally we must have N \ S ⊆ M. Otherwise, if
there is an unproductive player outside of M , the players within M
replace one of the productive players by an unproductive one that has
a lower reservation payoff. N \ S ⊆ M implies s > dN (N), that is,
there are enough productive players. Then, a majority with N \S ⊆M
is not dominated by the majority of the grand coalition iff
−(n− s) r + (s− dN (N)) r̂
n− dN (N) ≥
1− (n− s) r − sr̂
n
⇐⇒
r̂ − r ≥ n− dN (N)
dN (N) (n− s) >
1
s
.
Thus any set M with N \ S ⊆M,S *M, and dN (M) = 0 cannot be
stable
if s > dN (N) and r̂ − r < n− dN (N)
dN (N) (n− s) .
It is dominated by M ′ = N .
v) Any majority M such that M∩S = ∅ leads to a payoff of 0 and requires
s ≤ dN (N) . Consider the set M ′ = M \ L ∪ S such that L ⊆ M and
m− l + s ≥ m− dN (M) . M ′ dominates M if
0 ≥ r + 1− (m− l) r − sr̂
m− l + s ⇐⇒ r̂ − r ≥
1
s
.
If r̂ − r < 1/s and s ≤ dN (N) any set M with M ∩ S = ∅ cannot be
stable and is dominated by M ′ = M ∪ S.
These are all restrictions to democratically stable governance structures. The
remaining governance structures are presented in the theorem.
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6 Exogenous payments on networks
6.1 Introduction
The theory of cooperative games provides distribution rules for different economic
activities. We refer to the subclass of games with transferable utility. Within this
class, games describe situations in which agents mutually generate a cooperation
benefit, while the individual shares of this benefit are determined by a coalition
function and the connections between the agents. For this paper, we assume that
the payoffs of a subset of players are fixed, which we call exogenous payments.
This setting might improve the description of special economic situations. For
example, a lawyer’s wage usually does not depend on the result of a negotiation.
Instead firms pay a fixed wage to the lawyer and the remaining profit is distributed
among the firms. The same setting works for the housing market. For buying a
house, potential buyers employ a realtor whose wages are usually fixed. Hence,
the margin between the buyer’s willingness to pay and the seller’s reservation
price is distributed among these two agents, while the wage of the realtor must
be paid.
For the general analysis of these situations, we refer to solutions for cooper-
ative games with cooperation structures. Within these games the productivity
of the players and the connections between the players matter. Players cannot
interact (and cooperate) freely, but require some sort of connection channel to
produce a worth. These channels are modelled by an undirected graph as intro-
duced in Myerson (1977). That paper presents an extension of the Shapley (1953)
value, the most common solution for cooperative games without a network struc-
ture. Additionally, so-called outside options may play an important rule. The
accepted price might not only be influenced by the actual buyer-seller pairing.
Other potential buyers of a real-estate might increase the bargaining strength of
the particular seller. Hence, his profit should increase. The Myerson value does
not reflect these outside options. Thus, we modify a second solution, the graph-χ
value presented in Casajus (2009a). It is able to balance the influence of realized
cooperations and potential cooperations. Of course, the decision between apply-
ing the modified Myerson value and the modified graph-χ value depends on the
specific problem. Sometimes outside options might be negligible, and sometimes
outside options play no role, because agents do not know there are other potential
buyers, i.e., in situations with imperfect information.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on exogenous payments.
Wiese (2012b) extends the Shapley value to reflect exogenous payments. Ad-
ditionally, the paper introduces several axioms for solutions to games with ex-
ogenous payments. The main contribution of this paper is the extension of these
properties to games with cooperation structures. As games with cooperation
structures are a more general setting than games with coalition structures (par-
tition structures), our results generalize the results of Wiese (2012a) where the χ
value is modified to reflect exogenous payments. By choosing a special network,
we can mimic the results, while allowing much more general connections between
players.
First, in section 6.3, we present basic definitions for cooperative games, espe-
cially cooperation structures, the Myerson value and the graph-χ value. Then, in
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section 6.3, we introduce the mixture of games with cooperation structures and
exogenous payments, which we call XP-CO games. In section 6.4, we modify the
Myerson value and the graph-χ value such that they reflect exogenous payments.
These solutions are called the XP-Myerson value and the XP-graph-χ value. For
each of the solutions, we present an axiomatization. Section 6.5 concludes the
paper.
6.2 Basic Definitions and notation
A game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v) (often abbreviated by v) where
N is a finite set of players and v is a (coalition) function 2N → R such that
v (∅) = 0. For a fixed player set N , the set of all TU-games V (N) is a R−vector
space.
For every set ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , we define the unanimity game uS ∈ V (N) by
uS (T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T,
0, otherwise.
The set of unanimity games is a base of V (N) . Thus, there exists a unique linear
combination for every game v
v =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
hv (S)uS.
The coefficients hv (S) are called Harsanyi (1963) dividends.
A solution to cooperative games is a function V (N) → RN . For any S ⊆ N
and x ∈ RS, we often write xS instead of
∑
i∈S xi.
Two players i, j ∈ N are called symmetric (in the game v) if for all coalitions
T obeying i /∈ T and j /∈ T we have
v (T ∪ {i}) = v (T ∪ {j}) .
The Shapley value, denoted by Sh (N, v), is one of the most famous solutions for
cooperative games and is defined by
Shi (N, v) =
∑
T⊆N\{i}
|T |! (|N | − |T | − 1)!
|N |! [v (T ∪ i)− v (T )] .
It distributes the worth v (N) according to a weighted average of marginal con-
tributions.
Now, following Myerson (1977), we define cooperation structures: For any
player set N , a cooperation structure is an undirected graph L on N , i.e., L ⊆
LN = {{i, j} |i, j ∈ N, i 6= j }. Elements of graphs are called links. For any i, j ∈
N , i and j are called connected if i = j or if there are tuples (i1, j1) , ..., (ik, jk)
such that
i1 = i,
jk = j, and
for all l = 1, ..., k :
{il, jl} ∈ L.
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Being connected is an equivalence relation. Thus, for a given graph L, the player
set is decomposed in equivalence classes which we will call components. For any
i ∈ N , Ci (N,L) denotes player i’s component. A partition structure P of N is a
system of sets of N with ∅ /∈ P and for any i ∈ N there is a unique S ∈ P such
that i ∈ S. Any graph L induces a partition structure by
C (N,L) = {S ⊆ N : ∃i ∈ N s.t. S = Ci (N,L)} .
We say a graph L is connected if for all i ∈ N , we have Ci (N,L) = N .
For any S ⊆ N , the restriction of the graph L on S is given by
L |S := {{i, j} ∈ L |i, j ∈ S } .
A CO-game (N, v, L) is a triple, where (N, v) is a cooperative game and L is a
cooperation structure of N. A solution to CO-games is a function that assigns to
any CO-game (N, v, L) a real vector x ∈ RN . Every CO-game (N, v, L) induces
a characteristic function vL ∈ V (N) which is given by
vL(T ) =
∑
S∈C(T,L|T )
v(S).
For a CO-game (N, v, L) we define player i′s outside option graph with respect
to the graph L by
L(i) := L
∣∣
Ci(N,L) ∪ {{j, k} |j ∈ Ci (N,L) , k ∈ N \ Ci (N,L)} .
Myerson (1977) presents a simple solution for CO-games (N, v, L) which is
strongly connected to the Shapley value and uses the following two properties.
Axiom 33 (Component Efficiency in CO-games) A solution to CO-games
ϕ fulfills the Component Efficiency property if for all CO-games (N, v, L) and all
components C ∈ C(N,L)
ϕC (N, v, L) = v(C)
holds.
Component efficiency implies that the components are the productive units
in the game. Instead of sharing the worth of the grand coalition, component
efficient solutions distribute the worth of the coalitions.
Axiom 34 (Fairness in CO-games) A solution to CO-games ϕ fulfills the
Fairness property if for all CO-games (N, v, L) and all links {i, j} ∈ L
ϕi(N, v, L)− ϕj(N, v, L) = ϕi(N, v, L \ {i, j})− ϕj(N, v, L \ {i, j}).
holds.
Fairness demands that if a link is deleted the formerly linked players are hurt
equally.
Theorem 35 The Myerson value given by µ (N, v, L) := Sh
(
N, vL
)
is the unique
solution to CO-games that fulfills Component Efficiency and Fairness.
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A second CO value is the graph-χ value, introduced in Casajus (2009a). In
addition to the links within a component, possible cooperation benefits (measured
in the coalition function) with players outside of the own component may also
influence the payoffs of the players. The paper presents two additional properties
for CO-games.
Axiom 36 (Weak Fairness in CO-games) A solution to CO-games ϕ fulfills
the Weak Fairness property, if for any CO-game (N, v, L) with a connected graph
L and for any {i, j} ∈ L,
ϕi(N, v, L)− ϕi(Ci (N,L \ {i, j}) , v
∣∣
Ci(N,L\{i,j}) , L
∣∣
Ci(N,L\{i,j}) )
= ϕj(N, v, L)− ϕj(Cj (N,L \ {i, j}) , v
∣∣
Cj(N,L\{i,j}) , L
∣∣
Cj(N,L\{i,j}) )
holds.
Unlike Fairness proper, the weak Fairness axiom deals only with connected
graphs. For these graphs alone, the losses of the formerly linked players should
be the same. For connected graphs L \ {i, j} the equations within weak Fair-
ness and Fairness are equivalent. But if the player set is split (by deleting the
link {i, j}) , Fairness takes all production possibilities into account, while Weak
Fairness considers only the production possibilities within the respective com-
ponent. Nevertheless, if the payoffs of players only depend on the cooperation
benefits within their component, Fairness and Weak Fairness are equivalent for
all graphs.
Lemma 37 If a solution for CO-games ψ fulfills Component decomposability,28
i.e.,
ψi(N, v, L) = ψi(Ci (N,L) , v
∣∣
Ci(N,L) , L
∣∣
Ci(N,L) )
for all CO-games (N, v, L), ψ obeys the Weak Fairness axiom if and only if it
obeys the Fairness axiom.
The Myerson value fulfills the property. Hence, by the previous Lemma, the
Myerson value obeys weak Fairness as well.
Axiom 38 (Outside-Option Consistency in CO-games) A solution to
CO-games ϕ fulfills the Outside Option Consistency property, if for all CO-games
(N, v, L), all i ∈ N and any j ∈ Ci (N,L),
ψi(N, v, L)− ψi(N, v, L (i)) = ψj(N, v, L)− ψj(N, v, L (j))
holds.
Outside Option Consistency demands that players within the same component
should suffer equally comparing their payoffs in the graph L and in the outside
option graph L(i) = L(j).
28van den Nouweland (1993)
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Theorem 39 (Casajus (2009a)) The graph-χ value, which for any i ∈ N is
given by
χ#i (N, v, L) = µi (N, v, L (i)) +
v (Ci (N,L))− µCi(N,L) (N, v, L (i))
|Ci (N,L)| ,
is the unique solution for CO-games that fulfills Component Efficiency, Weak
Fairness, and Outside Option Consistency.
Unlike the Myerson value, the graph-χ value takes into account outside op-
tions. The graph-χ value does not fulfill the Fairness axiom or the Component
decomposability axiom.
6.3 XP-CO games and theirs axioms
We now define our setting of a XP-CO game by decomposing the player set into
exogenous players (who get a fixed wage) and non-exogenous players (who pay
the wage but use the links of the exogenous players).29
Definition 40 Cooperation structure games with exogenous payments (XP-CO
games) are tuples
(N, v, L,X, pi) ,
where
• (N, v, L) is a CO game,
• X ⊆ N fulfills C \X 6= ∅ for every component C ∈ C (N,L),
• pi ∈ RN is a vector specifying a payoff for every member of N and, in
particular, for every member of X.
X is chosen such that it is not a superset of any of L′s components. After all,
the non-exogenous players must pay the exogenous players’ wages.
A solution to XP-CO games assigns a vector ψ (N, v, L,X, pi) ∈ RN to any
XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi) .
Now, we find several axioms/properties a solution for XP-CO games may or
may not fulfill.
Axiom 41 (EP/Exogenous payments) 30A solution to XP-CO games ψ ful-
fills the Exogenous payments axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi) and
any player i ∈ X, we have
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi) = pii.
This is the most fundamental axiom of the class of games with exogenous
payments. It demands that the payoffs for a subset of players (the players of
X) be fixed. For technical reasons pi also suggests exogenous payments for the
players of N \X that may not matter for the realized payoffs.
29This setting closely follows Wiese (2012b) and Wiese (2012a)
30The definition is the natural extension of the property found in Wiese (2012b).
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Axiom 42 (CE/ Component Efficiency) 31 A solution to XP-CO games ψ
fulfills the Component Efficiency axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi)
and any component C ∈ C(N,L), we have
ψC (N, v, L,X, pi) = v(C).
With a view to the examples from the introduction, we interpret the compo-
nents as the productive units. In every component, agents share the worth of
this component only, which might include paying the exogenous players in this
component. Thus, no side payments to other coalitions should be possible.
Axiom 43 (F/Fairness) A solution to XP-CO games ψ fulfills the Fairness
axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi) and for any {i, j} ∈ L, we have
ψi(N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψj(N, v, L, ∅, pi)
= ψi(N, v, L \ (i, j) , ∅, pi)− ψj(N, v, L \ {i, j} , ∅, pi).
Axiom 44 (WF/Weak Fairness) A solution to XP-CO games ψ fulfills the
Weak Fairness axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi) such that L is con-
nected on N and any
(i, j) ∈ L, we have
ψi(N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψj(N, v, L, ∅, pi)
= ψi(Ci (N,L \ {i, j}) , v
∣∣
Ci(N,L\{i,j}) , L
∣∣
Ci(N,L\{i,j}) , ∅, pi)
−ψj(Cj (N,L \ {i, j}) , v
∣∣
Cj(N,L\{i,j}) , L
∣∣
Cj(N,L\{i,j}) , ∅, pi).
Based on the axioms introduced in section , Fairness and Weak Fairness deal
with the deletion of links of a graph. While Fairness deals with all graphs, Weak
Fairness deals with connected graphs, only. If a link of a connected graph is
deleted, the formerly linked players should suffer or gain equally (as long as there
are no exogenous players). If there are exogenous players and only one of the
formerly linked players has to pay for an exogenous player, the tax burden may
imply different payoffs for the players.
Axiom 45 (Co/Consistency) 32A solution to XP-CO games ψ fulfills the Con-
sistency axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi) and any player i ∈ N\X,we
have
ψi
(
N, v, L,X, (ψj (N, v, L, ∅, pi))j∈N
)
= ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi) .
Consistency compares two situations with different sets of exogenous players.
If the exogenous players obtain wages as if there are no exogenous players, this
should also hold for the non-exogenous players.
Axiom 46 (IR/Irrelevance) A solution to XP-CO games ψ fulfills the Irrel-
evance axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi), any pi′ ∈ RN and any
i ∈ N \X, we have
ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi) = ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi′) .
31Component efficiency is introduced in Aumann and Dreze (1974).
32Consistency is the extension of the axiom of the same name in Wiese (2012b).
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If there are no exogenous players, the (theoretical) exogenous payments should
not matter.
Axiom 47 (So/Solidarity) A solution to XP-CO games ψ fulfills the Solidarity
axiom if for any XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi′), for any pi′′ ∈ RN , and for any
players i, j /∈ X, such that j ∈ Ci (N,L), we have
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′′) = ψj (N, v, L,X, pi′)− ψj (N, v, L,X, pi′′) .
For any other set of exogenous players, we demand that changing wages should
equally change the players’ payoff in any component. That is, while players
may benefit differently from the exogenous players, the cost of employing the
exogenous players is equally shared among the players in a component. Note that
situations may occur that involve increasing the exogenous players’ wages in one
component, while decreasing the exogenous players’ wages in another component.
In a slightly different but equivalent formulation, this axiom is called Shifting in
Wiese (2012a).
Axiom 48 (OO/Outside Option Consistency) A solution to XP-CO games
ψ fulfills the Outside Option Consistency axiom if for any XP-CO game
(N, v, L,X, pi) and any i, j ∈ N such that j ∈ Ci (N,L), we have
ψi(N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψi(N, v, L (i) , ∅, pi) = ψj(N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψj(N, v, L (j) , ∅, pi).
If there are no exogenous players, the players’ gains and losses from outside
options are equally distributed within a component. Equivalently, if we delete
links of the outside option graph of a component, then the absolute losses of any
player in the final component should be equal.
6.4 Two XP-CO values
In this chapter, we present two different XP-CO values. First, we show a useful
minor result. Any XP-CO solution fulfilling Solidarity and Component Efficiency
also fulfills Irrelevance. All proofs can be found in this paper’s appendix.
Proposition 49 The axioms Solidarity (So) and Component Efficiency (CE)
imply the Irrelevance axiom (IR).
We point to one special equation derived from these two axioms:
Remark 50 Especially, for any two XP-CO games (N, v, L,X, pi′),
(N, v, L,X, pi′′) and for any i /∈ X, Solidarity (So) and Component Efficiency
(CE) imply
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′′)
=
ψX∩Ci(N,L) (N, v, L,X, pi
′′)− ψX∩Ci(N,L) (N, v, L,X, pi′)
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
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If we consider two XP-CO games with the same set of exogenous players,
the difference of the payoffs equals the difference of the overall wages equally
distributed among all non-exogenous players. Thus, if some (or all) wages of
exogenous players increase, the non-exogenous players’ payoff decreases equally.
We now turn to the first main result of the paper. There is only one solution
fulfilling Exogenous Payment, Component Efficiency, Consistency, Fairness and
Solidarity. If there are no exogenous players, this solution coincides with the
Myerson value. Consequently, this XP-CO solution is denoted the XP-Myerson
value.
Theorem 51 For a XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi), there is a unique XP-CO so-
lution fulfilling EP, CE, Co, F, and So. It is called XP-Myerson value µXP
and is given by
µXPi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
µi (N, v, L) +
µCi(N,L)∩X(N,v,L)−piCi(N,L)∩X
|Ci(N,L)\X| if i /∈ X.
We now prove that this axiomatization is a minimal one.
Theorem 52 None of the axioms EP, CE, Co, F, and So is redundant.
On the one hand, the XP-Myerson value inherits all advantages of the Myerson
value. The axiomsCo and F are somehow intuitive and the Myerson value is an
obvious extension of Shapley’s principles to solutions on graphs. On the other
hand, like the Myerson value, the XP-Myerson value does not reflect outside
options, as we can see from the following remark.
For N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, v = u{1,2} + u{1,4}, L = {(1, 2) , (1, 3) , (2, 3)}, X = {3},
and pi
(
0, 0, 1
4
, 0
)
, we obtain
µXP
(
N, v, L, {3} ,
(
0, 0,
1
4
, 0
))
=
(
3
8
,
3
8
,
1
4
, 0
)
.
This payoff vector may differ from an intuitive power distribution. One may
consider player 1 the more powerful player, as she has a potential cooperation
benefit with player 4. But, as players 1 and 4 are not linked, this cooperation
benefit does not play a role for the Myerson value. Thus, players 1 and 2 obtain
equal payoffs. The idea of additional power and, thus probably a higher payoff,
by non-realized links leads to the introduction of the graph-χ value in Casajus
(2009a). We now propose another XP-CO solution that also recognizes outside
options. Its construction follows the same arithmetic structure as the XP-Myerson
value. Similarly the axiomatization consists of the Myerson axiomatization and
the relevant axioms for XP-CO games.
Theorem 53 For a XP-CO game (N, v, L,X, pi), there is a unique XP-CO so-
lution satisfying EP, CE, Co, WF, OO, and So. It is called XP–graph-χ
value and given by
χ#,XPi (N, v, L,X, pi)
=
{
pii if i ∈ X,
χ#i (N, v, L) +
χ#
Ci(N,L)∩X(N,v,L)−piCi(N,L)∩X
|Ci(N,L)\X| if i /∈ X.
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This value proposes the payoffs
(
5
8
, 1
8
, 1
4
, 0
)
, which better suits our understand-
ing of the bargaining power.
Again, we can show that this is a minimal axiomatization.
Theorem 54 None of the axioms mentioned in the previous theorem is redun-
dant.
6.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present two solutions for games, where (i) productivity is mea-
sured by a coalition function, (ii) the produced worth depends on whether the as-
sociated players can communicate, and (iii) particular agents obtain exogenously
specified payoffs.
The first solution is the extension of the Myerson value for cooperative games
with cooperation structure. That is, it only values the player’s links and the
player’s contributions. However, it does not pay attention to outside options, i.e.,
potential links between do not influence the payoff structure. The second XP-CO
solution does reflect these production possibilities. Besides the definition of the
two values, we provide an axiomatization for each solution concept. The crucial
difference within these axiomatization is whether non-exogenous players might
be hurt equally if a link is deleted. While the Myerson demands this Fairness
condition for all links, the graph-χ value demands this only for the outside option
graph and for all connected graphs.
Our results are part of a broader research of exogenous payments within coop-
erative games. If we use the full graph of the players, LN ,33 our results replicate
the results of Wiese (2012a). As our setting allows for a wide range of other
graphs L, we provide solutions for a more general bargaining situation.
6.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 49. Let ψ be a XP-CO solution obeying So and CE.
Fix i ∈ N \X. For all j ∈ Ci (N,L), So states
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′′)
= ψj (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψj (N, v, L,X, pi′′) .
Summing up over all j ∈ Ci (N,L) \X yields
|Ci (N,L) \X| (ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′)− ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′′))
=
∑
j∈Ci(N,L)\X
[ψj (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψj (N, v, L,X, pi′′)] .
Now, by using CE, we obtain
|Ci (N,L) \X| (ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′)− ψi (N, v, L,X, pi′′))
=
∑
j∈Ci(N,L)\X
[ψj (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− ψj (N, v, L,X, pi′′)]
= v (Ci (N,L))− ψX (N, v, L,X, pi′)− v (Ci (N,L)) + ψX (N, v, L,X, pi′′)
= ψX (N, v, L,X, pi
′′)− ψX (N, v, L,X, pi′) .
33We might also use the union of the full graphs of the components.
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Now, X = ∅ yields
|Ci (N,L)| (ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi′)− ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi′′)) = 0,
thus IR holds.
Proof of Theorem 51. Let ψ be a XP-CO solution fulfilling this five axioms.
By EP, for any i ∈ X, we have
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi) = pii.
Assume X = ∅. Then, the axioms CE and F imply the axioms Component
Efficiency and Fairness for CO-games34. As CE and So are fulfilled, Propo-
sition 49 yields that ψXP (N, v, L, ∅, pi) does not depend on pi by IR. Thus
ψXP (N, v, L, ∅, pi) is a CO solution that satisfies Component Efficiency and Fair-
ness.
For i ∈ N , the axiomatization of Myerson (Theorem 35) then implies
ψXPi (N, v, L, ∅, pi) = µi (N, v, L) .
Together with Co, we have
ψXPi
(
N, v, L,X, (µj (N, v, L))j∈N
)
= ψXPi
(
N, v, L,X,
(
ψXPi (N, v, L, ∅, pi)
)
i∈N
)
= µi (N, v, L) .
Now let i /∈ X. By Proposition 49/ Remark 50, we obtain
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi)
= ψi
(
N, v, L,X, (µi (N, v, L))i∈N
)− ψX∩Ci(N,L) (N, v, L,X, pi)|Ci (N,L) \X|
+
ψX∩Ci(N,L)
(
N, v, L,X, (µj (N, v, L))j∈N
)
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
By EP we obtain
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi) = µi (N, v, L) +
µX∩Ci(N,L) (N, v, L)− piX∩Ci(N,L)
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
This proves that there is at most one solution fulfilling all five axioms.
In fact, the XP-Myerson value µXP fulfills all five axioms. By construction, EP
is fulfilled. Additionally, the value satisfies CE, because, for all components
34These axioms are introduced in definition 33 and definition 34.
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C ∈ C (N,L), we have∑
j∈C
µXPj (N, v, L,X, pi)
=
∑
j∈C∩X
µXPj (N, v, L,X, pi) +
∑
j∈C\X
µXPj (N, v, L,X, pi)
= piC∩X +
∑
j∈C\X
[
µj (N, v, L) +
µC∩X (N, v, L)− piC∩X
|C \X|
]
= piC∩X +
∑
j∈C\X
µj (N, v, L) + µC∩X (N, v, L)− piC∩X
=
∑
j∈C
µj (N, v, L) = v (C) .
Co is fulfilled because for all i ∈ N we have
µXPi (N, v, L, ∅, pi) = µi (N, v, L) .
If for all i ∈ X
pii = µi (N, v, L) ,
holds, the definition of µXP implies for all j ∈ N \X,
µXPj (N, v, L,X, µ (N, v, L))
= µj (N, v, L) +
µCj(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− µCj(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)
|Ci (N,L) \X|
= µj (N, v, L)
= µXPj (N, v, L, ∅, pi) (by construction)
F is fulfilled because for i, j ∈ N , and any link {i, j} ∈ L, we have
µXPi (N, v, L \ {i, j} , ∅, pi)− µXPj (N, v, L \ {i, j} , ∅, pi)
= µi (N, v, L \ {i, j})− µj (N, v, L \ {i, j}) .
As the Myerson value fulfills the Fairness property for CO-solutions, we obtain
µXPi (N, v, L \ {i, j} , ∅, pi)− µXPj (N, v, L \ {i, j} , ∅, pi)
= µi (N, v, L)− µj (N, v, L)
= µXPi (N, v, L, ∅, pi)− µXPj (N, v, L, ∅, pi),
thus F holds. So is fulfilled because for any i ∈ N \X,
µXPi (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− µXPi (N, v, L,X, pi′′)
=
µCi(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− pi′Ci(N,L)∩X
|Ci (N,L) \X| −
µCi(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− pi′′Ci(N,L)∩X
|Ci (N,L) \X|
=
pi′′Ci(N,L)∩X − pi′Ci(N,L)∩X
|Ci (N,L) \X|
=
pi′′Cj(N,L)∩X − pi′Cj(N,L)∩X
|Cj (N,L) \X|
= µXPj (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− µXPj (N, v, L,X, pi′′).
66
Proof of Theorem 52. We present XP-CO values that fulfill four of the axioms
but violate the fifth one.
i) EP: Consider the XP-CO solution ψEP given by
ψEP (N, v, L,X, pi) = µ (N, v, L) ,
i.e., the Myerson value for the associated CO-game (N, v, L) . It satisfies
axioms CE, Co, F, So, but violates EP for all XP-CO games such that
pii 6= µi (N, v, L) .
ii) CE: Consider the XP-CO solution ψCE given by
ψCEi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
1 if i /∈ X.
ψCE satisfies EP, Co, F, So, but violates CE for the XP-CO games
(N, v, L,X, pi)
N = {1, 2} ,
v = u{1,2},
L = {1, 2} ,
X = {1} , and
pi1 6= 0.
iii) Co: Let w ∈ RN++ such that there are i, j ∈ N with wi 6= wj. Consider the
XP-CO value ψCodefined by
ψCoi (N, v, L,X, pi) ={
pii if i ∈ X,
µi (N, v, L) +
wi·µCi(N,L)∩X(N,v,L)∑
j∈Ci(N,L)\X wj
− piX∩Ci(N,L)|Ci(N,L)\X| if i /∈ X.
It violates Co, but satisfies EP, CE, F, and So.
iv) F: Consider the XP-CO solution ψF given by
ψF (N, v, L,X, pi) = χ# (N, v, L,X, pi) ,
i.e., the XP-graph-χ value introduced later in theorem 39. This value does
not fulfill F, consider N = {1, 2, 3} , L = {{1, 2} , {1, 3}} and v = u1,2 +u1,3.
ψF (N, v, L) = (µi(N, v, L (i)))i∈N
= µ(N, v, LN) =
(
1,
1
2
,
1
2
)
.
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Deleting the link {1, 3} then yields
µ1(N, v, (L \ {1, 3}) (1)) = µ1(N, v, LN) = 1
µ3(N, v, (L \ {1, 3}) (3)) = µ3(N, v, LN) = 1
2
ψF (N, v, L \ {1, 3}) =
(
1 +
1− 3
2
2
,
1
2
+
1− 3
2
2
,
1
2
+
0− 1
2
1
)
=
(
3
4
,
1
4
, 0
)
.
We obtain
ψF1 (N, v, L \ {1, 3})− ψF3 (N, v, L \ {1, 3}) =
3
4
,
but
ψF1 (N, v, L)− ψF3 (N, v, L) =
1
2
.
Hence, the Fairness axiom is not fulfilled. In Theorem 53 we also show that
ψF fulfills EP, CE, Co, and So.
v) So: Consider the XP-CO solution ψSo defined by
ψSoi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
pii if i ∈ X,
µi (N, v, L) + µCi(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− piCi(N,L)∩X if 1 /∈ X, i = 1,
µi (N, v, L)
if 1 /∈ X,
i ∈ C1 (N,L) \X,
µXPi (N, v, L,X, pi) otherwise.
For N = {1, 2, 3}, L = LN and X = {3} we can observe
ψSo1 (N, v, L,X, pi
′ + pi′′)− ψSo1 (N, v, L,X, pi′) = −pi′′3 and
ψSo2 (N, v, L,X, pi
′ + pi′′)− ψSo2 (N, v, L,X, pi′) = 0.
Hence, So is violated, but one can easily show that the axioms EP, CE,
Co, and F are fulfilled.
Proof of Theorem 53. The XP-graph-χ value fulfills all six axioms. EP
and CE are obviously fulfilled. OO and WF are fulfilled because for X = ∅
the graph-χ value fulfills Outside Option Consistency and Weak Fairness for CO
games.35 If the exogenous players’ wages coincide with the payoffs of the graph-χ
value, the nominator vanishes and the other players in N \X obtain the payoffs
35The axioms for CO-games are introduced in definition 36 and definition 38.
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of the graph-χ value. Hence, Co is fulfilled.
For pi′, pi′′, any i ∈ N \X, and any j ∈ Ci (N,L) \X, we have
χ#,XPi (N, v, L,X, pi
′)− χ#,XPi (N, v, L,X, pi′′)
=
pi′′X∩Ci(N,L) − pi′X∩Ci(N,L)
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
Thus, So is fulfilled and the XP-graph-χ value is one solution fulfilling EP, CE,
OO, WF, Co, and So.
Now, we show the uniqueness of this solution. Assume, ψ is a XP-CO solution
obeying EP, CE, OO, WF, Co, and So. By EP, for any i ∈ X, we have
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi) = pii.
Now let X = ∅. CE and So imply IR by proposition 49. Thus ψ does not depend
on the wages pi. Therefore, for X = ∅, ψ is a CO solution fulfilling CE, WF,
and OO. Then, theorem 39 implies
ψi (N, v, L, ∅, pi) = χ#i (N, v, L) .
By Co, we can derive
ψi
(
N, v, L,X,
(
χ#i (N, v, L)
)
i∈N
)
= χ#i (N, v, L) .
From the remark of proposition 49, it follows that
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi)− ψi
(
N, v, L,X,
(
χ#j (N, v, L)
)
j∈N
)
=
ψCi(N,L)∩X
(
N, v, L,X,
(
χ#j (N, v, L)
)
j∈N
)
− ψCi(N,L)∩X (N, v, L,X, pi)
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
Finally, EP implies
ψi (N, v, L,X, pi) = χ
#
i (N, v, L) +
χ#Ci(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− piCi(N,L)∩X
|Ci (N,L) \X| .
Proof of Theorem 54. Again, we present XP-CO solution that fulfill five
axioms, but violate the sixth one.
i) EP: Consider the XP-CO solution ψEP given by
ψEP (N, v, L,X, pi ) = χ# (N, v, L) ,
the graph-χ value introduced in theorem 39. It satisfies the axioms CE,
Co, WF, OO, So, but violates EP for all XP-CO games such that for at
least one i /∈ X, pii 6= χ#i (N, v, L).
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ii) CE: Consider the XP-CO solution ψCE given by
ψCEi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
1 if i /∈ X.
It satisfies EP, Co, WF, OO, So, but violates CE for the XP-CO games
(N, v, L,X, pi) given by
N = {1, 2} ,
v = u{1,2},
L = {{1, 2}} ,
X = {1} , and
pi1 6= 0.
iii) Co: Let w ∈ RN++ such that there are i, j ∈ N with wi 6= wj. Consider the
XP-CO value ψCo defined by
ψCoi (N, v, L,X, pi)
=
{
pii if i ∈ X,
χ#,XPi (N, v, L) +
wi·χ#,XPCi(N,L)∩X(N,v,L)
wCi(N,L)\X
− piX∩Ci(N,L)|Ci(N,L)\X| if i /∈ X,
i.e., a weighted XP-graph-χ value. This XP-CO value replicates the proper-
ties of the XP value presented in Wiese (2012b). It violates Co, but satisfies
EP, CE, WF, OO, and So.
iv) WF: Consider the XP-CO value ψWF given by
ψWFi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
{
pii if i ∈ X,
χi (N, v, L) +
χX∩Ci(N,L)(N,v,L)−piX∩Ci(N,L)
|Ci(N,L)\X| if i /∈ X,
where χ is a CO value and given by
χi (N, v, L) = Shi (N, v) +
v (Ci (N,L))− ShCi(N,L) (N, v)
|Ci (N,L)| .
Using the coalition structure induced by the graph L, this CO-value is the
χ-value presented in Casajus (2009b). ψWF does not fulfill WF, but obeys
EP, CE, Co, OO, and So.
Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, v = u{1,2} + u{2,3} and L = {(1, 2) , (1, 3)} . By
deleting the link {1, 2}, L \ {1, 2} = {1, 3} we obtain:
ψWF1 (N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψWF1
(
C1 (N, {1, 3}) , v
∣∣
C1(N,{1,3}) , L
∣∣
C1(N,{1,3}) , ∅, pi
)
= Sh1
({1, 2, 3} , u{1,2} + u{2,3})− Sh1 ({1, 3} , 0)
=
1
2
− 0,
while
ψWF2 (N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψWF2
(
C2 (N, {1, 3}) , v
∣∣
C2(N,{1,3}) , L
∣∣
C2(N,{1,3}) , ∅, pi
)
= Sh2
({1, 2, 3} , u{1,2} + u{1,3}, )− Sh2 ({2} , 0)
= 1− 0.
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Hence, the value ψWF does not obey WF.
Regarding OO: As L (i) is connected, we obtain
ψWFi (N, v, L, ∅, pi)− ψWFi (N, v, L (i) , ∅, pi)
= Shi (N, v) +
v (Ci (N,L))− ShCi(N,L) (N, v)
|Ci (N,L)| − Shi (N, v) ,
which is a constant within the component of player i.
v) OO: The XP-Myerson value µXP (N, v, L,X, pi) violates OO, but by theo-
rem 51 EP, CE, Co, and So hold. By Lemma 37, the XP-Myerson value
also fulfills WF.
vi) So: We define a XP-CO solution by
ψSoi (N, v, L,X, pi) =
pii if i ∈ X
χ#1 (N, v, L) + χ
#
C1(N,L)∩X (N, v, L)− piC1(N,L)∩X if i = 1 /∈ X
χ#i (N, v, L)
if 1 /∈ X,
i ∈ C1 (N,L) \X,
χ#,XPi (N, v, L,X, pi) otherwise
Consider N = {1, 2, 3}, L = LN , and X = {3} . We can observe
ψSo1 (N, v, L,X, pi
′′)− ψSo1 (N, v, L,X, pi′) = −pi′′3 and
ψSo2 (N, v, L,X, pi
′′)− ψSo2 (N, v, L,X, pi′) = 0.
Hence, So is violated, but the axioms EP, CE, Co, WF, and OO are
fulfilled.
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Part III
Distribution rules for indivisible
goods
7 Shapley meets Hamilton:
a distribution rule for indivisible goods
7.1 Introduction
The theory of cooperative games provides a number of solutions for particular dis-
tribution problems. The most famous solutions for these problems are the Core
(see Gillies (1959)), the Shapley (1953) value, and the Banzhaf (1968) value.
These solutions typically assume that the commonly produced worth can be ar-
bitrarily divided. Hence, these solutions are not applicable for indivisible goods
like parliament seats or material prizes.
Let us consider a simple example. In the game which consists of three players
A, B, and C, the players individually produce 3, 1, and 1 units of an indivisible
good. If they agree to cooperate, players A and B or players A and C jointly
produce 4 units of the good, while players B and C together produce 3 units
of the good. All players together can produce 6 units of the good. The players
agree on cooperation and share the 6 units. First, by ignoring the fact that the
good is indivisible, we have a game with transferable utility and we distribute
the six units according to the Shapley value. Hence, the payoffs are given by
(3, 1.5, 1.5). But as the good is indivisible, this distribution is not feasible. Our
research question is whether we can use these Shapley payoffs for the distribution
of indivisible goods.
There are no general results for this research question. Minor results that
use the Shapley payoff can be found in Azamkhuzhaev (1991)and Azamkhuzhaev
(1994). However, the author analyzes a small class of games and mainly presents
conditions that imply a non-empty Core. Other solutions may be found by in-
terpreting distribution problems as games with nontransferable utility (NTU).
Then, one can apply solutions like the Shapley NTU-value (consider Aumann
(1985)) or the Harsanyi NTU-value (consider Hart (1985)). However, these solu-
tions typically demand that the set of feasible payoffs is convex. Clearly, sets of
integer vectors are typically not convex such that these NTU-solutions cannot be
applied to our problem.
We propose an approach that uses results of the theory of apportionment
problems. We interpret the Shapley payoffs as the claims of the players on the
distributed worth. Then, we can apply solutions for apportionment problems.
Prominent solutions are the Hamilton (1966)method (also known as the Vinton
or Hare-Niemeyer method) and the Webster method36 (also known as the Sainte-
Lague¨ (1910) method).
We propose the following integer distribution scheme. An integer solution for
36For the original proposal consider Webster and Everett (1903, p. 121).
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a given coalition function is a tuple of two mappings. The first mapping allows
for real payoff vectors and is called the First-Best solution.37 As this real payoff
vector might not be applicable, the second mapping provides integer solution
vectors and is called the Second-Best solution.
We offer two approaches. The first one is an axiomatic approach. We present a
Second-Best solution that is a combination of the Shapley value and the Hamilton
method and can be characterized uniquely by five axioms. The second approach
yields the same payoff vectors as the solution of an optimization problem. The
payoff vectors within the axiomatized Second-Best solution are the efficient ones
which minimize any lp−distance to the Shapley value.
Section 7.2 presents some basics of the theory of cooperative games, especially
the Shapley Value. We also introduce apportionment problems and the Hamilton
method. In section 7.3, we extend the Chun axiomatization (Symmetry, Efficiency
and Coalitional Strategic Equivalence) to integer solutions for cooperative games.
We present axioms which cover properties for both the First-Best and the Second-
Best solution and show some connections between these axioms. Finally, section
7.4 defines the Hamilton-Shapley solution and provides the main theorems of the
paper. Section 7.5 concludes the paper.
7.2 Basic Definitions
Firstly, we introduce games with transferable utility and secondly, we present
apportionment problems. Both concepts use a finite set of players N = {1, ..., n}.
A game with transferable utility (shortly, TU-game) (N, v) is described by
the player set N and a coalition function v : 2N −→ R, where v(∅) = 0. The set
of all TU- games V (N) is a R−vector space.
For any x ∈ R, bxc denotes the maximal integer which is not larger than x.
For a vector x ∈ RN , bxc = (bxic)i∈N . The fractional remainder fr of x ∈ R is
given by fr (x) = x− bxc . For any x ∈ R, by dxewe denote the minimal integer
which is not smaller than x.
For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, we define the characteristic vector 1S ∈ RN by
1Si =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 if i /∈ S.
For a TU-game (N, v), a player i ∈ N and a subset S ⊆ N \{i} , the marginal
contribution of player i to coalition S in v is given by
MCvi (S) := v (S ∪ {i})− v (S) .
Players within (N, v) are characterized in different ways:
Players i, j are called symmetric in (N, v) iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we have
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}).
A player i is called a Dummy in (N, v) iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i}, we have
MCvi (S) = v ({i}).
37In contract theory, an optimal (First-Best) contract may not be feasible if players do not
have perfect information.
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A player i dominates another player j in (N, v) iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
we have v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) and for at least one coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j} ,
v(S ∪ {i}) > v(S ∪ {j}).
For every set ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, we define the unanimity game uS ∈ V (N) by
uS (T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T,
0 otherwise.
For a fixed player set N , the set of all unanimity games is a base of V (N) .
Thus, there exists a unique linear combination for every game v,
v =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
λS (v)uS.
The scalars λS (v) are called Harsanyi (1963) dividends.
A solution ϕ to TU-games is a function ϕ : V (N)→ RN . The most prominent
solution to TU-games is the Shapley value, introduced in Shapley (1953).
Definition 55 For TU-game (N, v), the Shapley value Sh (N, v) is defined by
Shi (N, v) :=
∑
T⊆N,i∈T
λT (v)
|T | .
Chun (1989) axiomatizes this value by the following three axioms.
Axiom 56 (efficiency in TU-games ) A solution to TU-games ϕ fulfills the
efficiency axiom iff for all v ∈ V (N), we have ∑i∈N ϕi (N, v) = v (N) .
Axiom 57 (symmetry in TU-games) A solution to TU-games ϕ fulfills the
symmetry axiom iff for all v ∈ V (N) and any symmetric players i, j in (N, v),
we have ϕi (N, v) = ϕj (N, v) .
Axiom 58 (coalitional strategic equivalence in TU-games) A solution to
TU-games ϕ fulfills the coalitional strategic equivalence axiom iff for all v ∈
V (N), any S ⊆ N , any λ ∈ R and for all i /∈ S, we have
ϕi (N, v) = ϕi (N, v + λ · uS) .
Theorem 59 (Chun (1989)) The Shapley value is the unique solution to TU-
games that fulfills efficiency, symmetry, and coalitional strategic equivalence.
Clearly, efficiency is a desireable property for distributing the cooperation
benefit. Symmetry follows the idea of treating equals equally. Coalitional strate-
gic equivalence is an axiom that neglects solidarity as a player’s payoff may only
increase if its contributions increase. If, by the term λ · uS, the contributions of
the players of S increase, these players should profit, exclusively.
In section 7.3, we extend these properties to a new class of integer solutions.
We now introduce the class of apportionment problems which have been know
since the late 18th century. An overview can be found in Fitzpatrick (1944).
An apportionment is described by its player set N , an integer s and a positive
real vector (qi)i∈N . The integer s usually describes the size of the parliament/
house whose seats are to be distributed and the real vector q describes the number
of votes for each party. The set of all apportionment problems
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
is
denoted by A (N) .
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Definition 60 Let
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
be an apportionment problem. For i ∈ N , the
effective quotas (qei )i∈N are given by
qei (N, s, q) :=
qi∑
j∈N qj
· s.
These effective quotas describe the proportional share of s which can be
claimed because of the voting results.
Definition 61 Using the methodology of Balinski and Young (1975), an appor-
tionment solution is a correspondence Φ : A (N)⇒ ZN that fulfills five properties
• Efficiency: For all a ∈ Φ (N, s, (qi)i∈N), we have ∑i∈N ai = s.
• Completeness: For all sequences (qji )i∈N , j ∈ N, qji ∈ R, such that for all
i ∈ N limj→∞ qji = q̂i and a ∈ Φ
(
N, s,
(
qji
)
i∈N
)
hold, we have
a ∈ Φ (N, s, (q̂i)i∈N) .
• Homogeneity: For all λ > 0 and all (N, s, (qi)i∈N) ∈ A (N) we have
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
= Φ
(
N, s, (λ · qi)i∈N
)
.
• Symmetry: For any bijection σ : N → N and for any apportionment prob-
lem
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
, we have
Φ
(
N, s,
(
qσ(i)
)
i∈N
)
= σ
(
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
))
.38
• Proportionality: For all (N, s, (qi)i∈N) such that for all i ∈ N
qei (N, s, q) ∈ Z
holds, we have
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
= {qe (N, s, q)} .
It is worth mentioning that these five properties do not characterize a unique
solution to apportionment problems. In fact, these properties are quite weak re-
quirements. Efficiency demands that s be distributed. Completeness is a technical
assumption. Basically, it demands that possible ties be split equally. Homogene-
ity says that if the votes increase proportionally for all parties, the solution should
not change, as the relative voting results do not change. Symmetry ensures that
the names of the players do not matter, while Proportionality demands that the
effective quotas should be the unique solution, whenever they are integers.
Remark 62 Because of Homogeneity, the solution of an apportionment problem(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
and the solution of the problem with effective quotas(
N, s,
(
qei (s, q)i∈N
))
coincide.
38Here, applying the bijection to a set of vectors means applying it to all elements of the set.
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Hence, we can focus on the apportionment problems with effective quotas.
These problems can be interpreted as TU-games.
Remark 63 The apportionment problem
(
N, s, (qei (s, q))i∈N
)
with effective quo-
tas may be interpreted as a cooperative game (N, v) , where the coalition function
v : 2N → R is given by
v (T ) =
∑
i∈T
qei (s, q) .
Thus, any apportionment method is already a solution for a subset of TU-
games. We have to extend these solutions to the class of all TU-games. The
Hamilton method uses a simple algorithm for distributing seats according to
effective quotas.
Definition 64 Let
(
N, s, (qei )i∈N
)
be an apportionment problem with effective
quotas. Hamilton (1966)’s method is defined in two steps. At the first step, every
player obtains the integer part of her/his effective quota bqei c . At the second step,
all sets are identified that
• consist of
s−
∑
i∈N
bqei c
players and
• whose fractional remainders
qei − bqei c
are larger than the remainders of the other players.
For any of these sets the included players obtain an additional payoff of 1. Hence,
multiple solution vectors are possible. Thus, we have
Ham
(
N, s, (qei )i∈N
)
=
{
bqei c+ 1S
∣∣∣∣∣S ⊆ N : |S| = s−∑
i∈N
bqei c and
for all i ∈ S, j /∈ S fr (qei ) ≥ fr
(
qej
)}
.
Lemma 65 This Hamilton method is a solution for apportionment problems, i.e.,
it fulfills the five properties mentioned in Definition 61.
By construction, the Hamilton method fulfills Efficiency, Symmetry and Com-
pleteness. Homogeneity is fulfilled because effective quotas are used. Proportion-
ality can be easily shown.
Let’s consider the example from the introduction once again. The Shapley
payoffs of the three agents are given by (3, 1.5, 1.5) . Thus, by using these payoffs
as the quotas, the Hamilton method suggests distributing the integer part of the
payoffs (3, 1, 1) and then distributing the residual payoff of 1 to either player B
or player C.
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7.3 Integer solutions and their axioms
The integer approximation of a solution to TU-games can be modelled by the
following class of solutions.
Definition 66 An integer solution for cooperative games Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
consists
of a function ΨR : V (N)→ RN and a correspondence ΨZ : V (N)⇒ ZN \ {∅} .
The first mapping is called the First-Best solution. This solution assumes
that the good to be distributed is a divisible good. Note that, for the coalition
function, we do not exclude a real-valued worth v (N) . The second mapping
is a correspondence ΨZ (N, v) and is called the Second-Best solution. As the
First-Best solution might not be applicable (the good may be indivisible), the
Second-Best solution describes a rule which distributes integers.
We now present axioms that integer solutions to cooperative games may or
may not fulfill.
7.3.1 Properties
Axiom 67 (Efficiency) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Efficiency
axiom iff for any v ∈ V (N), we have ∑i∈N ΨRi (N, v) = v (N) and for any
ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v), we have ∑i∈N ϑi = bv (N)c .
This is the most fundamental axiom as it specifies the overall payoff for the
First-Best and the Second-Best payoffs. While the First-Best solution distributes
the whole worth of the grand coalition, the Second-Best solution distributes as
many seats as possible, as we do not exclude problems with v (N) /∈ Z.
Axiom 68 (Dummy 1) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Dummy
1 axiom iff for any game v ∈ V (N) and any Dummy i ∈ N , we have
ΨRi (N, v) = v (i) .
This axiom claims that the First-Best payoff should be easy to define whenever
a player has constant marginal contributions in a game. In that case, the player’s
First-Best payoff should be this marginal contribution.
Axiom 69 (Conformity) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Confor-
mity axiom iff for any game v ∈ V (N), for any player i ∈ N with ΨRi (N, v) ∈ Z,
and for any ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v), we have ϑi = ΨRi (N, v) .
This axiom restricts the allowed Second-Best payoffs. Whenever there is a
player whose First-Best payoff is an integer, the Second-Best payoff of this player
should coincide with the First-Best payoff.
Axiom 70 (First-Best Invariance) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills
the First-Best Invariance axiom, iff for any games v, w ∈ V (N) with
ΨR (N, v) = ΨR (N,w) ,
we have
ΨZ (N, v) = ΨZ (N,w) .
77
This axiom for the Second-Best payoffs is very strong. By agreeing that the
First-Best payoffs represents the fair claims for the players, only these payoffs
should influence the Second-Best solution. Other information should not matter.
Axiom 71 (Dominance) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Dom-
inance axiom iff for any v ∈ V (N) and any player i ∈ N dominating player
j ∈ N in v, we have ϑi ≥ ϑj for all ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) .
This is another axiom for the Second-Best payoffs, that ensures that less
productive players never obtain a higher payoff than more productive ones.
7.3.2 Beyond Symmetry
The First-Best solution may also fulfill the Symmetry axiom introduced in The-
orem 59, property (ii). For the Second-Best solution, we may not demand equal
payoffs for symmetric players. Consider the game
({1, 2} , u{1,2}), an application
of the Symmetry axiom means distributing less or more seats than available. In
the presence of the Efficiency axiom, we suggest the following axiom.
Axiom 72 (Symmetry 1) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the first
Symmetry axiom iff for any symmetric players i, j ∈ N in v ∈ V (N), we have
ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
j (N, v) and for any ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) , |ϑi − ϑj| ≤ 1.
That is, the payoffs of symmetric players should be as close as possible. In
fact, there is another form of symmetry we like to see obeyed by an integer
solution. ΨZ
({1, 2} , u{1,2}) = {(1, 0)} fulfills the first Symmetry axiom, but it
gives preferential treatment to player 1. Although players 1 and 2 are symmetric
in v, only one of these players obtains a non-zero payoff. We propose an additional
Symmetry axiom:
Axiom 73 (Symmetry 2) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the second
Symmetry axiom iff for any symmetric players i, j ∈ N in v ∈ V (N) and any
ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v), we have ΨRi (N, v) = ΨRj (N, v) and the vector ω given by
ωk =

ϑi if k = j,
ϑj if k = i,
ϑk otherwise
is also an element of ΨZ (N, v) .
This axiom demands that whenever we relabel the players and the coalition
function does not change, the players’ payoff vectors change according to the
relabeling.
A “good“ solution should fulfill both Symmetry axioms. Therefore, we may
use a third axiom that loosely belongs to this family of symmetry axioms, the
Quota axiom.
Axiom 74 (Quota) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
satisfies the Quota ax-
iom iff for any game v ∈ V (N), any player i ∈ N, and any ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) , we
have ⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋ ≤ ϑ ≤ ⌈ΨRi (N, v)⌉ .
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This axiom demands that an integer solution should minimize the distance
between ΨR and payoff vectors of ΨZ. Derived from the equally named appor-
tionment property, the key statement of this axiom is the main driving force of
the Hamilton method. We later show the conflict between this Quota axiom and
the Monotonicity axiom.
Proposition 75 Symmetry 2 and Quota imply Symmetry 1.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix. Therefore, to implement
all three axioms, we only have to demand the Quota and the second Symmetry
axiom.
7.3.3 Beyond Coalitional Strategic Equivalence
For the First-Best solution, the Coalitional Strategic Equivalence axiom intro-
duced by Chun (Theorem 59, property (iii)) may hold.
For the Second-Best solution, we might simply adopt the axiom of the First-
Best solution:
Axiom 76 (Coalitional Strategic Equivalence*) An integer solution
Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Coalitional Strategic Equivalence* axiom iff for any
game v ∈ V (N), for any subset S ⊂ N, for any λ ∈ R, we have
ΨR (N, v + λ · uS)
∣∣
N\S = ΨR (N, v)
∣∣
N\S ,
and
ΨZ (N, v + λ · uS)
∣∣
N\S = ΨZ (N, v)
∣∣
N\S ,
where for a set U ⊆ RN and a subset T ⊂ N, U|T ⊆ RT is defined by
U|T =
{
z ∈ RT |∃y ∈ U such that for all i ∈ T : zi = yi
}
.
However, this axiom is not compatible with some of the other axioms.
Remark 77 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v = u{1,2,3}, and S = {1, 2}. The axioms Effi-
ciency, Symmetry 1, and Symmetry 2 imply
ΨR (N, v) =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
and
ΨZ (N, v) = {(1, 0, 0) , (0, 1, 0) , (0, 0, 1)} .
In u{1,2,3}, player 3 may obtain a payoff of 1. However, in u{1,2,3} + u{1,2} player
3 is dominated by players 1 and 2. Thus, using the Dominance axiom and the
Efficiency axiom,
ΨZ
({1, 2, 3} , u{1,2,3} + u{1,2}) ∣∣{3} = ΨZ (N, u{1,2,3}) ∣∣{3}
= {0, 1}
cannot hold.
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Thus, to extend property (iii) in Theorem 59 , we propose a weaker formulation
of the axiom:
Axiom 78 (Coalitional Strategic Equivalence) An integer solution
Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Coalitional Strategic Equivalence axiom iff for any game
v ∈ V (N), for any subset S ⊂ N, and for any λ ∈ R, we have
ΨR (N, v + λ · uS)
∣∣
N\S = ΨR (N, v)
∣∣
N\S ,
and for any player i ∈ N, we have
ΨZ (N, v + ui)
∣∣
N\i = ΨZ (N, v)
∣∣
N\i
Remark 79 In the presence of Efficiency,
ΨZ (N, v + ui)
∣∣
N\i = ΨZ (N, v)
∣∣
N\i
is equivalent to
ΨZ (N, v + ui) = Ψ
Z (N, v) + 1{i}. (7)
7.4 The Hamilton-Shapley solution
We now present some connections between axioms for integer solutions.
Proposition 80 The Quota axiom implies the Conformity axiom.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
As Quota plays an important role for establishing the Hamilton solution, we
do not have to additionally demand the Conformity axiom. If Second-Best vectors
are within Quota, the payoff of symmetric players differ minimally.
Conclusion 81 The axioms Symmetry 2, Efficiency, and Coalitional Strategic
Equivalence imply the Dummy 1 axiom.
This is an implication of the Axiomatization of Chun (theorem 59), as the
Shapley value fulfills the Dummy 1 axiom.
Proposition 82 The axioms First Best Invariance, Efficiency, Coalitional Stra-
tegic Equivalence, Dummy 1, and Dominance imply the Quota axiom.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
This is a major proposition for the main theorem. Although the Quota ax-
iom is the main driving-force for the Hamilton solution, we can replace it with
several axioms close to the theory of TU-games: these five axioms together with
Symmetry 2. Now, we introduce a solution to integer games and present an
axiomatization of this solution, which is strongly connected to the Chun axiom-
atization in theorem 59.
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Theorem 83 The Hamilton-Shapley solution, defined by
ΨRHS (N, v) = Sh (N, v)
and
ΨZHS (N, v)
=
{
bSh (N, v)c+ 1S
∣∣∣∣∣S ⊆ N, |S| = bv (N)c −∑
i∈N
bShi (N, v)c
and fr (Shi (N, v)) ≥ fr (Shj (N, v)) for all i ∈ S, j /∈ S
}
,
is the unique integer solution that fulfills Efficiency, First-Best Invariance, Sym-
metry 2, Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, and Dominance.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
It is not surprising that the First-Best solution is the Shapley value, as Chun
axiomatized the Shapley value by Symmetry, Coalitional Strategic Equivalence
and Efficiency. The more important result is the Second-Best part of the Theo-
rem. The unique integer approximation of the Shapley value, while fulfilling the
five axioms, is given by the application of the Hamilton-Shapley solution.
Note that it also extends the Hamilton solution of apportionment solutions:
Remark 84 The Hamilton-Shapley solution and the Hamilton solution applied
to the Shapley payoffs
i) coincide for TU-games (N, v) with v (N) ∈ Z, i.e. we have
ΨZHS (N, v) = Ham (N, v (N) , Sh (N, v)) .
ii) may differ for TU-games with v (N) /∈ Z. For example, consider any two-
player game with Shapley payoffs (2, 0.9). The Hamilton-Shapley solution
suggests the solution vector (2, 0) . But considering effective quotas, we ob-
tain
qe1 =
2
2.9
· 2 ≈ 1.38 and
qe2 =
0.9
2.9
· 2 ≈ 0.62.
Hence the Hamilton method applied to the Shapley payoffs yields the solution
vector (1, 1) . While the Hamilton-Shapley solution is as close as possible to the
Shapley payoffs, the Hamilton solution applied to the Shapley payoffs approxi-
mates the effective Shapley payoffs
bv (N)c
v (N)
Sh (N, v) .
Next, we show that this is a minimal axiomatization, i.e., we present solutions
that fulfill four axioms but violate the fifth one.
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Proposition 85 The five axioms mentioned above are logically independent.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix.
In addition to this axiomatization result, we can motivate the Hamilton-
Shapley method by a second approach. The most intuitive way to approximate
the Shapley value by integer vectors may be by choosing the efficient vectors clos-
est to the Shapley value. Birkhoff (1976) shows a nice property of the Hamilton
method.
Proposition 86 For any apportionment problem with effective quotas(
N, s, (qei )i∈N
)
, the Hamilton method, among all solutions, minimizes∑
i∈N |ai − qei | ,
∑
i∈N |ai − qei |2, and any other lp-norm of a− qe.
We can apply this proposition to an optimization problem, where the distance
of efficient integer vectors is minimized with respect to a lp-distance.
Corollary 87 The Hamilton-Shapley solution consists of all those efficient inte-
ger vectors whose lp-distance to the Shapley value is minimal.
In contrast to many optimization problems, for this intuitive approach, the
choice of the particular distance function does not matter. Thus, both the ax-
iomatic approach and the intuitive approach lead to the same integer solution for
TU-games, the Hamilton-Shapley solution.
Nevertheless, the Hamilton solution faces problems regarding (Population-)
Monotonicity, introduced in Balinski and Young (1975).
Axiom 88 (Monotonicity) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfills the Mo-
notonicity axiom iff for any v, w ∈ V (N) and any i, j ∈ N with ΨRj (N, v) > 0
and ΨRj (N,w) > 0, any ϑ
v ∈ ΨZ (N, v) and ϑw ∈ ΨZ (N,w) , with
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
≥ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
,
we have
• ϑvi ≥ ϑwi or
• ϑvj ≤ ϑwj or
• ΨRi (N,v)
ΨRj (N,v)
=
ΨRi (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
and
(
ϑwi , ϑ
w
j
)
can be substituted for
(
ϑvi , ϑ
v
j
)
in ϑv.
This important axiom for apportionment problems connects the payoffs be-
tween solution correspondences of different games. Assume that the First-Best
payoffs of players i and j increase, comparing v and w, but player i′s relative
increase is larger than player j′s relative increase. Then clearly, as player i′s
claims becomes stronger in w than in v compared to player j, player i′s Second-
Best payoff should increase (from v to w) or player j′s Second-Best payoff should
decrease (from v to w).
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Proposition 89 The Hamilton-Shapley solution does not fulfill this Monotonic-
ity axiom.
The proof can be found in this paper’s appendix. This result is inherited
from the Population-Paradox of the Hamilton solution. Even if the claims of
all the players increase proportionally and the distributed worth also increases,
one player’s payoff may decrease. In fact, as Monotonicity and Quota are in-
compatible on apportionment problems,39 there is no integer solution fulfilling
Quota and Monotonicity. Nevertheless, Balinski and Young (1975) propose an
apportionment solution that fulfill Quota and at least some kind of Monotonicity
property.
7.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a solution to cooperative games that distributes integer
vectors to the agents. The solution approximates the Shapley value and extends
results for apportionment problems to the class of all TU-games. It resembles the
Hamilton solution and it allows for the analysis of more complicated bargaining
situations, even those in which the benefits of cooperation are negative. Thus,
we can model saboteurs - players that have negative marginal contributions or
even negative Shapley payoffs. On the other side apportionment problems usually
demand non-negative claims.
The solution is motivated by two different approaches. First, in accepting five
axioms, the Hamilton-Shapley solution is the unique solution that fulfills these
axioms. Second, the solution minimizes a simple optimization problem.
Nevertheless, similar to the theory of apportionment, there is no perfect solu-
tion to the integer distribution problem. The proposed Hamilton-Shapley solution
does not fulfill the Monotonicity axiom. While it might not be necessary to in-
clude this axiom for a general solution, in the context of the presented example,
Monotonicity is a real necessity. Hence, future research might provide a solution
fulfilling this axiom, but violating some of the five axioms from theorem 83. The
least convincing axiom may be the axiom of coalitional strategic equivalence.
7.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 75. Let Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
be an integer solution for TU-
games fulfilling the second Symmetry axiom and the Quota axiom. For any game
v ∈ V (N) and for any symmetric players i, j ∈ N , Symmetry 2 implies
ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
j (N, v) .
By Quota, for any ϕ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) we obtain⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋ ≤ ϕi ≤ ⌈ΨRi (N, v)⌉ and⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋ ≤ ϕj ≤ ⌈ΨRj (N, v)⌉ .
Hence,
|ϕi − ϕj| ≤ 1
39Consider Bradberry (1992).
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is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 80. Let Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
be an integer solution for TU-
games fulfilling the Quota axiom. For any game v ∈ V (N) and i ∈ N with
ΨRi (N, v) ∈ Z, the Quota axiom implies
ϑi ∈
{⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋
,
⌈
ΨRi (N, v)
⌉}
, for all ϑ ∈ Ψ (N, v) .
AsΨRi (N, v) ∈ Z, we obtain
ϑi = Ψ
R
i (N, v) , for all ϑ ∈ Ψ (N, v) .
Thus Symmetry 1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 82. Consider an integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
fulfilling
all five axioms and assume the Quota axiom is not fulfilled.
Hence, there are a game (N, v), a payoff vector ϕ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) , and a player i ∈ N
such that
ϕi ≤
⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋− 1.
Then, if for all j ∈ N \ {i}
ϕj ≤
⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋
holds, we conclude∑
k∈N
ϕk ≤
∑
k∈N
⌊
ΨRk (N, v)
⌋− 1
<
∑
k∈N
⌊
ΨRk (N, v)
⌋ ≤ ⌊∑
k∈N
ΨRk (N, v)
⌋
,
where the last inequality follows from the superadditivity of the function b·c .
Thus, the Efficiency axiom implies that there is at least one player j ∈ N such
that
ϕj ≥ 1 +
⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋
.
The Dummy 1 axiom implies
ΨR (N, v) = ΨR
(
N,
∑
k∈N
ΨRk (N, v)uk
)
.
Consider the game
w =
∑
k∈N
ΨRk (N, v)uk +
(⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋− ⌊ΨRi (N, v)⌋+ 1)ui,
where all players are Dummies. Because of the Efficiency axiom and multiple
applications of equation 7, the payoff vector ω given by
ωk =
{
ϕi +
⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋− ⌊ΨRi (N, v)⌋+ 1 if k = i,
ϕk if k 6= i
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lies within ΨZ (N,w) . Observe now, that player i dominates player j in w, as
ΨRi (N, v) +
⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋− ⌊ΨRi (N, v)⌋+ 1 > ΨRj (N, v)
are the constant marginal contributions for the Dummies. In contrast, we obtain
ωi = ϕi +
⌊
ΨRj (N, v)
⌋− ⌊ΨRi (N, v)⌋+ 1 ≤ ⌊ΨRj (N, v)⌋ < ωj.
This contradicts Dominance, i.e., ϕi ≤
⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋− 1 cannot hold.
Let there be a game (N, v), a solution vector ϕ ∈ ΨZ (N, v) , and a player i ∈ N,
such thatϕi ≥
⌈
ΨRi (N, v)
⌉
+ 1. Similar to the first case, the Efficiency axiom
implies there is at least one player j ∈ N such that
ϕj ≤
⌈
ΨRj (N, v)
⌉− 1.
Then, the Dummy 1 axiom and the First-Best Invariance axiom imply
ΨR (N, v) = ΨR
(
N,
∑
k∈N
ΨRk (N, v)uk
)
.
Now, consider the game
w =
∑
k∈N
ΨRk (N, v)uk +
(⌊
ΨRi (N, v)
⌋− ⌊ΨRj (N, v)⌋+ 1)uj,
where all players are Dummies. Because of the Efficiency axiom and multiple
applications of equation 7, the payoff vector ϑ given by
ϑk =
{
ϕj +
⌈
ΨRi (N, v)
⌉− ⌈ΨRj (N, v)⌉+ 1 if k = j,
ϕk if k 6= j
lies within ΨZ (N,w) . Observe now, that player j dominates player i in w. Then
ϑj = ϕj +
⌈
ΨRi (N, v)
⌉− ⌈ΨRj (N, v)⌉+ 1
≤ ⌈ΨRi (N, v)⌉ < ϕi = ϑi.
contradicting Dominance. Therefore, ϕj ≤
⌈
ΨRj (N, v)
⌉− 1 cannot hold.
Summarizing the two cases, Quota holds.
Proof of Theorem 83. First we show that there is at least one integer solution
that fulfills the five axiom.
Let Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨZ
)
be an integer solution fulfilling these fives axioms. By the
axiomatization of Chun (theorem 59 ), the axioms Efficiency, Symmetry 2, and
Coalitional Strategic Equivalence imply ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v). The First-Best
Invariance axiom implies there exists a nonempty correspondence
ψ : RN ⇒ ZN ,
such that
ΨZ (N, v) = ψ (Sh (N, v)) .
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We use the game v =
∑
i∈N Shi (N, v)u{i} as a representative for all games with
coinciding Shapley payoffs. By Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, we obtain
ΨZ (N, v) = ΨZ
(
N,
∑
i∈N
Shi (N, v)u{i}
)
= bSh (N, v)c+ Ψ
(
N,
∑
i∈N
(Shi (N, v)− bShi (N, v)c)u{i}
)
.
Within
w =
∑
i∈N
(Shi (N, v)− bShi (N, v)c)u{i},
the marginal contribution of a player i is given by
MCwi (S) = Shi (N, v)− bShi (N, v)c ∈ [0, 1) for all S ⊆ N \ {i} .
Let ϑ ∈ ΨZ (N,w) be fixed. By Corollary 81 and Proposition 82 , we obtain
ϑi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N.
Since Efficiency holds, we must now decide which players obtain an additional
payoff of 1. Dominance implies that whenever the fractional remainder
Shi (N, v) − bShi (N, v)c of a player i is larger than the fractional remainder of
a player j, it can never happen that ϑi = 0 and ϑj = 1. This implies ϑi = 1 for
those bw (N)c players whose fractional remainders are the highest. If there are
ties for the last remaining additional payoffs, the second Symmetry axiom implies
multiple solution vectors. Thus, the correspondence ΨZ is uniquely determined.
Secondly we show that actually the Hamilton-Shapley solution fulfills the prop-
erties.
By the properties of the Shapley value, the First-Best solution ΨRHS fulfills its
condition within Efficiency, Symmetry 2, Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, and
Dominance. By construction, ΨZHS fulfills the Efficiency and the First-Best In-
variance axiom.
The second Symmetry axiom is fulfilled because for symmetric players i, j ∈ N
of the game v ∈ V (N) , we have
Shi (N, v) = Shj (N, v) ,
which implies bShi (N, v)c = bShj (N, v)c. If for any ϑ ∈ ΨZHS (N, v) , ϑi 6= ϑj,
the second stage of the Hamilton method distributes the last additional payoff to
one of the players. As the fractional remainders are equal, there must be another
allocation ϑ′ ∈ ΨZHS (N, v), where ϑi = ϑ′j, ϑj = ϑ′i, and ϑk = ϑ′k for all k 6= i, j.
Dominance is fulfilled, because for a player i dominating player j, we have
Shi (N, v) > Shj (N, v) and, thus, either
bShi (N, v)c > bShj (N, v)c ,
or
bShi (N, v)c = bShj (N, v)c and
Shi (N, v)− bShi (N, v)c > Shj (N, v)− bShj (N, v)c ,
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both implying ϑi ≥ ϑj for all ϑ ∈ ΨZHS (N, v) .
Comparing v and v + ui, player i
′s Shapley payoff increases by 1. Therefore, for
i ∈ S we have
bShi (N, v + ui)c = bShi (N, v)c+ 1,
and the fractional remainders of all players does not change. Hence, Coalitional
Strategic Equivalence is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 85. We present solutions that fulfill four of the five
axioms but does not meet the fifth one.
i) Coalitional Strategic Equivalence: Let for all i, j ∈ N :
i C j in v ⇐⇒
Shi (N, v) > Shj (N, v) and bShi (N, v)c = bShj (N, v)c .
and for all (N, v) ∈ V (N)
SCSE (N, v) =
{
S ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣|S| = bv (N)c −∑
j∈N
bShj (N, v)c ,
∀i, j ∈ N s.t. i C jin v, we have i ∈ or j /∈ S
}
.
An integer solution ΨCSE satisfying Efficiency, First-Best Invariance, Dom-
inance, and Symmetry 2 is given by:
ΨRCSE (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨZCSE (N, v) =
{
z ∈ ZN ∣∣z = bSh (N, v)c+ 1S, S ∈ SCSE (N, v)} .
It does not fulfill Coalitional Strategic Equivalence:
Let N = {1, 2} and v, w ∈ V (N) given by
v = 0.5 · u{1,2} + 1.5 · u{1},
w = v + u{2}.
We then obtain
ΨRCSE (N, v) = (0.25, 1.75) and
ΨRCSE (N, v) = (1.25, 1.75) .
This implies i C j in w, but not in v. Hence, we obtain
ΨZCSE (N, v) = {(1, 1) , (2, 0)} ,
ΨZCSE (N,w) = {(2, 1)} .
ii) Dominance: Let
SDo (N, v) =
{
S ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣|S| = bv (N)c −∑
j∈N
bShj (N, v)c
}
.
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An integer solution satisfying Efficiency, First-Best Invariance, Symmetry
2, Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, but not Dominance is then given by:
ΨRDo (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨZDo (N, v) =
{
z ∈ ZN ∣∣z = bSh (N, v)c+ 1S, S ∈ SDo (N, v)} .
iii) Symmetry 2: Let
SSy (N, v) =
{
T ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣∣|T | = bv (N)c −∑
j∈N
bShj (N, v)c ,
∀i, j ∈ N s.t. Sy jin v, we have i ∈ T or j /∈ T
}
,
where for all i, j ∈ N :
i Sy j in v ⇐⇒
Shi (N, v)− bShi (N, v)c > Shj (N, v)− bShj (N, v)c
or
i = 1, ,j = 2, and
Sh1 (N, v)− bSh1 (N, v)c = Sh2 (N, v)− bSh2 (N, v)c .
An integer solution satisfying Efficiency, First-Best Invariance, Dominance,
Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, but not Symmetry 2 is then given by:
ΨRS (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨZS (N, v) =
{
z ∈ ZN |z = bS (N, v)c+ 1T , T ∈ SSy (N, v)
}
.
iv) First-Best Invariance: First, we define an integer solution on a subset of
TU-games and then using Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, we extend the
solution to the set of all TU-games.
For all S ⊆ N :
aS ∈ R, 0 ≤ aS < |S| , v :=
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
aS · uS,
let:
SFB (N, v) =
{
T ⊆ N
∣∣∣∣|T | = bv (N)c − |N |⌊
∑
∅6=S⊆N aS
|N |
⌋
,
∀i, j ∈ N : if i F j in v, we have i ∈ or j /∈ T
}
,
where for all i, j ∈ N :
i F j in v ⇐⇒
i dominates j in v.
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We then define
Ω (N, v) :=
{
z ∈ ZN
∣∣∣∣z = ⌊
∑
∅6=S⊆N aS
|N |
⌋
+ 1T , T ∈ SFB (N, v)
}
.
Now, for all λS ∈ R, S ⊆ N, we define an integer solution fulfilling Efficiency,
Symmetry 2, Dominance, and Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, but not
First-Best Invariance by
ΨRFB (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨZFB
N, ∑
∅6=S⊆N
λSuS
 = ∑
∅6=S⊆N
⌊
λS
|S|
⌋
· 1S +
Ω
N, ∑
∅6=S⊆N
(
λS − |S|
⌊
λS
|S|
⌋)
uS
 .
Concerning Dominance, if player i dominates player j within v, for all
S ⊆ N \ {i, j} we obtain λS∪{i} (v) ≥ λS∪{j} (v) and strictly larger for
atleast one coalition. Thus, a dominating player does not obtain a lower
payoff than the dominated player.
However ΨRFB (N, v) does not fulfill the First-Best Invariance axiom.
Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and the games
v =
2
5
u1 +
2
5
u2 +
1
5
u3,
w =
6
5
u3 − 3u{1,2,3} + 14
5
u{1,2}.
The Shapley payoffs are given by Sh (N, v) = Sh (N,w) =
(
2
5
, 2
5
, 1
5
)
. We
obtain
ΨZFB (N, v) = Ω (N, v) and
ΨZFB (N,w) = 1{3} − 1{1,2,3} + 1{1,2} +
Ω
(
N,w − u3 + 3u{1,2,3} − 2u{1,2}
)
.
Player 1 dominates player 3 in v, but this does not hold in w + 3u{1,2,3} −
2u{1,2} − u3, just consider
MC
w+3u{1,2,3}−2u{1,2}−u3
3 (∅) =
1
5
> 0 = MC
w+3u{1,2,3}−2u{1,2}−u3
1 (∅) .
Thus,
ΨZFB (N, v) = {(1, 0, 0) , (0, 1, 0)} , but
ΨZFB (N,w) = {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) , (0, 0, 1))}
and ΨZFB violates First-Best Invariance.
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v) Efficiency: An integer solution satisfying First-Best Invariance, Symmetry
2, Dominance, Coalitional Strategic Equivalence, but not Efficiency is given
by:
ΨRE (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨZE (N, v) = {bSh (N, v)c} .
Proof of Proposition 89. Consider the voting results
party 1 : 30000 votes,
party 2 : 30000 votes,
party 3 : 10000 votes.
The house size is either 10 or 11. The resulting equivalent games (remember
remark 63) are given by
v (1) = v (2) =
30
7
, v (3) =
10
7
, and v (S) =
∑
i∈S
v (i) ,
w (1) = w (2) =
33
7
, w (3) =
11
7
, and w (S) =
∑
i∈S
w (i) .
We obtain
ΨZHS (N, v) = Ham ({1, 2, 3} , 10, Sh (N, v))
= {(4, 4, 2)} ,
but
ΨZHS (N,w) = Ham ({1, 2, 3} , 11, Sh (N,w))
= {(5, 5, 1)} .
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8 Shapley meets Webster:
another distribution rule for indivisible goods
8.1 Introduction
This paper presents a distribution scheme for situations in which players must
share commonly produced but indivisible goods. This situation is modelled by
a coalition function and literature provides a wealth of distribution concepts for
divisible goods. The most common solution is the Shapley (1953). Using the
axiomatization of Young (1985), the Shapley payoffs only rely on the contributions
of a player to sets of the other players. This assumption must be changed slightly
to implement indivisible goods.
For this purpose, consider a simple example. In a game which consists of
three players A, B, and C, the players alone produce 1, 1, and 2 units of an
indivisible good, respectively. Nevertheless there exists a potential cooperation
benefit if all players cooperate. Instead of an aggregated production of 4, work
specialization allows for the production of 5 indivisible units. These are the only
cooperation benefits, thus A and B may produce 2 units, while A and C or B
and C produce three units. We accept the Shapley payoffs as the fair claims for
the apportionment procedure given by
(
4
3
, 4
3
, 7
3
)
. Clearly, this payoff vector is not
feasible in terms of indivisible goods.
The Hamilton-Shapley method, proposed in the previous paper, suggests the
payoff vector 1, 1, and 2 to the three players. The remaining worth of 1 is
distributed to any players, due to the same fractional remainders. Modifying
the Webster method40 of apportionment, we propose another solution to integer
games. Firstly we check if the ordinary rounded claims can be used to distribute
five units. However, this does not work in the example. Consequently, we scale
all claims of the players. This does not change the relative differences of the
claims of the players. The optimal scalar is the minimal or maximal number such
that one of the players scaled fractional remainder is 0.5. This is the scalar 15
14
and implies that the player C’s claims is 5
2
. Hence, she/he obtains the additional
payoff of 1. Thus, the Webster apportionment proposes only one Second-Best
payoff vector, namely (1, 1, 3) . The major advantage of the application of the
Webster method is that it inherits the (Population) Monotonicity property. That
is, if we increase the shared worth, the paradoxial decrease of a player’s payoff
cannot occur. Nevertheless, the literature shows that the Webster method in-
herits another paradox.41 It may occur that a player’s payoff is below her claim
rounded down or above her claim rounded up, i.e., the so called Quota axiom is
violated. However, the probability of such a situation is relatively small. Sec-
tion 8.2 presents some basics of the theory of games with transferable utility,
especially the Shapley value. Next, in section 8.3, we introduce apportionment
problems and the Webster method. Combining TU-games and apportionment
problems, we present integer games in section 8.4. In doing so, we provide ax-
ioms or properties for solutions of integer games. Finally, section 8.5 defines the
Webster-Shapley set and provides the main theorem of the paper. Section 8.6
40The original argumentation can be found in Webster and Everett (1903, p. 111-112).
41An overview on apportionment paradoxes can be found in Bradberry (1992).
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concludes the paper.
8.2 Basic Definitions
Let N be a finite set of players, w.l.o.g., we choose N = {1,..., n}. Subsets of N
are called coalitions and are usually denoted by S or T .
For any x ∈ R, by bxcwe denote the maximal integer which is not larger than
x. For a vector x ∈ RN , bxc = (bxic)i∈N . The fractional remainder of x ∈ R is
given by x− bxc. For any x ∈ R, by dxewe denote the minimal integer which is
not smaller than x. For integers x ∈ Z, we have bxc = dxe = x.
Let d : Z → R,be a strictly increasing function that also fulfills: a ≤ d (a) ≤
a+ 1. d implies a rounding method, denoted by [·]d, by
[z]d =
{ bzc if z < d (bzc)
bzc+ 1 if z > d (bzc)
and choosing [d (bzc)]d = bzc or [d (bzc)]d = bzc + 1. A game with transferable
utility (TU-game) is described by its player set N and a coalition function v : 2N
−→ R, where v(∅) is normalized to 0. The set of all TU-games V (N) is a
R−vector space. A game (N, v) is called monotonic iff for all T ⊆ S ⊆ N,
we have v (T ) ≤ v (S). Players i, j are called symmetric (in (N, v)) iff for all
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, we have v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}).
A player k is called a null player (in (N, v)), iff for all S ⊆ N \ {k}, we have
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S).
A player i dominates another player j (in (N, v)) , iff for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
we have v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) and for at least one coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j} ,
v(S ∪ {i}) > v(S ∪ {j}).
For a given TU-game (N, v) , a player i ∈ N and a subset S ⊆ N \ {i} , the
marginal contribution of i to S within v is given byMCvi (S) := v (S ∪ {i})−v (S).
For every set ∅ 6= S ⊆ N, we define the unanimity game uS ∈ V (N) by
uS (T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T,
0 if otherwise.
For a fixed player set N , the set of all unanimity games are a base of V (N).
Thus, there exists a unique linear combination for every game v,
v =
∑
S⊆N,S 6=∅
λS (v)uS.
These scalars λS (v) are called Harsanyi-dividends.
For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , we define the characteristic vector 1S ∈ RN
1Si =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 if i /∈ S.
A solution to the class of TU-games V(N) is a function: V(N)→ RN .
Definition 90 For every TU-game (N, v), the Shapley solution, introduced in
Shapley (1953), is defined for any i ∈ N by
Shi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
λS (v)
|S| .
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The Shapley value fulfills many nice properties. Three of these axioms are
later used for integer distribution.
Definition 91 (efficiency) A solution for TU-games ϕ fulfills the efficiency
principle 42 iff for any TU-game (N, v),∑
i∈N
ϕi (N, v) = v (N)
holds.
Definition 92 (marginality) A solution for TU-games ϕ fulfills the marginal-
ity principle43 iff for any two TU-games (N, v) and (N,w) and any agent i ∈ N
that for all S ⊆ N \ {i} , fulfill
v (S ∪ {i})− v (S) = w (S ∪ {i})− w (S) ,
ϕi (N, v) = ϕi (N,w)
Definition 93 (symmetry) A solution for TU-games ϕ fulfills the symmetry
principle44 iff for any TU-game (N, v) and any pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N ,
ϕi (N, v) = ϕj (N, v)
holds.
The Shapley value is uniquely characterized by these three properties as shown
in Young (1985).
Theorem 94 The Shapley value is the unique solution for TU-games that fulfills
efficiency, marginality, and symmetry.
In section 8.4, we adapt these axioms for integer distribution problems. While
the first and the third are easily translated into a framework of integer distri-
bution, a similar axiom to marginality may not work in the context of integer
distribution.
8.3 Apportionment and Webster’s method
A second important branch for integer distribution is the class of apportionment
problems. There, N also describes a finite set of players and, now, claims are
described by a nonnegative real vector (qi)i∈N , representing votes or bargaining
power.
The shared integer number of seats is given by s. We denote the set of all
apportionment problems
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
by A (N).
Usually, the claims of all players might not add up to s. Hence, we introduce
the effective claim of a player on s.
42While efficiency is a well-known concept in economic theory, a slightly modified version is
introduced in the paper of Shapley.
43This axiom is introduced in Young (1985).
44This axiom has also been introduced in Shapley’s paper.
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Definition 95 Let
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
be an apportionment problem. For all i ∈ N,
the effective quotas (qei )i∈N are given by
qei (s, q) :=
qi∑
j∈N qj
· s.
A solution for apportionment problems is not simply a mapping A (N)→ NN .
As players may be tied for a remaining payoff, it must be a correspondence.
Additionally, a solution must display five properties.
Definition 96 An apportionment solution is given as a correspondence
Φ : A (N)⇒ NN that fulfills at least these five properties
i) Efficiency: For all a ∈ Φ (N, s, (qi)i∈N) , we have ∑i∈N ai = s.
ii) Completeness: If there is a sequence
(
qji
)
i∈N such that for all i ∈ N :
limj→∞ q
j
i = q̂i and for all j : a ∈ Φ
(
N, s,
(
qji
)
i∈N
)
, we then have a ∈
Φ
(
N, s, (q̂i)i∈N
)
.
iii) Homogeneity: For all λ > 0 and all
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
) ∈ A (N), we have
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
= Φ
(
N, s, (λ · qi)i∈N
)
.
iv) Symmetry: Let σ be a bijection of N . For any apportionment problem(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
we then have
Φ
(
N, s,
(
qσ(i)
)
i∈N
)
= σ
(
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
))
.45
v) Proportionality: For all
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
such that for all i ∈ N, we have
qei (s, q) ∈ N,
then Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
= {qe (s, q)} must hold.
It is worth mentioning that these five properties do not characterize a unique
solution to apportionment problems. In fact, these properties are quite weak re-
quirements. Efficiency demands that s be distributed. Completeness is a technical
assumption. Basically, it demands that possible ties be split equally. Homogene-
ity says that if votes increase proportionally for all parties, the solution should
not change, as the relative voting results do not change. Symmetry ensures that
the names of the players do not matter, while Proportionality demands that the
effective quotas (based on the votes) should be the unique solution, whenever
they are integers.
A well-known solution for apportionment problem is the method of Webster
(also called Sainte-Lague¨ in Europe).
45Here, permutating a set means permutating every element.
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Definition 97 (Webster 1832) The Webster solution for an apportionment
problem
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
is given by
Wi
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
=
[
qei (s, q)
λ
]
, where λ is such that∑
i∈N
Wi
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
= s.
If there are ties, the solution set consists of all possible tie breaking distribu-
tions.
First, this formula by Webster is an apportionment solution.
Lemma 98 This Webster method is a solution for apportionment problems, i.e.,
it fulfills the five properties mentioned in Definition 96.
This famous solution fulfills many interesting properties, especially the fol-
lowing two ones.
Definition 99 (Near-Quota) An apportionment method Φ is said to be near
quota if for any a ∈ Φ (N, s, (qi)i∈N) there are no i, j ∈ N such that
qei (s, q)− (ai − 1) < ai − qei (s, q) and
aj + 1− qej (s, q) < qej (s, q)− aj.
By Near-Quota, it is not possible to move two agents closer to their effective
quotas by giving an extra seat to i at j’s expense.
Definition 100 (Monotonicity) An apportionment method Φ is said to be mo-
notone if for any claims (qi)i∈N ∈ RN++, (qi)i∈N ∈ RN++, for any
a ∈ Φ (N, s, (qi)i∈N), a ∈ Φ (N, s, (qi)i∈N) and for all i, j ∈ N with
qi
qj
≥ qi
qj
we have 
ai ≥ ai or aj ≤ aj,
or
qi/qj = qi/qj, and ai, aj can be substituted for ai, aj in a.
Monotonicity demands that whenever the claim of an agent i increases in
comparison to another agent j, agent i should not be hurt, while agent j should
be better off. The third case relates to possible ties between players. If “=”
holds, there may be a specific payoff that can be shifted between players i and j.
Additionally to the five properties from Definition 96, Balinski and Young
(2010) showed that Near-Quota and Monotonicity uniquely describe the Webster
method.
Theorem 101 The Webster method is the only apportionment method that sat-
isfies Monotonicity and Near-Quota.
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A second approach for defining the Webster solution was also known to Saint
Lague¨. The solution minimizes inequality (measured in the weighted per capita
representation) among all possible apportionment problems.
Lemma 102 The Webster method minimizes
∑
i∈N
qi
(
ai
qi
− s∑
j∈N qj
)2
among all apportionment solutions.
8.4 Cooperative games and integer solutions
We now combine the theory of apportionment problems and the theory of coop-
erative games. The combination is called integer distribution problems and it can
be modelled by the following class of solutions.
Definition 103 For a fixed player set N, the set of all monotonic games is de-
noted by M(N).
Note that we do not exclude real-valued worths v (N). A solution for this
class of problems is given by two mappings.
Definition 104 An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
for monotonic cooperative
games enlists of a function ΨR : M(N) → RN+ and a correspondence ΨN :
M(N)⇒ NN , where for all games (N, v) , ΨN (N, v) 6= ∅.
The first mapping is called the First-Best solution. It assumes the good to be
distributed is a divisible good and proposes a certain real vector as the solution
for the distribution problem. In reality this real vector may not be feasible.
Hence, for these applications, the Second-Best solution ΨN only allows integer
solutions. As we cannot rule out ties among the player we must use a solution
correspondence.
Inspired by several axioms from the previous chapters, we present axioms
integer solutions for cooperative games may or may not fulfill.
Axiom 105 (Efficiency) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Effi-
ciency axiom iff for any v ∈ V (N), we have ∑i∈N ΨRi (N, v) = v (N) and for any
ϑ ∈ ΨN (N, v) we have ∑i∈N ϑi = bv (N)c.
This is the most fundamental axiom. While the First-Best solution should
distribute the whole worth of the grand coalition, the Second-Best solution only
distributes the integer part of the worth of the grand coalition.
Axiom 106 (Completeness) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the
Completeness axiom if for any sequence of games vi ∈M(N) such that
• limi→∞ΨR (N, vi) = ΨR (N, v) ,
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• for all j ∈ N we have ΨRj (N, v) 6= 0,
• and for all i ∈ N, a ∈ ΨN (N, vi),
we have
a ∈ ΨN (N, v) .
This axiom is equivalent to the second property in definition 96. We demand
that if the First-Best payoffs changes, the Second-Best payoff should not change
drastically, i.e., we require some continuous property. As a side note, this does
not hold for players whose claim is zero, as they should not receive any payoff,
while there may be distribution methods that distribute positive payoffs to players
whose First-Best payoff is slightly higher than zero.
Axiom 107 (Homogeneity) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Ho-
mogeneity axiom if for any v, w ∈M(N) such that
• bv (N)c = bw (N)c and
• there exists a λ > 0 with ΨR (N, v) = λΨR (N,w) ,
we have
ΨN (N, v) = ΨN (N,w) .
Homogeneity is derived from the third property in definition 96. Whenever
the integer part of the worth of the grand coalition of two games is equal and the
First-Best payoffs are proportional, the Second-Best payoffs should coincide.
Axiom 108 (Symmetry 1) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Sym-
metry 1 axiom iff for any players i, j ∈ N , any v ∈ M(N) with ΨRi (N, v) =
ΨRj (N, v) , and for any ϑ ∈ ΨN (N, v) , we have |ϑi − ϑj| ≤ 1.
This axiom reflects a first aspect of treating equal players. It demands that
the Second-Best payoffs of players, whose First-Best payoffs are equal, should not
differ in more than one seat.
Axiom 109 (Symmetry 2) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Sym-
metry 2 axiom iff for any symmetric players i, j ∈ N in v ∈ M(N), we have
ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
j (N, v).
Additionally for any game w ∈ M(N) with ΨRi (N,w) = ΨRj (N,w) and any
ϑ ∈ ΨN (N,w), the vector ω given by
ωk =

ϑi if k = j,
ϑj if k = i,
ϑk otherwise
is an element of ΨN (N, v).
This axiom represents a combination of the axiom of TU-games and the fourth
property in definition 96. Symmetric players should have the same First-Best
payoffs, while for the Second-Best payoffs, the labeling of the players should play
no role.
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Axiom 110 (Proportionality) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the
Proportionality axiom if for any v ∈M(N) and any a ∈ ZN such that
• ∑i∈N ai = bv (N)c and
• there is a λ ∈ R with a = λ ·ΨR (N, v),
ΨN (N, v) = {a}
holds.
This axiom is equivalent to the fifth property in definition 96. In the case of
natural First-Best payoffs, these payoffs are feasible for the Second-Best solution.
Thus, this vector should be the unique Second-Best payoff.
Axiom 111 (Marginality) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Mar-
ginality axiom iff for any player i ∈ N and any two games v, w ∈ M(N) such
that for all S ⊆ N \ {i}
v (S ∪ {i})− v (S) = w (S ∪ {i})− w (S) ,
we have
ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
i (N,w) .
Used in the same way as in Theorem 94, this axiom demands that whenever
a player’s contributions are equal in two games, the player’s payoffs should be
the same. Hence, the axiom says the contributions within a game measure the
productivity.
Axiom 112 (Near-Quota) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Near-
Quota axiom iff for any v ∈ M(N), for any ϑ ∈ ΨN (N, v) there are no i, j ∈ N
such that
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRi (N, v)− (ϑi − 1) ≤ ϑi −
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRi (N, v) , and
ϑj + 1− bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRj (N, v) ≤
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRj (N, v)− ϑj,
where at least one inequality is strict.
Remark 113 The axiom of Near-Quota is equivalent to
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRi (N, v)− ϑi ≤ −
1
2
,
ϑj − bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRj (N, v) ≤ −
1
2
,
where at least one inequality is strict.
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This axiom is inspired by the axiom of apportionment problems. There, the
claims are directly given by the problem. From our point of view, in the setting of
integer games, the claims are determined by the First-Best payoffs. In addition
we modify the inequalities. We demand that there be no other payoffs that
move at least one player closer to his effective First-Best payoff. The axiom of
apportionment problems demands that both players be moved closer to their
scaled effective quotas. In a sense, our approach is more similar to the approach
of Pareto efficiency, as no player is hurt, while another player, in a sense, benefits.
Axiom 114 (Monotonicity) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Mo-
notonicity axiom if for any games v, w ∈ M(N) and any players i, j ∈ N , any
a ∈ ΨN (N, v), and b ∈ ΨN (N,w) with
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
≥ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
one of the following three conditions hold
• ai ≥ bi, or
• aj ≤ bj, or
•
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
=
ΨRi (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
and bi, bj can be substituted for ai, aj in a.
Again, for apportionment problems, the claims q matter, while for our ap-
plication, the First-Best payoffs are the relevant ones. If ΨRj (N, v) = 0, we let
a/0 =∞ and define a/0 > b/0 iff a > b.
Additionally, we introduce another Monotonicity axiom, which directly re-
flects that players with a higher claim should not receive a lesser Second-Best
payoff.
Axiom 115 (Weak Monotonicity) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills
Weak Monotonicity if for any game v, w ∈M(N) and any players i, j ∈ N such
that ΨRi (N, v) > Ψ
R
j (N, v), and any a ∈ ΨN (N, v), it holds that
ai ≥ aj.
This axiom builds from the performance principle. A player with a higher
First-Best payoff should not obtain less than a player with a lower First-Best
payoff.46
Axiom 116 (Dummy 2) An integer solution Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
fulfills the Dummy
2 axiom if for any game v ∈ M(N) and any player i ∈ N with ΨRi (N, v) = 0,
we have ai = 0 for all a ∈ ΨN (N, v).
This is a rather weak axiom. While apportionment problem do not treat
players with zero claims, in monotonic games players with zero payoffs may occur.
As the major applications of the framework do not demand soldarity,47 these
46This axiom is close to the Dominance axiom (axiom 71). However Weak Monotonicity does
not depend on the game itself, but on the emerging First-Best payoffs, thus also restricting the
Second-Best payoffs of players who do not dominate or are dominated.
47That is, a less productive player’s payoff is increased at the expense of other players.
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player should obtain a zero payoff.
Not all the introduced axioms are independent. There are some interesting
connections for subsets of them.
Proposition 117 Near-Quota implies Symmetry 1.
First, Near-Quota implies Symmetry 1, that is, any two players obtaining
the same payoffs via the First-Best solution, obtain nearly the same Second-Best
payoffs. The difference may be zero, but if Efficiency holds, the payoff may differ,
because the distributed worth is too small.
Proposition 118 Efficiency, Symmetry 2, Proportionality, and Monotonicity
imply the Weak Monotonicity axiom.
This is the reason we use the term “weak” Monotonicity. Together with three
fundamental properties, any solution fulfilling Monotonicity also fulfills the Weak
Monotonicity axiom.
Proposition 119 If for all v ∈ M(N) and all λ ∈ R, ΨR (N, λv) = λΨR (N, v)
holds,48 and the Second-Best solution fulfills Monotonicity and Efficiency, then
ΨN fulfills Homogeneity.
If the First-Best solution is homogenous and the Second-Best fulfills Mono-
tonicity and Efficiency, the Second-Best solution also fulfills the Homogeneity
axiom. That is, we can restrict our analysis on games with an integer worth of
the grand coalition.
Proposition 120 Efficiency and Near-Quota imply the Proportionality axiom.
If the Second-Best payoffs are efficient and as close as possible to the First-
Best payoffs, the scaled Shapley payoffs bv(N)c
v(N)
Sh (N, v) is the unique Second-Best
payoff.
8.5 Divisor methods and the Webster-Shapley solution
For defining a solution for integer games, we build on several definitions intro-
duced for apportionment problems.49 Within this chapter, all proofs can be found
in this paper’s appendix.
First, we present a special class of integer solutions, called Divisor methods.
Definition 121 (Divisor method) An apportionment method Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
is called a divisor method if there is some rounding method [·]d : R→ N such that
Φ
(
N, s, (qi)i∈N
)
=
{
a : ai =
[qi
λ
]
d
, where λ is such that
∑
i∈N
[qi
λ
]
d
= s
}
.
48That is, the First-Best solution is homogenous in the game v.
49Consider Balinski and Young (2010).
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Remark 122 By ai =
[
qi
λ
]
d
, we obtain
d (ai − 1) ≤ qi
λ
≤ d (ai) ⇐⇒ qi
d (ai)
≤ λ ≤ qi
d (ai − 1) ,
hence choosing the divisor method induced [·]d is equivalent to using the the min-
max-inequality:
min
ai>0
qi
d (ai − 1) ≥ maxai≥0
qi
d (ai)
.
The main reason for introducing divisor methods stems from its connection
to (population-) monotone apportionment methods.
Theorem 123 (Balinski and Young (2010, p. 117)) An apportionment
method is monotone if and only if it is a divisor method.
We try to replicate this equivalence between monotone apportionment meth-
ods and divisor method. In our approach, the role of the quotas are played by the
First-Best solutions. As we allow players with zero First-Best payoffs, we must
modify the definition of a new class of divisor method slightly.
Definition 124 (Integer Divisor method) An efficient integer solution for
monotonic cooperative games Ψ =
(
ΨR,ΨN
)
is called an integer divisor method if
there is some rounding method [·]d : R→ N such that for all v ∈M(N) we have
ΨN (N, v)
=
{
a ∈ NN :
∑
i∈N
ai = bv (N)c and ai =
{ [
ΨRi (N,v)
λ
]
d
if ΨRi (N, v) > 0,
0 if ΨRi (N, v) = 0
}
.
Similarly to remark 122, we obtain the following equivalent criterion.
Remark 125 If ΨN (N, v) is a divisor method [·]d, for all i ∈ N with ai > 0 we
obtain
ΨRi (N, v)
d (ai)
≤ λ ≤ Ψ
R
i (N, v)
d (ai − 1)
while for ai = 0 only the left inequality holds.
It’s not difficult to show that any integer divisor method fulfills Monotonicity.
Theorem 126 If ΨN is an integer divisor method, Ψ fulfills Monotonicity.
We now prove the opposite direction of the Theorem. Together with Efficiency,
Symmetry 2, Completeness, Proportionality, and Homogeneity, the only integer
solutions that fulfill Monotonicity are the divisor methods. For this proof, we
require some preparing minor theorems that are closely related to similar propo-
sitions and theorems found in Balinski and Young (2010).
Proposition 127 Let bv (N)c = s be fixed and ΨR be surjective. If Ψ fulfills
Efficiency, Dummy 2, and Monotonicity, for any a ∈ ZN with ∑i∈N ai = s, the
set
Q (a) =
{
q : ∃v ∈M(N)s.t. q = ΨR (N, v) and a ∈ ΨN (N, v)}
is convex.
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This proposition resembles Lemma 4.1. in Balinski and Young (2010, p.110).
It says that the First-Best payoffs for all games with a fixed Second-Best payoff
vector are a convex set. Using the lemma, we prove the equivalence of integer di-
visor methods and monotone integer solutions for a fixed grand coalition’s integer
worth if there are only two players.
Proposition 128 Let |N | = 2 and bv (N)c = s be fixed, let ΨR be surjective, and
let Ψ fulfill Completeness, Proportionality, Homogeneity, Dummy 2, Symmetry
2, and Monotonicity, then ΨN is an integer divisor method.
This proposition resembles Theorem 4.2 in
Balinski and Young (2010, p.108-109).
Definition 129 For any s ∈ N+, we define
amin (i, s) =
min
{
ai
∣∣∃v ∈M(N) with a ∈ ΨN (N, v) , bv (N)c = s,ΨRi (N, v) > 0}
amax (i, s) =
max
{
ai
∣∣∃v ∈M(N) with a ∈ ΨN (N, v) , bv (N)c = s,ΨRi (N, v) > 0} .
If s is the integer worth of the grand coalition, amin (i, s) and amax (i, s) describe
the minimal resp. maximal payoff player i can achieve. By Symmetry 2, amin (i, s)
and amax (i, s) do not depend on the player i ∈ N . In that case, we write amin (s)
and amax (s). Clearly, if additionally Proportionality holds, amin (i, s) ≤ 1 and
amax (i, s) ≥ s− n+ 1.
Definition 130 Let v ∈ M(N) and Ψ be an integer solution. Players i, j ∈ N
are said to be tied, if there are a, b ∈ ΨN (N, v) such that ai 6= bi and aj 6= bj. For
any v ∈M(N), the set of all tied players is denoted by T (v).
The next Definitions and Lemmas prove that if there are ties among the
players, the difference of payoffs is 1, each pair of players in T (v) is tied, and the
payoff of 1 may be switched between them.
Definition 131 Fix v ∈ M(N) and any a ∈ ΨN (N, v). Let i, j ∈ T (v), i 6= j
and write [i, j] if there is a a ∈ ΨN (N, v) such that ai < ai and aj > aj.
Thus, regarding a and a, [i, j] means a certain payoff is switched from i to j.
This relation divides T (v) in two groups as shown in the following Lemma.50
Lemma 132 Let Ψ fulfill Monotonicity and Efficiency. For a fixed v ∈ M(N)
and any a ∈ ΨN (N, v), if [i, j] and [k, l] then [i, l].
We now show that for any v ∈ M(N) and any a ∈ ΨN (N, v) the payoff that
can be switched between two players is 1.
Lemma 133 Let v ∈ M(N) and Ψ be an integer solution. If Ψ fulfills Mono-
tonicity and Proportionality, then for all a, b ∈ ΨN (N, v) and i ∈ T (v) , we have
|ai − bi| ≤ 1.
50The lemma resembles Lemma 4.3. in Balinski and Young (2010, p. 111).
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This Lemma, derived from Lemma 4.3. in Balinski and Young (2010, p. 112)
shows that if there is a tie between several players, a player may not gain more
than one additional payoff.
Another important puzzle piece for the main theorem of this chapter is the
existence of games such that one player obtains the minimal payoff and another
player obtains the maximal payoff.51
Lemma 134 Let |N | ≥ 3 and bv (N)c = s 6= 0 be fixed. Then, if ΨR is surjective
and Ψ fulfills Monotonicity, Symmetry 2, Proportionality, and Efficiency, there
exists a v ∈M(N) such that(
amin (s) , amax (s) , a3, ..., an
) ∈ ΨN (N, v) .
Now, we can show, that for at least four players, even if the first player
obtains the minimal payoff, the payoffs of two other player can be chosen (nearly)
arbitrarily.52
Lemma 135 Let n ≥ 4, bv (N)c = s 6= 0 be fixed and amax (s) ≥ a2 > 1 and
amax (s) > a3 ≥ 1. If ΨR is surjective and Ψ fulfills Monotonicity, Symmetry 2,
Proportionality, and Efficiency and there exists a game v ∈M(N) such that a ∈
ΨN (N, v), there exists a game v ∈ M(N) such that (amin (s) , a2, a3, b4, ..., bn) ∈
ΨN (N, v).
These games are especially important for the next Lemma. We showed that
games exist in which a player obtains the minimal payoff and two other players
obtain any reachable payoff. In fact, we can also show that a game exists in which
these players are tied with the exact same payoffs.53
Lemma 136 Let n ≥ 4, bv (N)c = s 6= 0 be fixed and amax (s) ≥ a2 > 1 and
amax (s) > a3 ≥ 1. If ΨR is surjective and Ψ fulfills Monotonicity, Symmetry 2,
Proportionality, and Efficiency and if there exists a game v ∈ M(N) such that
a ∈ ΨN (N, v) , there exists a game v′ ∈ M(N) such that players 1, 2, and 3 are
tied with payoffs amin (s) , a2 − 1, and a3 and an additional payoff of1.
Now, we are able to prove the equivalence of integer divisor methods and
monotonic methods, in a first step for a fixed integer worth of the grand coalition.
Remember that we already proved the statement for two players in Proposition
128.
Proposition 137 Assume Ψ fulfills Dummy 2, Efficiency, Proportionality,
Completeness, Homogeneity, and Symmetry 2 and ΨR is surjective. For fixed
bv (N)c = s, if Ψ fulfills Monotonicity, ΨN is an integer divisor method.
Definition 138 For fixed bv (N)c = s, ds : N→ R, is a specific divisor criterion
derived by
ds (a) =
ΨRj (N, v)
ΨRi (N, v)
if i and j are tied between amin (s) and a.
51This is similar to of Lemma 4.2 in Balinski and Young (2010, p. 111).
52This lemma is similar to the first part of Lemma 4.4. in Balinski and Young (2010, p. 113).
53This lemma is similar to the second part of Lemma 4.4. in Balinski and Young (2010, p.
113).
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Until now, we have shown that for any games the payoff structure is derived
by applying a divisor criterion. As we assumed that the integer part of the worth
of the grand coalition is fixed, the divisor criterion may differ between v (N) = 2
and v (N) = 3. Hence, we must show that by using the Monotonicity axiom
among all First-Best payoffs, the applied divisor criterion is the same over all
games.
Proposition 139 Assume Ψ fulfills Efficiency, Proportionality, Completeness,
Homogeneity, and Symmetry 2 and ΨR is surjective. For |N | = 2, if Ψ fulfills
Monotonicity, for any a+ b = s and 1 < a < s− 1
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) and
ds (a− 1)
ds (b)
do not depend on s.
Nevertheless, the theorem cannot cover a = 1 or a = 0, as until now, amin (s)
may depend on s, i.e. there may be s1 and s2 such that Q (s1, 0) 6= {(s1, 0)} ,
while Q (s2, 0) = {(s2, 0)}. Thus ds1 (0) 6= 0, but ds2 (0) = 0. The next Lemma
shows that this situation cannot occur.
Lemma 140 For all two-player games, if there exists an a ∈ N such that
Q (a, 0) 6= {(a, 0)}, then for all b ∈ N, we have Q (b, 0) 6= {(b, 0)}.
This Lemma says that as long as a player’s First-Best payoff is positive, the
minimal payoff a player can obtain does not depend on the shared worth or the
number of players.
Definition 141 For any surjective integer solution that additionally satisfies
Monotonicity, Efficiency, Proportionality, Completeness, Homogeneity, and Sym-
metry 2, we define the divisor criterion
d (a) = max
{
y1
y2
∣∣∣∣ (y1, y2) ∈ Q (a, amin + 1)} .
By Lemma 140 d (a) is well defined and we have a ≤ d (a) ≤ a+1. Even more
important, with this divisor criterion we can extend Theorem 139 to a = 1 and
a = s− 1. Thus, for two-player games, the divisor criterion does not depend on
the shared worth s. Additionally the criterion does not depend on the number of
players.
Proposition 142 Let a surjective integer solution Ψ fulfill Efficiency, Propor-
tionality, Completeness, Homogeneity, and Symmetry 2. For |N | ≥ 2, if Ψ fulfills
Monotonicity, the divisor criterion does not depend on the number of players.
This Proposition and Theorem 126 establish the equivalence between mono-
tonic methods and integer divisor methods.
Theorem 143 Let Ψ fulfill Dummy 2, Efficiency, Proportionality, Complete-
ness, Homogeneity, and Symmetry 2 and let ΨR be surjective. Then if Ψ fulfills
Monotonicity, ΨN is an integer divisor method.
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Additionally, by using Theorem 126 and agreeing on these six axioms, an
suitable integer solution is relatively small. The only remaining solutions are the
integer divisor methods.
To find a unique integer solution we must choose an additional axiom. For
this purpose, similarly to section 8.3, we apply the Near-Quota axiom that leads
to a Webster-like integer divisor method. For the proof of this statement, we
require one last technical Lemma.
Lemma 144 For any two different integer divisor methods [·]d1 and [·]d2 there is
a game v such that
ΨN (N, v)d1 = (a1 + 1, a2, 0, ..., 0) and
ΨN (N, v)d2 = (a1, a2 + 1, 0, ..., 0) .
Thus, for any two different integer divisor methods, there is a monotonic
game such that the Second-Best solution sets are singletons and unequal. This is
a necessary property for the following theorem.
Theorem 145 The unique integer divisor method that fulfills Near-Quota is
given by d1 (a) = a+
1
2
.
Of all the integer divisor methods, only the one that uses the ordinary round-
ing method also fulfills Near-Quota. This theorem is similar to Theorem 6.2. in
in Balinski and Young (2010, p. 132-133).
Proposition 146 (Young) For monotonic games v ∈M(N), the unique First-
Best-solution obeying Marginality, Symmetry 2, and Efficiency is the Shapley
value, i.e.,
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) .
Combining theorem 143, theorem 145, and the result of Young, we obtain the
main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 147 There is a unique integer solution fulfilling the axioms Dummy
2, Efficiency, Completeness, Marginality, Symmetry 2, Monotonicity, and Near-
Quota. For any v ∈M(N), this solution is given by
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨN (N, v) =
{
z ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∃λ ∈ R with zi =
[
Shi (N, v)
λ
]
a+ 1
2
,
∑
j∈N
zj = bv (N)c
}
.
This solution is called the Webster-Shapley method and WS (N, v) denotes its
Second-Best solution.
That is, if we demand that an integer solution should fulfill these seven axioms,
the integer part of the worth of the grand coalition must be distributed according
to the Webster-Shapley method, where first, the Shapley payoffs are calculated.
Second, any player with zero Shapley payoffs obtains a zero Second-Best payoff,
while the remaining players obtain Webster payoffs where the claims are given as
the Shapley payoffs.
The final Theorem shows that this is a minimal axiomatization, i.e. if we
discard one of the axioms, uniqueness no longer holds.
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Theorem 148 The axioms Efficiency, Completeness, Marginality, Symmetry 2,
Monotonicity, and Near-Quota are not redundant.
However, we did not manage to find whether Dummy 2 is redundant. A
combination of Monotonicity and Efficiency might do the trick.
Proposition 149 The Webster-Shapley method does not satisfy Coalitional Stra-
tegic Equivalence, Conformity, or Quota.
We would like to mention that the probability of violating Quota is relatively
low. That is the Webster-Shapley payoffs of practically any random game satisfy
Quota.
8.6 Conclusions
This paper presents a solution for integer games in which players commonly gen-
erate indivisible goods. We assume that players prefer distributing the produced
worth according to the Shapley value. If they are faced with indivisibility they
have to modify the distribution process. Regular results of the theory of games
with transferable utility cannot be applied. Due to its nice behavior regarding
Monotonicity paradoxes, we propose the application of the Webster solution while
the Shapley payoffs represent the claims. The Webster-Shapley solution for inte-
ger games denotes this distribution scheme. We present an axiomatization of this
solution by modifying axioms of apportionment problems and games with trans-
ferable utility and provide minor theorems that may also be applied to several
other divisor methods like the Adams solution (with d (a) = a) or the Jefferson
method.54 (d (a) = a+1) The former solution gives a drastic advantage to players
with large claims, while the latter one does so for players with smaller claims.
For applications within an institutional setting, where this might desirable, the
Jefferson(-Shapley) method may be an interesting alternative to the Webster-
Shapley solution. Nevertheless as the Webster method prefers neither larger nor
smaller claims, it is, from a general perspective, the first candidate for integer
distribution.
In contrast to the Hamilton-Shapley solution, it neither fulfills the Coalitional
Strategic Equivalence axiom, nor the Dummy 2 axiom. Nevertheless, for most
integer games, the condition of the Dummy 2 axiom is fulfilled.
8.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 98. By construction, the Webster method fulfills Efficiency,
Symmetry 2, and Homogeneity. If the effective quotas are natural numbers,
the scalar λ is 1 and they coincide with the payoffs of Webster method. Thus,
Proportionality holds.
For Completeness, let there be a sequence
(
qji
)
i∈N such that for all i ∈ N
lim
j→∞
qji = q̂i
54Consider Balinski and Young (1978).
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and for all j = 1, 2, ...
a ∈ W
(
N, s,
(
qji
)
i∈N
)
.
Applying the definition of the rounding method yields for all k ∈ N, j = 1, 2, ...
such that ak > 0
qjk
ak − 12
> λk >
qjk
ak +
1
2
, (8)
thus for all j = 1, 2, ...
min
ak>0
qjk
ak − 12
≥ max
al≥0
qjl
al +
1
2
.
Assume a /∈ W (N, s, (q̂i)i∈N). Thus there are k, l ∈ N such that
ak − 1
2
>
q̂k
λ
and al +
1
2
<
q̂l
λ
,
thus
q̂k
ak − 12
<
q̂l
ak +
1
2
.
By the min-max-inequality from above and by limj→∞ q
j
i = q̂i this cannot hold.
Thus, Completeness holds.
Proof of Proposition 117. By Near-Quota, for any ϑ ∈ ΨN (N, v) , we do not
have i, j ∈ N such that
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRi (N, v)− ϑi ≤ −
1
2
and
ϑj − bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨRj (N, v) ≤ −
1
2
and at least one of the inequalities is strict. Hence, for ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
j (N, v), by
adding the inequalities, there are no i, j ∈ N such that
ϑj − ϑi < −1.
Thus for all i, j ∈ N it holds that
ϑj − ϑi ≥ −1,
but similarly
ϑj − ϑi ≤ 1.
Hence, Symmetry 1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 118. Let i, j ∈ N and v ∈M(N) such that ΨRi (N, v) >
ΨRj (N, v). Let a ∈ ΨN (N, v) and fix ai ∈ N.
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First, we determine the payoffs for a two-player game w such that First-Best
payoffs are given by
ΨR1 (N,w) = Ψ
R
2 (N,w) =
2ai + 1
2
.
As
ai
ai + 1
<
2ai+1
2
2ai+1
2
<
ai + 1
ai
,
for any c ∈ ΨN (N,w), Monotonicity and Proportionality imply
c1 ≥ ai or c2 ≤ ai + 1, and
c1 ≤ ai + 1 or c2 ≥ ai.
Efficiency implies c1 + c2 = 2ai + 1, hence
ai ≤ c and c2 ≤ ai + 1.
By Symmetry 2,
ΨN (N,w) = {(ai + 1, ai) , (ai, ai + 1)} .
Now for the game v ∈M(N), we obtain
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
>
2ai+1
2
2ai+1
2
,
thus by Monotonicity
ai ≥ ai + 1 or aj ≤ ai.
Thus Weak Monotonicity holds.
Proof of Proposition 119. Let v, w ∈ M(N) such that w = λ · v and
bv (N)c = bw (N)c.
By assumption for any i, j ∈ N such that ΨRj (N, v) 6= 0 we obtain
ΨRi (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
=
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
.
Assume ΨN (N, v) * ΨN (N,w) and fix a ∈ ΨN (N, v) \ ΨN (N,w). We choose
b ∈ ΨN (N,w) such that a and b coincide with the maximal number of coordinates,
which is not n by the choice of a. Hence, a 6= b and Efficiency suggest there are
i, j ∈ n with ai < bi and aj > bj. Then, Monotonicity implies b given by
bj =

aj if k = i,
ai if k = j,
bj otherwise
lies in ΨN (N,w) , which is a contradiction to the choice of b. Hence ΨN (N, v) ⊆
ΨN (N,w) , but similarly we obtain ΨN (N, v) ⊇ ΨN (N,w) thus ΨN (N, v) =
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ΨN (N,w).
Proof of Proposition 120. Let a ∈ ZN be proportional to ΨR (N, v). Clearly,
by Efficiency, ΨN (N, v) = {a} implies ∑i∈N ai = bv (N)c.
Now let
∑
i∈N ai = bv (N)c.
• Assume v (N) = 0. Then v (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N . Thus, if there is a
b ∈ ΨN (N, v) , such that b 6= 0. We have at least one pair i, j ∈ N such
that bi ≤ −1 and bj ≥ 1, but Proposition 117 implies there is no such b.
• Now, assume v (N) 6= 0. By Efficiency, for any i ∈ N we have
ai =
bv (N)c
v (N)
·ΨRi (N, v) .
Assume there is a b ∈ ΨN (N, v) such that b 6= a. Then, there must be
i, j ∈ N such that
bi ≥ bv (N)c
v (N)
·ΨRi (N, v) + 1 and
bj ≤ bv (N)c
v (N)
·ΨRj (N, v)− 1
which contradicts Near-Quota.
Thus Proportionality is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 126. Let Ψ be an integer divisor method, i.e. there is
a rounding method d with ΨN (N, v) ={
z ∈ ZN
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c and zi =
{ [
ΨRi (N,v)
λ
]
d
, if ΨRi (N, v) > 0
0, if ΨRi (N, v) = 0
}
and let v, w ∈M(N) such that
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
≥ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
.
Assume a ∈ ΨN (N, v), b ∈ ΨN (N,w) , ai < bi, aj > bj, and ai, aj cannot be
substituted for bi, bj. By the definition of Ψ
N (N, v) we obtain
d (ai − 1) ≤ Ψ
R
i (N, v)
λv
≤ d (ai)
d (aj − 1) ≤
ΨRj (N, v)
λv
≤ d (aj)
d (bi − 1) ≤ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
λw
≤ d (bi)
d (bj − 1) ≤
ΨRj (N,w)
λw
≤ d (bj) .
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Now, ai < bi implies d (ai) ≤ d (bi − 1), while aj > bj implies d (aj − 1) ≥
d (bj). Hence,
ΨRi (N, v)
λv
≤ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
λw
ΨRj (N, v)
λv
≥ Ψ
R
j (N,w)
λw
Dividing the first inequality by the second inequality yields
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
≤ Ψ
R
i (N,w)
ΨRj (N,w)
,
where equality holds if and only if ai = bi − 1 and aj − 1 = bj, which means
ai, aj can be substituted for bi, bj.
Proof of Proposition 127. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and
Young (2010, p.110). Let Q (a) be not convex. Then, there are q, q′ ∈ Q (a) and
λ ∈ (0, 1) , such that q′′ = λq + (1− λ) q′ /∈ Q (a). Let v′′ ∈ M(N) be such that
ΨR (N, v′′) = q′′ and let b ∈ ΨN (N, v′′). We choose i, j ∈ N such that
ai < bi and
aj > bj.
Let v, v′ ∈ M(N) such that ΨR (N, v) = q and ΨR (N, v′) = q′. First, note that
q′′i 6= 0 and q′′j 6= 0. Otherwise, we have qi = q′i = 0 or qj = q′j = 0 and by the
Dummy 2 axiom, aj = bj or ai = bi. As aj > 0, the Dummy 2 axiom implies
qj, q
′
j > 0. The choice of a and b and Monotonicity imply
qi
qj
<
q′′i
q′′j
and
q′i
q′j
<
q′′i
q′′j
Thus,
q′′i = λqi + (1− λ) q′i
< λ
q′′i
q′′j
qj + (1− λ) q
′′
i
q′′j
q′j = q
′′
i
which proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 128. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and
Young (2010, p. 109). Assume Ψ fulfills Monotonicity and Homogeneity. By
Proposition 127, each Q (a) is an interval.
By Proportionality, a ∈ Q (a) and {a} = ΨN (N, v) if a = ΨR (N, v).
Additionally Completeness implies that a is in the interior of the intervalQ (a).
Otherwise, if a ∈ Q (a) is a boundary point, there is a sequence of monotonic
games vn such that ΨR (N, vn)→ a and a /∈ ΨN (N, vn) = {b}. By Completeness,
b ∈ ΨN (N, v) contradicting Proportionality.
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If a1 ≥ 1 and a2 ≥ 1 holds Q (a) are closed intervals. Q (0, s) and Q (s, 0) are
closed, by the Dummy 2 axiom. Finally, the intervals can only intersect on the
boundary points. Otherwise, Monotonicity is violated.
Then, using Q (a), a divisor criterion d (a) can be defined. For any Q (a1, a2)
where a1 + a2 = s, we define ds (a1) as the first coordinate of the right-hand
endpoint of Q (a1, a2) and ds (a2) as the second coordinate of the left-hand end-
point of Q (a1, a2) , which is well defined because of Symmetry 2. It is easy to see
that ds (a) is monotone increasing in a and a ≤ d (a) ≤ a + 1 and ds fulfills the
min-max inequalities of divisor methods.
Proof of Lemma 132. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p. 111-112). Let v ∈ M(N) and a ∈ ΨN (N, v) be fixed. Assume a
is a Second-Best payoff for [i, j] and b is a Second-Best payoff for [k, l]. We
assume i 6= k and j 6= l, otherwise the result is trivial. By Monotonicity ai, aj
can be substituted for ai and aj. By efficiency we obtain ai + aj = ai + aj.
Then, [k, l] implies that b = (a1, ..., ak − α, ..., al + α, ...) ∈ ΨN (N, v). [i, j] implies
ai < ai = bi and aj > aj = bj. By Monotonicity, ai,aj can be substituted into b.
Thus,
(a1, ai − β , ..., aj + β, ..., ak − α, ..., al + α, ...) ∈ ΨN (N, v)
and we obtain [i, l] and [k, j]. But by Monotonicity ai − β and al + α can be
substituted in a, thus α = β and the switched payoffs are the same.
Proof of Lemma 133. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p. 110). Using Lemma132 we show that α = 1. Assume the contraposition
α > 1 and consider two cases:
i) for all i ∈ N : ai ≥ 1 : Then assume [i, j] and consider
b =
(
a1, ..., ai − 1, ..., aj + 1, ..., a|N |
)
.
By Proportionality for all games v′ such that ΨR (N, v′) = b, we have
ΨN (N, v′) = {b}. Thus,
a ∈ ΨN (N, v) and(
a1, ..., ai − α, ..., aj + α, ..., a|N |
) ∈ ΨN (N, v) .
By Monotonicity, as ai − α < ai − 1 and aj + α > aj + 1
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
>
bi
bj
cannot hold. Similarly as ai > ai − 1 and aj < aj + 1
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
<
bi
bj
cannot hold. Hence we obtain
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
=
bi
bj
.
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Then, Monotonicity implies
(
a1, ..., ai − α, ..., aj + α, ..., a|N |
) ∈ ΨN (N, v′)
contradicting Proportionality.
ii) there is at least one i ∈ N such that ai = 0. Let
k = arg min
i∈N
{
ΨRi (N, v) |ai = 0
}
.
If k /∈ T (v), we increase ΨRk (N, v) and decrease ΨRi (N, v) , i 6= k until we
obtain the following First-Best payoffs
ΨRi (N, v
′) =
{
αλΨRi (N, v) if i = k,
λΨRi (N, v) if i 6= k,
where α > 1, λ is chosen such that∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N, v
′) = s
and a new tie with player k occurs. We obtain
(a1, ..., ai − α, ..., ak + α, ..., an) ∈ ΨN (N, v′) .
If for all j 6= i, k : aj ≥ 1, a contradiction is obtained by using(
a1, ..., ai − α, ..., ak + α, ..., a|N |
)
,(
a1, ..., ai − 1, ..., ak + 1, ..., a|N |
)
, and
a,
and showing that
(
a1, ..., ai − 1, ..., ak + 1, ..., a|N |
)
is also a Second-Best
payoff for games with First-Best payoff a, similarly to the argumentation in
i).
If for any j 6= k, we also have aj = 0, then clearly j ∈ T . Hence there are
a′, a′′ ∈ ΨN (N, v′) such that a′k = 0, a′j = α, a′′k = α, and a′′j = 0. But now, a
contradiction can be found be comparing the payoffs with the game w such
that (1, 1) ∈ ΨN (N,w) , and we obtain a contradiction as in the previous
two cases.
Proof of Lemma 134. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p.111) Let v, v′ ∈M(N) be such that(
amin (s) , a2, ..., an
) ∈ ΨN (N, v) and
(b1, a
max (s) , ..., bn) ∈ ΨN (N, v′) ,
where a2 < a
max (s) and amin (s) < b1. We choose α sufficiently large such that
for all i ∈ N \ {2}
α
ΨR2 (N, v)
ΨRi (N, v)
>
ΨR2 (N, v
′)
ΨRi (N, v
′)
.
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Let v′′ such that
ΨRi (N, v
′′) =
{
λΨRi (N, v) if i 6= 2,
αλΨRi (N, v) if i = 2,
where λ is chosen such that ∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N, v
′′) = s.
For all c ∈ ΨN (N, v′′) and for all j ∈ N \ {2} Monotonicity implies
c2 ≥ amax (s) or cj ≤ bj.
Because Efficiency holds c2 < a
max (s) does not occur. Thus, c2 = a
max (s). Now
for all i, j 6= 2
ΨRi (N, v
′′)
ΨRj (N, v
′′)
=
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
,
holds. Substitution is not possible by c2 > a2 and
∑
j∈N cj =
∑
j∈N aj. Hence
for all j 6= 2 Monotonicity implies
cj ≤ aj,
i.e., c1 = a
min (s).
Proof of Lemma 135. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p. 112-113). If amin (s) = 1, the game v given by
ΨR (N, v) = (1, a2, a3, b4, ..., bn)
fulfills the condition by Proportionality.
If amin (s) = 0, we modify the game v′ that yields the payoffs c ∈ ΨR (N, v),
ci = a2, and cj = a3.
If, now, ck = 0 for some k 6= i, j, by permuting c we obtain a game v such that
(0, a2, a3, ....) ∈ ΨN (N, v).
If ck ≥ 1 for all k 6= i, j, we must have s ≥ n. By Proportionality, for any games
w such that
ΨR (N,w) = (1, 1, 1, ..., bv (N)c − n+ 1) = c′
we obtain ΨN (N,w) = {c′}. As a2 > 1, within a′ = (1, a2, a3, a′4, a′5, ...) there
must be a j ≥ 4 such that a′j < amax (s). Then, consider a game w′ such that
ΨR (N,w′) = (1, a2, a3, a′4, a
′
5, ...). We decrease Ψ
R
1 (N,w
′) and increase all other
ΨRk (N,w
′) by
ΨRi (N,w
′′) =
{
λΨRi (N,w
′) if i = 1,
µλΨRi (N,w
′) if i /∈ T (v) ,
such that ∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N,w
′) =
∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N, v)
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and µ < 1 is the maximal scalar such that a new tie occurs. Note that by
amin (s) = 0 and by Lemma 134, such a tie must exist.
If player 1 is not tied with player 2 or player 3, this situation yields a Second-Best
payoff vector of form (0, a2, a3, b4, ..., bn).
If player 1 is tied with players 2 or 3, we obtain [1, l], l ≥ 4 by decreasing ΨR1 ,
ΨR2 , and Ψ
R
3 increasing the other First-Best payoffs with another common factor
such that the sum of all First-Best payoffs stays constant. According to Lemma
134, eventually a tie must occur and by Lemma 132 this leads to [1, l]. Thus any
associated game v ∈M(N) has a Second-Best payoff (0, a2, a3, ...) ∈ ΨN (N, v).
Proof of Lemma 136. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p. 112-113). Let v be the monotonic game from the previous Lemma 135
that fulfills (
amin (s) , a2, a3, b4, ..., bn
) ∈ ΨN (N, v) .
Starting with ΨR (N, v) , we choose ΨR (N, v′) by
ΨRi (N, v
′) =
{
λµΨRi (N, v) if i ∈ T (v) ,
λΨRi (N, v) if i /∈ T (v)
such that ∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N, v
′) =
∑
i∈N
ΨRi (N, v)
and µ < 1 is the maximal scalar such that for at least one l /∈ T (v), [2, l] holds in
ΨN (N, v′). We repeat this procedure until there is a game v′′ such that there is
a tie between all players whose Second-Best payoffs are lower than amax (s). As
amin (s) < amax (s) and a3 < a
max (s), especially players 1 and 3 are tied. Using
Lemma 132, player 1, player 2, and player 3 are tied. Thus, for the game v′′, we
obtain (
amin (s) , a1, a2, b4, ..., bn
)
,
(
amin (s) + 1, a1 − 1, a2, b4, ..., bn
)
,
and
(
amin (s) , a1 − 1, a2 + 1, b4, ..., bn
)
lie in ΨN (N, v′′) ,
which proves the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 137. This proof resembles the one in Balinski and Young
(2010, p.113-114). Let Ψ fulfill Monotonicity. By Lemma 136, for all 0 < a <
amax (s), there is a game v ∈ M(N) such that players with First-Best payoffs
ΨRi (N, v) and Ψ
R
j (N, v) are tied for Second-Best payoffs a
min (s) and a. We
define a divisor method ds : N→ R, by
ds (a) =
ΨRj (N, v)
ΨRi (N, )
if i and j are tied between amin (s) and a.
Later, we define ds
(
amin (s)
)
and ds (a
max (s)). First notice that d is well-defined.
If there are two different ties ΨRi (N, v) and Ψ
R
j (N, v) for a
min (s) and a and
ΨRi (N,w) and Ψ
R
j (N,w) for a
min (s) and a, by Monotonicity, we obtain
ΨRj (N, v)
ΨRi (N, v)
=
ΨRj (N,w)
ΨRi (N,w)
.
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Next, we show ds (a) < ds (a+ 1). Assume there are v, w ∈ M(N) such that
players with First-Best payoffs ΨRi (N, v) and Ψ
R
j (N, v) are tied for Second-Best
payoffs amin (s) and a and, in w, players with First-Best payoffs ΨRi (N,w) and
ΨRj (N,w) are tied for Second-Best payoffs a
min (s) and a+ 1. Assume
ΨRj (N, v)
ΨRi (N, v)
≥ Ψ
R
j (N,w)
ΨRi (N,w)
.
By assumption, there is a Second-Best vector c ∈ ΨN (N, v) such that
cj = a and ci = a
min (s) + 1
and a Second-Best vector e ∈ ΨN (N,w) such that
ej = a+ 2 and ei = a
min (s) .
Clearly
a  a+ 2 and
amin (s) + 1  amin (s) .
As substituting is not possible by Lemma 133,
ΨRj (N, v)
ΨRi (N, v)
<
ΨRj (N,w)
ΨRi (N,w)
,
holds, i.e. ds (a) < ds (a+ 1).
Finally, we show that ΨN is the associated integer divisor method to d. Let
z ∈ ΨN (N, v) and choose any i, j ∈ N, i 6= j such that amax (s) ≥ zi > 1 and
amax (s) > zj ≥ 1. By Lemma 136 there is a game v′ ∈ M(N) such that players
with First-Best payoffs
ΨRi (N, v
′) ,ΨRj (N, v
′) , and ΨRk (N, v
′)
are tied for Second-Best payoffs zi−1, zj, and amin (s). Thus Monotonicity implies
ΨRi (N, v
′)
ΨRj (N, v
′)
≤ Ψ
R
i (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
.
Besides, i and k resp. j and k are tied. This implies
ΨRi (N, v
′)
ΨRk (N, v
′)
= ds (zi − 1) ,
ΨRj (N, v
′)
ΨRk (N, v
′)
= ds (zj) .
Thus we obtain
ds (zi − 1)
ds (zj)
≤ Ψ
R
i (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
,
respectively
ΨRi (N, v)
ds (zi − 1) ≥
ΨRj (N, v)
ds (zj)
,
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i.e. the min-max inequality derived from d (corollary 122).
There still remain all z such that zi = 1 or zj = a
max (s).
By choosing ds (a
max (s)) =∞, the inequality also holds for zj = amax (s).
For zi = 1, if a
min (s) = 0, set ds (0) = 1 and the inequality is true for zi = 1
by the definition of d and Monotonicity. If amin (s) = 1, set ds (0) = 0 and the
inequality is true as well.
Hence if ΨN fulfills the six properties, its Second-Best vectors lie within
ΨN (N, v)
⊆
{
z ∈ NN
∣∣∣∣∣ mini∈N,zi>0 ΨRi (N, v)ds (zi − 1) ≥ maxj∈N,zj≥0 Ψ
R
j (N, v)
ds (zj)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c
}
.
We prove the equality of these two sets.
Let v ∈M(N) and let z fulfill the min-max inequality, i.e.
min
i∈N,zi>0
ΨRi (N, v)
ds (zi − 1) ≥ maxj∈N,zj≥0
ΨRj (N, v)
ds (zj)
.
Let
U =
{
i ∈ N ∣∣ΨRi (N, v) = 0}
be the set of all players whose First-Best payoffs are zero. We then find a sequence
of games vk ∈M (N \ U) that fulfills for all i ∈ N \ U
lim
k→∞
ΨRi
(
N \ U, vk) = ΨRi (N, v) ,
z
∣∣
N\U ∈ ΨN
(
N \ U, vk) ,
and
min
i∈N\U,zi>0
ΨRi
(
N \ U, vk)
ds (zi − 1) > maxj∈N\U,zj≥0
ΨRj
(
N \ U, vk)
ds (zj)
.
z is the unique Second-Best payoff, that fulfills the min-max inequality. As
ΨN
(
N \ U, vk) is nonempty, we obtain
ΨN
(
N \ U, vk) ⊆ {z}
=
{
y ∈ NN\U
∣∣∣∣∣∃λ : yi =
[
ΨRi
(
N \ U, vk)
λ
]
d
,
∑
i∈N
yi =
⌊
vk (N)
⌋}
,
thus ΨN
(
N \ U, vk) = {z}. By Completeness and Dummy 2, for all games
w ∈ M (N \ U) such that for all i ∈ N \ U , ΨRi (N \ U,w) = ΨRi (N, v) holds,
we obtain z
∣∣
N\U ∈ ΨN (N \ U,w).
Assume z /∈ ΨN (N, v) . Then we choose y ∈ ΨN (N, v) that differs from z in a
minimal number of coordinates. By Efficienciency there are j, k ∈ N \ U such
that yj > zj and yk < zk. By Monotonicity, yj and yk can be substituted into z.
This new vector lies within ΨN (N, v) and differs from z in less coordinates than
y, a contradiction. Thus z ∈ ΨN (N, v) which proves the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 139.
The divisor criterion derived by Proposition 128 is not unique. We define
another divisor criterion by
d (a) = max
{
y1
y2
∣∣(y1, y2) ∈ Q (a, 2)} .
Let bv (N)c = s.
• On the contrary, assume there are a,b ∈ N, 1 < a < s − 1, and a + b = s
such that
d (a)
d (b− 1) >
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) .
Consider a three-player game v with First-Best payoffs given by
ΨR1 (N, v) =
d (a)− ε
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b+ 1) ,
ΨR2 (N, v) =
d (b− 1) + ε
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b+ 1) ,
ΨR3 (N, v) =
1
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b+ 1) ,
where ε is sufficiently small and fulfills
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR2 (N, v)
=
d (a)− ε
d (b− 1) + ε >
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) .
We obtain
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR3 (N, v)
< d (a) and
ΨR2 (N, v)
ΨR3 (N, v)
> d (b− 1) .
For any c ∈ ΨN (N, v), Monotonicity leads to
c1 ≤ a or c3 ≥ 2,
c2 ≥ b or c3 ≤ 1, and
c1 ≥ a+ 1 or c2 ≤ b− 1.
These inequalities imply either
c1 + c2 + c3 ≥ a+ b+ 3
or
c1 + c2 + c3 ≤ a+ b,
i.e. ΨN (N, v) = ∅. Thus,
d (a)
d (b− 1) ≤
ds (a)
ds (b− 1)
must hold.
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• Similarly, assume there are a and b such that
d (a)
d (b− 1) <
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) .
Consider a three-player game v such that First-Best payoffs
ΨR1 (N, v) =
d (a) + ε
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b) ,
ΨR2 (N, v) =
d (b− 1)− ε
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b) , and
ΨR3 (N, v) =
1
d (a) + d (b− 1) + 1 · (a+ b) ,
where ε is sufficiently small such that
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR2 (N, v)
=
d (a) + ε
d (b− 1)− ε <
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) .
Monotonicity implies
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR3 (N, v)
> d (a) and
ΨR2 (N, v)
ΨR3 (N, v)
< d (b− 1) .
For any c ∈ ΨN (N, v), Monotonicity leads to
c1 ≥ a+ 1 or c3 ≤ 0,
c2 ≤ b− 1 or c3 ≥ 1, and
c1 ≤ a or c2 ≥ b.
Again these inequalities contradict efficiency.
That is
d (a)
d (b− 1) =
ds (a)
ds (b− 1) ,
i.e. the divisor criterion does not depend on the integer worth of the grand coali-
tion s.
Proof of Lemma 140. Let
Q (a, 0) = [(y1, y2) , (a, 0)] .
and assume b < a. Consider a monotonic game v ∈M(N) such that
ΨR1 (N, v) =
y1 + ε
a
· band
ΨR2 (N, v) =
y2 − ε
a
· b.
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By
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR2 (N, v)
>
y1
y2
,
for all c ∈ ΨN (N, v), we obtain
c1 ≥ a or c2 ≤ 0.
Using b < a, these inequalities imply c1 = b and c2 = 0, i.e. Q (b, 0) 6= {(b, 0)}.
Now assume b > a. We show Q (a+ 1, 0) 6= {(a+ 1, 0)}. Consider the three-
player game w such that
ΨR1 (N,w) =
d2a (a− 1)
d2a (a) + d2a (a− 1) + d2a (a− 1) y2y1
· 2a,
ΨR2 (N,w) =
d2a (a)
d2a (a) + d2a (a− 1) + d2a (a− 1) y2y1
· 2a, and
ΨR3 (N,w) =
d2a (a− 1) y2y1
d2a (a) + d2a (a− 1) + d2a (a− 1) y2y1
· 2a.
By the previous Theorem
d2a (a− 1)
d2a (a)
=
d (a− 1)
d (a)
.
Then, for any c ∈ ΨN (N,w), Monotonicity implies
c1 ≥ a or c2 ≤ a
or
c3 = 0 and (a, a, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w) ,
and
c1 ≤ a− 1 or c2 ≥ a+ 1
or
c3 = 0 and (a− 1, a+ 1, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w) .
Besides
ΨR1 (N,w)
ΨR3 (N,w)
=
y1
y2
,
thus Monotonicity implies
c1 ≥ a or c3 ≤ 0
or
c2 = a and (a, a, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w) ,
and
c1 ≤ a− 1 or c3 ≥ 1
or
c2 = a and (a− 1, a, 1) ∈ ΨN (N,w) .
Now consider the four cases:
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• c1 ≥ a+ 1. Then, the second set of inequalities implies c2 ≥ a+ 1 or c3 = 0.
The former cannot hold as c1 + c2 + c3 = 2a, while the latter implies that
the vector (a− 1, a+ 1, 0) is also a payoff of ΨN (N,w), which contradicts
Lemma 133. Thus, c1 ≤ a.
• c1 ≤ a − 2. If c3 > 0 we must have c2 = a and (a, a, 0) is also a payoff
ΨN (N,w), again contradicting Lemma 133. Thus c1 ≥ a− 1.
• c1 = a. The second set of inequalities implies c2 ≥ a+ 1 which contradicts
Efficiency, or c3 = 0, c2 = a, and (a− 1, a+ 1, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w). The fourth
set of inequalities implies c2 = a, c3 = 0, and (a− 1, a, 1) ∈ ΨN (N,w) or
c3 ≥ 1 and c2 ≤ a − 1, which contradicts the second set of inequalities.
Hence, (a, a, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w) implies
(a− 1, a+ 1, 0) , (a− 1, a, 1) ∈ ΨN (N,w) .
• Let c1 = a− 1. The third set of inequalities implies c3 = 0 and c2 = a + 1
or c2 = a, c3 = 1, and (a, a, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w). Consider c = (a− 1, a+ 1, 0).
The first set of inequalities demands that (a, a, 0) must also be a Second-
Best payoff of w. Both (a− 1, a+ 1, 0) and (a− 1, a, 1) demand that
(a, a, 0) ∈ ΨN (N,w) .
Summarizing, we obtain
ΨN (N,w) = {(a− 1, a+ 1, 0) , (a− 1, a, 1) , (a, a, 0)} .
Finally consider the two- player game w′ where
ΨR1 (N,w
′) =
d2a (a) + ε
d2a (a) +
d2a(a)
d(a)
· (a+ 1) and
ΨR2 (N,w
′) =
d2a(a)
d(a)
− ε
d2a (a) +
d2a(a)
d(a)
· (a+ 1) .
For any d ∈ ΨN (N,w′), by Monotonicity we obtain by comparing w′ and w
d1 ≥ a+ 1 or d2 ≤ 0,
thus ΨN (N,w′) = {(a+ 1, 0)} and Q (a+ 1, 0) 6= {(a+ 1, 0)}. The assumption
for any other b > a+ 1 follows by induction, thus proving the Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 142. First, we must show that the divisor criterion from
the previous theorem applies to all problems with at least three players, i.e.
a ∈ ΨN (N, v) iff for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, aj > 0 : Ψ
R
i (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
≤ d (ai)
d (aj − 1)
.
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Assume one of the inequalities does not hold, for example
ΨRi (N, v)
ΨRj (N, v)
>
d (ai)
d (aj − 1)
.
In this case, note d (aj − 1) > 0. Now, consider a two-player game w such that
First-Best payoffs
ΨRi (N,w) =
d (ai) + ε
d (ai) + d (aj − 1)
· (ai + aj)
ΨRj (N,w) =
d (aj − 1)− ε
d (ai) + d (aj − 1)
· (ai + aj) ,
where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
By the definition of the divisor criterion, ΨN (N,w) = {(ai + 1, aj − 1)}. By
Monotonicity, a ∈ ΨN (N, v) must fulfill ai ≥ ai + 1 or aj ≤ aj − 1, which is a
contradiction.
Now assume a fulfills the inequalities. If the inequalities are strictly fulfilled,
a is the unique vector fulfilling the inequalities, thus {a} = ΨN (N, v). If at least
one inequality is not strict, we can construct a sequence of games such that all
inequalities are strict, while the First-Best payoffs converge to ΨR (N, v). Note
that aj > 0 and the Dummy 2 axiom imply Ψ
R
j (N, v) > 0. This allows the ap-
plication of Completeness and we obtain {a} ∈ ΨN (N, v). Therefore the divisor
criterion also holds for games with at least three players.
Proof of Lemma 144. Note that d1 (a) = λ · d2 (a) for a λ > 0 cannot hold,
as otherwise both criteria represent the same divisor method. Thus choose a1,a2
such that
d1 (a1)
d1 (a2)
<
d2 (a1)
d2 (a2)
.
Consider the monotonic game v ∈M(N) given by
ΨR1 (N, v) =
d2 (a1)− ε
d2 (a2) + d2 (a1)
(a1 + a2 + 1) and
ΨR2 (N, v) =
d2 (a2) + ε
d2 (a2) + d2 (a1)
(a1 + a2 + 1)
where ε > 0 sufficiently small. Then by the choice of the First-Best payoffs:
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR2 (N, v)
>
d1 (a1)
d1 (a2)
and
ΨR1 (N, v)
ΨR2 (N, v)
<
d2 (a1)
d2 (a2)
,
hence v is a monotonic game that yields
ΨN (N, v)d2 = (b1, b2 + 1, 0, ...) and
ΨN (N, v)d1 = (b1 + 1, b2, 0, ...) .
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Proof of Proposition 145. Assume there is another integer divisor method
[·]d2 that fulfills Near-Quota. By Lemma 144, there is a game v ∈M(N) such that
the unique Second-Best solution for [·]d1 is the payoff vector (a1, a2 + 1, 0, ..., 0),
while [·]d2 yields the unique Second-Best solution (a1 + 1, a2, 0, ..., 0). By the
Min-max inequality, we then have
ΨR1 (N, v)
a1 +
1
2
<
ΨR2 (N, v)
a2 +
1
2
. (9)
We derive
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨR1 (N, v)
=
ΨR1 (N, v) (a1 + a2 + 1)
ΨR1 (N, v) + Ψ
R
2 (N, v)
=
ΨR1 (N, v)
(
a2 +
1
2
)
+ ΨR2 (N, v)
(
a1 +
1
2
)
ΨR1 (N, v) + Ψ
R
2 (N, v)
<
ΨR1 (N, v)
(
a1 +
1
2
)
+ ΨR2 (N, v)
(
a1 +
1
2
)
ΨR1 (N, v) + Ψ
R
2 (N, v)
, (ineq. 9)
< a1 +
1
2
= (a1 + 1)− 1
2
Otherwise we obtain
bv (N)c = bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨR1 (N, v) +
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨR2 (N, v) .
Hence for the second player
bv (N)c
v (N)
ΨR2 (N, v) > a2 +
1
2
holds, contradicting Near-Quota.
Proof of Theorem 146. We mimic the proof of Young (1985) 55 and show the
Theorem by induction. Let T (v) = {T |λT (v) 6= 0} be the set of all coalitions
with non-vanishing Harsanyi dividends.
Firstly, Efficiency and Symmetry 2 imply ΨR (N, 0) = 0, i.e. for |T (v)| = 0.
Secondly, assume the payoffs are uniquely determined for monotonic games with
|T (v)| ≤ k. Then, we show the payoffs are uniquely determined for monotonic
games with |T (v)| = k + 1.
For this purpose we show that for every i /∈ ∩T∈T (v) there exists a S ⊆ N \{i}such
that
v =
∑
K⊆N,K 6=S
λK (v) · uK
is monotonic. Now we must distinguish two cases:
55In contrast to Young who shows the theorem for all TU-games, we restrict the theorem to
monotonic games.
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a) There is a S ⊆ N \ {i} such that λS (v) < 0. For v =
∑
K⊆N,K 6=S λK (v)uK
we obtain
v (R) =
{
v (R) if S 6⊆ R,
v (R)− λS (v) if S ⊆ R.
Hence, if R1 ⊇ R2, we have
v (R1)− v (R2)
=

v (R1)− v (R2) if S 6⊆ R2,
v (R1)− v (R2)− λS (v) if S ⊆ R2 and S 6⊆ R1,
v (R1)− λS (v)− (v (R2)− λS (v)) if S ⊆ R1
≥ 0.
Thus, v is monotonic as well.
b) For all T ⊆ N we have λT (v) ≥ 0.
Then, we choose any S ⊆ N \ {i} such that λS (v) > 0 and define
v =
∑
K⊆N,K 6=S
λK (v)uK .
If R1 ⊇ R2, we have
v (R1)− v (R2) =
∑
K⊆R1
λK (v)−
∑
K⊆R2
λK (v)
=
∑
K⊆R1\R2
λK (v) ≥ 0.
Hence, v is monotonic as well. For any S ⊆ N \ {i}, we compare v and v
and deduce
v (S ∪ i)− v (S) =
∑
S⊆N,
i∈S
λS (v) =
∑
S⊆N,
i∈S
λS (v) = v (S ∪ i)− v (S) .
By applying Marginality we obtain
ΨRi (N, v) = Ψ
R
i (N, v) .
Finally, observe that all i ∈ ∩T∈T (v)are symmetric in v. By Efficiency and
Symmetry 2, we thus obtain (for i ∈ ∩T∈T (v))
ΨRi (N, v) =
v (N)−∑j /∈∩T∈T (v) ΨRj (N, v)∣∣∩T∈T (v)∣∣ .
Proof of Theorem148. We show that the Webster-Shapley solution is not the
unique solution to six of the seven axioms.
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• Near-Quota is not redundant. Consider the integer solution Ψ given by
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨN (N, v) =
{
z ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∃λ ∈ R : zi =
⌊
Shi (N, v)
λ
⌋
,
∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c
}
,
the Jefferson method applied to the Shapley payoffs.56
This is an integer divisor method as the divisor criterion is given by d (a) =
a + 1. Therefore the axioms Dummy 2, Completeness, Monotonicity are
fulfilled. Additionally as the First-Best payoffs are the Shapley payoffs,
Marginality, Symmetry 2 and Efficiency hold.
Nevertheless the axiom Near-Quota is not fulfilled. Consider the game v
given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
v = u{1}+u{2}+ 4u{3}+ 24u{4}+ 0.8u{1,4}+ 2.8u{2,4}+ 0.8u{3,4}+ 0.6u{1,2,3}.
The Shapley payoffs are given by (1.6, 2.6, 4.6, 26.2) and the Second-Best
payoffs are
ΨN (N, v) = {(1, 2, 4, 28)} .
Thus, transferring one seat from agent 4 to agent 1 moves both agents closer
to their Shapley-payoffs, contradicting Near-Quota.
• Monotonicity is not redundant. Consider the integer solution Ψ given by
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨN (N, v) = Ham (N,Sh (N, v) , bv (N)c) ,
where Ham (·) is the Hamilton apportionment method introduced in the
fourth paper, definition 64
As the First-Best solution is the Shapley value, the conditions for the First-
Best solution within Efficiency, Symmetry 2 and Marginality are fulfilled.
Clearly, the Hamilton value is an efficient solution concept. Besides, Com-
pleteness, Dummy 2, and Symmetry 2 hold.
Additionally, Near-Quota is fulfilled. Otherwise, there would be players
i, j ∈ N and a payoff vector a ∈ ΨN (N, v) such that
1
2
<
bv (N)c
v (N)
Shi (N, v)− ai and
1
2
< aj − bv (N)c
v (N)
Shj (N, v) .
Note
ai <
bv (N)c
v (N)
Shi (N, v) and
aj >
bv (N)c
v (N)
Shj (N, v) .
56Consider Balinski and Young (1978).
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Then by the definition of the Hamilton method, we obtain
ai =
⌊bv (N)c
v (N)
Shi (N, v)
⌋
and
aj =
⌊bv (N)c
v (N)
Shj (N, v)
⌋
+ 1,
which yields
bv (N)c
v (N)
Shi (N, v)−
⌊bv (N)c
v (N)
Shi (N, v)
⌋
>
1
2
, while
bv (N)c
v (N)
Shj (N, v)−
⌊bv (N)c
v (N)
Shj (N, v)
⌋
<
1
2
.
But this means agent j had a lower priority to obtain an additional seat, a
contradiction and Near-Quota holds.
However, the integer solution does not fulfill Monotonicity. Consider the
monotonic three-player game v given by
v =
30
7
u{1} +
30
7
u{2} +
10
7
u{3},
w =
33
7
u{1} +
33
7
u{2} +
11
7
u{3}.
The First-Best payoffs and the Second-Best payoffs are given by:
ΨR (N, v) =
(
30
7
,
30
7
,
10
7
)
,
ΨN (N, v) = {(4, 4, 2)} .
ΨR (N,w) =
(
33
7
,
33
7
,
11
7
)
,
ΨN (N,w) = {(5, 5, 1)} .
Clearly
33
7
11
7
≥
30
7
10
7
,
but 4 6≥ 5, 2 6≤ 1, and (4, 5, 2) /∈ ΨN (N,w), contradicting Monotonicity.
• Marginality is not redundant. Consider the integer solution Ψ given by57
ΨR (N, v) =
v (N)
|N |
and
ΨN (N, v) =
{
z ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c and ∃λ ∈ R with
zi =
{ [
v(N)
|N |·λ
]
a+ 1
2
if Shi (N, v) > 0,
0 if Shi (N, v) = 0
}
.
57The Second-Best solution is the integer equal division rule.
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As the Second-Best solution is a divisor method, Monotonicity, Dummy 2,
Completeness, Efficiency, and Symmetry 2 hold. For the First-Best solution
Efficiency and Symmetry 2 are easy to see.
Near-Quota is fulfilled, because the Second-Best solution is the Webster
method applied to certain claims.
Marginality is not fulfilled. Consider N = {1, 2} and the two-player-games
v and w given by
v (S) =

0 if S = ∅,
1 if S = {1} ,
0 if S = {2} ,
1 if S = {1, 2}
and
w (S) =

0 if S = ∅,
1 if S = {1} ,
1 if S = {2} ,
2 if S = {1, 2} .
Agent 1 has equal marginal contributions in v and w, but the First-Best
payoffs differ:
ΨR (N, v) =
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
, while
ΨR (N, v) = (1, 1) .
• Symmetry 2 is not redundant.
Consider a m ∈ R++ such that for at least one pair i, j ∈ N mi 66= mj, then
define an integer solution Ψ given by
ΨR (N, v) = Shm (N, v) and
ΨN (N, v) =
{
z ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∃λ ∈ R : zi =
[
Shmi (N, v)
λ
]
,
∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c
}
,
where
Shmi (N, v) =
∑
S:i∈S
mi∑
j∈Smj
λS (v)
is the weighted Shapley value according to Kalai and Samet (1987). For
the First-Best solution Efficiency holds as∑
i∈N
Shmi (N, v)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
S:i∈S
mi∑
j∈Smj
λS (v)
=
∑
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
mi∑
j∈Smj
λS (v)
=
∑
S⊆N
λS (v) = v (N) .
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As the Second-Best solution is an integer divisor method, Monotonicity,
Dummy 2, Completeness, and Efficiency hold. Applying the Webster so-
lution to the First-Best payoffs guarantees Near-Quota. Marginality is ful-
filled, as for two games v, w ∈M(N) such that for all S ⊆ N \ i: v (S ∪ i)−
v (S) = w (S ∪ i) − w (S), it is easy to see that λS∪i (v) = λS∪i (w). Hence
the weighted Shapley payoffs are the same, i.e. Shmi (N, v) = Sh
m
i (N,w).
However Symmetry 2 does not hold.
Let N = {1, 2} and v = u{1,2}, which yield the First-Best payoffs
ΨR (N, v) =
(
m1
m1 +m2
,
m2
m1 +m2
)
,
thus as m1 6= m2, ΨR1 (N, v) 6= ΨR2 (N, v), and Symmetry 2 does not hold.
• Efficiency is not redundant, consider the integer solution given by
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
and ΨN (N, v) consists of all vectors z that fulfill
zi =

Shi (N, v)− 1 or Shi (N, v) if Shi (N, v) ∈ N+,
0 if Shi (N, v) = 0,
bShi (N, v)c otherwise.
As the First-Best solution is the Shapley value Symmetry 2 and Marginality
are easy to see. Clearly, Dummy 2 and Completeness are fulfilled.
Monotonicity is fulfilled: Let there be v,w ∈M(N),i, j ∈ N , a ∈ ΨN (N, v),
and b ∈ ΨN (N,w) such that
Shi (N, v)
Shj (N, v)
≥ Shi (N,w)
Shj (N,w)
,
ai < bi, and
aj > bj.
By the latter two inequalities we can deduce
Shi (N, v) ≤ Shi (N,w) and
Shj (N, v) ≥ Shj (N,w) .
Thus, together with the assumption, we obtain
Shi (N, v)
Shj (N, v)
=
Shi (N,w)
Shj (N,w)
,
which can only occur, if
ai = Shi (N, v)− 1,
bi = Shi (N, v) ,
aj = Shj (N, v) , and
bj = Shj (N, v)− 1.
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Thus, repeating this argument yields that ai and aj can be substituted into
b. Thus, Monotonicity holds.
Near-Quota is fulfilled: As for all i ∈ N , v ∈M(N) we have bShi (N, v)c ≤
Shi (N, v), every player’s payoff is below his/her claim, hence transferring
one seat does not move both agents closer to their Shapley payoffs.
Clearly, Efficiency is not fulfilled.
• Completeness is not redundant. Consider the integer solution Ψ given by
ΨR (N, v) = Sh (N, v) and
ΨN (N, v) =
{
z
∣∣∣∣∣zi =
[
Shi (N, v)
λ
]
d
, s.t.
∑
i∈N
zi = bv (N)c
}
,
where the “divisor criterion” d (a) = a+ 1
2
is nearly identical to the criterion
of the Webster method, but ties are broken by distributing the remaining
payoffs to the players whose claims are minimal (the Webster method dis-
tributes the remaining payoffs to any combination of tied players).
By construction Efficiency, Symmetry 2, Marginality, and Dummy 2 are
fulfilled.
Near-Quota and Monotonicity are fulfilled, because any Second-Best payoff
according to this solution is a payoff of the Webster-Shapley solution as
well.
Completeness is not fulfilled. Consider |N | = 2 and the sequence of games
vk = 1.5u{1} +
(
2.5 + 1
k
)
u{2} with First-Best payoffs
ΨR
(
N, vk
)
=
(
1.5, 2.5 + 1
k
)
. Clearly,
ΨN
(
N, vk
)
= {(1, 3)} ,
as the player’s 2 First-Best payoff is above d (2) for λ sufficiently above
1. The games vk converge to v∗ = 1. 5u{1} + 2.5u{2} and the resulting
tie is solved by distributing the remaining payoff of 1 to the player with
the smaller First-Best payoff. As this is player 1 the resulting Second-Best
payoff is
ΨN (N, v∗) = {(2, 2)} ,
contradicting Completeness.
Proof of Proposition 149. The Webster-Shapley method does not fulfill
CSE. Let v be a monotonic two-player game such that the First-Best payoffs are
(2.6, 1.6) . One feasible scalar λ is given by λ = 1/0.95. Therefore the Webster-
Shapley payoffs are given by WS (N, v) = {(3, 1)} . If we add u{2} to the original
game, the Shapley payoff of player 2 increases by 1, thus
Sh
(
N, v + u{2}
)
= (2.6, 2.6) .
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Hence the players are tied and the Webster-Shapley payoffs are given by
WS (N, v) = {(3, 2) , (2, 3)}
, contradicting CSE.
Regarding Quota, consider a set of five players and a game v such that the
Shapley payoffs are given by
(26.1, 1.6, 2.6, 4.7) .
λ = 26.1/25.5 yields Webster-Shapley payoff of
(25.5, 1.56, 2.54, 4.59)
whose rounded vector is not efficient, thus λ has to be increased. But, then player
1 obtains a Second-Best payoff of less than 26 and Quota is violated.
Part IV
Summary
This dissertation uses methods of cooperative game theory to establish solutions
for different kinds of economic problems. We model the economy by a coalition
function that captures the possible worths of any subset of players. This is the
base assumption of games with transferable utility. Additionally, we analyze
situations in which a subset of players obtains a pre-specified payoff while the
productivity of these players can be used by any subset of remaining players.
These situations include distribution problems where particular civil services are
used by private agents. Other applications deal with selling a real-estate with the
help of a real-estate agent or fixing a contract by employing a lawyer. We offer
two different settings for these situations, a lower effort for exogenous players or
communication channels for the players.
The first one involves reduced or increased efforts for the exogenous players.
If the agents’ payoffs do not depend on the bargaining result, their motivation for
working hard may decrease. That is, the non-exogenous players benefit less from
using exogenous players and the distributed worth decreases. We propose several
properties for an appropriate solution to this distribution problem. As the payoffs
of the exogenous players are fixed by the exogenous payments axiom, we specify
the payoffs of the non-exogenous players. A modified efficiency criterion suggests
that the whole worth has to be distributed while respecting the effort losses of the
exogenous players. The axiom of symmetry demands that non-exogenous players
that are equally productive, and thus equally benefit of the exogenous players,
should obtain the same payoffs. Additivity proposes that a game can be solved
by solving two smaller problems where the wages of the two games add up to the
original wages and the worths of each coalition add up similarly. Finally, even if a
player does not profit of the exogenous players, the null-player property demands
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that this player pays for the provided services. This is in line with the German
GEZ fees, i.e. any household has to pay for public broadcasting networks. We
show that these five properties uniquely determine a solution (called the Pay-and-
use value) that is equal to the Shapley payoffs of a particular game consisting of
the non-exogenous players. As usual for an axiomatic result, we show that this
is a minimal axiomatization. One minor critical point of this result is the use of
additivity. Similarly to the additivity concept used in the paper of Shapley, it
functions primarily as a technical tool to connect the payoffs of different games.
Thus, one may try find a more intuitive replacement of the additivity property.
The second paper directly continues the research on effort losses. After know-
ing the Pay-and-use payoffs for each fixed set of exogenous players, we endogenize
the set of exogenous players. Additionally, we assume reservation payoffs as in the
traditional bargaining literature. Then, from the view of a benevolent dictator,
we can compare different sets of exogenous players by means of the Kaneko-Nash
bargaining solution. Within this setting several wage vectors may not be feasible
due to low payoffs for a minority of players. In the context of civil services we
find it hard to believe that this minority (or even a single agent) blocks higher
payoffs the remaining players. Therefore we introduce an alternate stability con-
cept that models the rent-seeking of majorities. In our model a majority of
players uniquely benefits from the establishment of the exogenous players, while
the remaining players are not allowed to veto the distribution and instead ob-
tain a payoff according to their reservation payoffs. We present several results
for the simple class of unanimity games and determine all democratically stable
sets of exogenous players. Of course, this stability strongly depends on both the
Pay-and-use value and the stability concept. Another mentionable bargaining
solution is the one proposed in Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975). This solution
replaces the often criticized axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives with
a monotonicity axiom. As for the Nash bargaining solution, several extensions
for nonconvex bargaining sets are known, including Anant, Mukherji and Basu
(1990) and Conley and Wilkie (1996). Unfortunately, all these extensions assume
that if the bargaining set is not convex, it should at least be connected. However,
this does not hold for our bargaining set with effort losses. Thus, the Kaneko-
Nash is preferred as this method only demands compact bargaining sets. Clearly,
this holds for our problems.
The third paper focusses on another aspect of exogenous payments. Especially
for the real-estate example, the mediator does not increase the worth of the
bargaining players. Instead, she primarily enables the bargaining process by
connecting sellers and buyers. Thus, we enrich games with exogenous players
with an undirected graph. This extension models the fact that cooperation only
occurs if players are at least indirectly linked. Again, we provide solutions that,
after paying the exogenous players, distributes the remaining worth to the non-
exogenous players. We offer two different solutions depending on the importance
of outside options. Players may increase their payoffs by pointing to links that
could be established, e.g., buyers could point to sellers outside the bargaining
process. For these situations the XP-graph-χ value is presented and axiomatized.
For situations in which outside options do not play a role, i.e., because transaction
costs reduce the potential profit of outside options, we present the XP-Myerson
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value. If outside options do not exist58 both solutions coincide.
The fourth and the fifth paper analyze another problem of distribution within
a discrete environment. Some goods that must be distributed may not be ar-
bitrarily divisible. Thus we propose two solutions to games with transferable
utility that provide integer payoff vectors. Our approach builds from the inte-
ger approximation of the Shapley value. For the first solution in the fifth paper
we propose a purely performance based solution. That is, the axiom Coalitional
strategic equivalence (CSE) demands that an increase in the cooperation bene-
fits of a coalition leads to an increase in the payoff of all involved players. The
other players’ payoffs do not change. By using CSE and several other axioms
we define the Hamilton-Shapley solution that approximates the Shapley value by
choosing the closest integer vector with respect to the Shapley payoffs that is also
efficient in a certain sense. The solution resembles the Hamilton method. If the
worth of the grand coalition is an integer, both methods obtain the same payoff
vector(s). As the Hamilton-Shapley solution stays within Quota for all integer
games, research on apportionment problems shows that the Alabama Paradox
and the Population Paradox occur. The first one says that if the worth of the
grand coalition and the players’ Shapley payoffs increase, a player’s Hamilton-
Shapley payoff may decrease. The second one describes the situation in which
even though the relative difference of the Shapley payoffs of two players (i and j)
increases from game v to w, player i’s Hamilton-Shapley payoff may be less in w
than in v while player j’s Hamilton-Shapley payoff may be higher in w than in v.
While the first one is primarily important for congressional apportionment, the
second one is important for all integer distribution problems. If a player becomes
more powerful compared to another player, the solution vectors should honor this
situation.
Consequently, we propose solutions that avoid these two paradoxes. All these
solutions59 can be constructed by using particular rounding methods. The Shap-
ley payoffs are modified such that the distributed worth matches the integer part
of the worth of the grand coalition. Of all of these rounding methods, the usual
rounding yields the Webster-Shapley solution. It has a special property: It does
not stay within the quota, but at least it is as close as possible to the effective
Shapley payoffs. Thus, among all solutions avoiding the two paradoxes, it has the
best properties. Nevertheless, for specific problems, there may be better suited
solutions that use other rounding methods. If we want to encourage the forma-
tion of coalitions, we should apply a combination of the Jefferson method and
the Shapley solution.
58I.e., the graph is connected.
59All solutions that fulfill particular six properties.
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Referat:
Diese Dissertation pra¨sentiert Modelle zur Lo¨sung von Verhandlungsproblemen
mit diskreten Strukturen. Hauptgrundlage der Betrachtung ist dabei die Er-
weiterung und Anwendung von Theorien der kooperativen Spieltheorie. Insbeson-
dere der Shapley-Wert spielt eine wichtige Rolle.
Fu¨r alle Modelle wird der axiomatische Ansatz gewa¨hlt. Entsprechend werden
Eigenschaften/ Axiome pra¨sentiert, die Lo¨sungen erfu¨llen sollten. Hauptaussage
des axiomatischen Ansatzes ist dann, dass pra¨sentierte Lo¨sungen eindeutig durch
eine Auswahl an Eigenschaften bestimmt sind.
Der erste Abschnitt der Arbeit umfasst Verteilungsprobleme fu¨r Situationen, in
denen eine vorgegebene Teilmenge der Spieler zwar am o¨konomischen Geschehen
beteiligt ist, aber feste Auszahlungen erhalten. Diese Spieler werden als exo-
gene Spieler bezeichnet. Da deren Auszahlungen nicht vom Verhandlungsergeb-
nis abha¨ngen, kann angenommen werden, dass deren Einsatz bzw. Motivation
im Vergleich zu den anderen Spielern reduziert ist. Zur Lo¨sung des entsprechen-
den Verteilungsproblems wird der Pay-and-Use value vorgestellt, der die Ver-
handlungssumme abzu¨glich der Geha¨lter der exogenen Spieler leistungsgerecht
aufteilt. Im Folgenden wird ein alternatives Stabilita¨tskonzept vorgestellt, das
die Bestimmung optimaler Institutionen ermo¨glicht.
Ein zweites Modell untersucht die Wirkung von sozialen Verbindungen auf die
Auszahlung der nichtexogenen Spieler. Diese ko¨nnen unter Umsta¨nden eine
wichtigere Rolle als die eigentlichen Kooperationsgewinne spielen. Es werden
zwei Verteilungsregeln eingefu¨hrt und axiomatisiert. Wa¨hrend die erste Regel
ausschließlich existente Verbindungen in die Verteilungsregel einbezieht, beru¨ck-
sichtigt die zweite Regel auch sogenannte Außenoptionen.
Im zweiten Abschnitt der Dissertation werden Lo¨sungen fu¨r kooperative Spiele
vorgestellt, die auch auf nichtbeliebig teilbare Gu¨ter anwendbar sind. Anwen-
dungsmo¨glichkeiten ergeben sich demnach fu¨r Sitzverteilungen in Gremien, aber
auch fu¨r die Verteilung von Lotteriepreisen unter Tippgemeinschaften. Es werden
zwei Lo¨sungen vorgestellt, die Hamilton-Shapley Lo¨sung und die Webster-Shapley
Lo¨sung genannt werden, deren hauptsa¨chlicher Unterschied in ihrem Monotoniev-
erhalten besteht.
141
